

How Aristotle's Theory of Education Has Been Studied in Our Century^{*}

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The history of ancient Greek education starts with Homer. His epics repeatedly praise the “virtue (ἀρετή)” of the chivalric mind: thus, education in antiquity originates as the education of the chivalric mind. This is the first step with which scholars of pedagogy and history start to describe ancient Greek education. In the Spartan milieu, this education takes on a military colouration: Spartan education aims at developing virtue in soldiers. The era of “old Athenian education (ἡ ἀρχαία παιδεία)” follows it.¹ This education shifts away from military virtue to virtues in the field of sport and music: it comes to stress the importance of “being a man both beautiful and good (καλοκἀγαθία)”.² With the appearance of the Sophists, this education shifts its emphasis to the education of virtue in the fields of neither sport nor music, but to the education of virtue in the field of politics. In the course of this history, many intellectuals, such as philosophers and Sophists, expand on the controversy regarding the nature of virtue and the process of education. Their struggles bear fruit in the era of Hellenism, and the tradition is inherited in the Roman Empire. Thus, the history of ancient Greek education may well be said to be the history of the transition of the concept of virtue, *i.e.*, the history of the transition

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¹ I quote this expression from Marrou (1956, 36), who follows Aristophanes (*Nubes* 961).

² This translation comes from Marrou (1956, 43). See also *EE* VIII₃, 1248b8ff. and *MM* II₉, sec. 2f., where Aristotle discusses this concept. The abbreviations employed in this essay are based on Liddell, Scott, and Jones (1996).

of the ideal of man.³

In the thousand years of the history of ancient Greek education, Plato and Isocrates are especially worthy of note because, as Henri-Irénée Marrou puts it, education before Plato and Isocrates “had long been arrested at the archaic stage of its development, and uncertain of its future. It now achieved that final Form which remained intact through all later developments and was the hallmark of its originality to historians”.⁴ One who is familiar with antiquity may note that they differ in many ways. For example, Plato emphasizes the role of philosophy as the strict science of education, while Isocrates emphasizes the role of rhetoric as the probable science; the former founded an institution named the *Academeia*, while the latter uses his own house as his school; the *Academeia* lasts for approximately a thousand years, while Isocrates’ school ceases on his death, and so on.⁵ Although these differences may be significant when we consider the features of each school, we should recall that they both belong to the first generation that clearly expresses the aim and method of education and that both also have had a tremendous influence on later ages. It is needless, on the one hand, to comment on the vast importance and range of Plato’s philosophy. On the other hand, the importance of Isocrates must be respected in the history of education, even when we compare the former with the latter.⁶ Historically speaking, each of them respectively has become the model for a tradition in Western education, that is, mathematical-

³ I am indebted to Jaeger (1939–1945), Marrou (1956), and Simmons (1977) for the description in this paragraph.

⁴ Marrou (1956, 61). Although Socrates should also be mentioned as the member who investigates the nature of virtue and education, here Plato is taken to represent Socrates. In addition, please note this: although the pre-Socratic philosophers are usually remembered for their attempt to understand the physical world, many of them were also concerned with moral matters (see McKirahan 1994, 353ff.).

⁵ There are various differences between Plato’s *κῆπος* and his *Academeia* that I cannot discuss here. On this matter, see Dillon (2003, esp. 5ff.).

⁶ “It is to Isocrates more than to any other person that the honour and responsibility belong of having inspired in our Western traditional education a predominantly literary tone. [...] Herein lies Isocrates’ real greatness: his historical importance is such that there is no point in arguing about his weaknesses and limitations. But it must be repeated that there can be no question of attempting to make him Plato’s spiritual equal” (Marrou 1956, 79–80).

philosophical education and rhetorical-literary education.⁷ This is the reason why both of them are worthy of note.

In spite of their importance in this regard, however, it is thought to be in the era of Hellenism that ancient Greek education fully developed and flourished: “[i]t was only in the generation following Aristotle and Alexander the Great that education assumed its classical and definitive form”;⁸ “[s]o expressive is this word that if I were asked to describe the distinctive character of Hellenistic civilization, I should define it as the civilization of *παιδεία*—coming between the civilization of the ancient city—the *πόλις*—and the civilization of the City of God—the *Θεόπολις*, i.e. the Christian civilization that covers the late Roman Empire from Constantine’s time onwards and the Western and Byzantine Middle Ages”.⁹ It is in the course of the history of education that Plato and Isocrates are said to have been influential on the Western tradition of education that develops from the education in Hellenism. However, this survey also shows that Aristotle does not appear in this historical outline of ancient Greek education, as if his theory of education had no significance. This appears strange when we recall two facts: (1) Aristotle as well as Plato and Isocrates lived in classical Athens; that is, all three lived in the same age that Hellenism follows; and (2) the influence of Aristotle’s thought on later generations is no less than that of Plato and Isocrates. Although it might be objected that I provide merely an outline of ancient Greek education, I will demonstrate in the following section that Aristotle would still stand in the shadows even when I were to describe it in more detail.

Why, then, has Aristotle’s theory of education not appeared in this history? In this essay, I consider how Aristotle’s theory of education has (or has not) been studied in our century, and why this is the case. As far as I am aware, this problem has not been tackled so far. To accomplish this end, I take the following steps: first, I will present a brief history of how Aristotle’s theory of education has (or has not) been studied by scholars of pedagogy, history, and philosophy in our century; namely, those from the late 19th century to the present. Second, I will examine its

⁷ Jaeger also states “[p]hilosophy and rhetoric, from which the two main forms of humanism in later ages were to derive” (Jaeger 1939–1945, Vol. II, xi). See also Hirokawa (2005, 18).

⁸ Marrou (1956, 95).

⁹ Marrou (1956, 100).

background. Finally, I will consider what makes it possible to study his theory of education in the 21st century. This endeavour will shed light on the problem of why it is challenging to investigate Aristotle's theory of education and the way in which this might be achieved.¹⁰

1. A Brief History of Studies on Aristotle's Theory of Education

In this section, by exploring the previous research on Aristotle's theory of education, I will show how and why scholars treat his theory of education as they do though I will examine the reasons more devotedly in the next section. It should be noted that I focus mainly on recent scholars and their works; that is, the period considered is predominantly the 20th century, with some references to the 19th and 21st centuries, the works in our century.¹¹ In the following sections, I will divide our period into three parts: scholars and their works from the late 19th century to the 1940s (§ 1.1), those from the 1950s to the 1970s (§ 1.2), and those since the 1980s (§ 1.3).

1.1. From the Late 19th Century to the 1940s——Neglect

Having surveyed the works on ancient Greek education written by prewar scholars, we note a marked tendency to neglect Aristotle's theory of education.¹²

¹⁰ See Appendix, where I give brief comments for avoiding ambiguity regarding the use of the English word "education" in this essay.

¹¹ Although I am unable to discuss here earlier scholars, such as ancient commentators and those from the middle ages, the reason why I concentrate on this period is that it is in the late 19th century that the modern pedagogy as a science started (mainly in German).

¹² It is true, of course, that some prewar scholars refer to Aristotle's theory of education. Although Marrou (1956, 353–354) provides a critical survey of the works since the second half of the 19th century, however, he does not rate them highly in general. Here, I would like to refer to some works that Marrou does not mention but that refer to Aristotle in a sense. For example, Mahaffy (1882) and Ulrich (1947) devote a chapter to Aristotle in their works. Newman provides a brief comment on Aristotle's theory of education in his commentary on Aristotle's *Politics* (see Newman 1887–1902, Vol. III, xl–xlvi). Burnet (1903) extracts some related chapters from Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Politics*. Furthermore, others concentrate on his theory of education. For example, Thomas Davidson's *Aristotle and ancient Greek Ideals* (1892) devotes many chapters to his theory of education. Kiyoshi Miki—a Japanese prewar philosopher who studied with H. G. Gadamer under the supervision of M. Heidegger—wrote *Aristotle* (1938) that describes Aristotle's theory of education from three perspectives, namely, its aim, method, and pillar. (However, since he

This tendency is clear when we compare the prewar works with the postwar ones. Despite the fact that Aristotle, as the so-called Father of Science, is no less important than Plato or Isocrates in terms of his influence on later ages, why do they virtually ignore his theory of education? To address this problem, I would like to focus on two distinguished, highly influential prewar scholars of ancient Greek culture and education: Werner Jaeger and Henri-Irénée Marrou.¹³

First, let us examine how Jaeger treats Aristotle's theory of education. Werner Jaeger is a classist, who wrote a great three-volume book entitled *Paideia: Die Formung des Griechischen Menschen* (1933–1947). He starts this book with the following proclamation: "I PRESENT to the public a work of historical research dealing with a subject hitherto unexplored. It treats *paideia*, the shaping of the Greek character, as a basis for a new study of Hellenism as a whole".¹⁴ In this

does not include a bibliography, I am unable to ascertain which documents he used.) In spite of these works, however, it is clear that none of them are as influential as the works of Jaeger and Marrou regarding the study of ancient Greek education.

In addition, I would add a note even to a work to which Marrou refers. That is a famous treatise entitled the *Schools of Hellas* written by Kenneth J. Freeman (1907), about which Marrou comments, "this book largely derives from Grasberger and Girard" (Marrou 1956, 354). This book certainly does not include any impressive discussion of Aristotle's theory of education, although Freeman refers to his comments in many contexts. This does not mean, however, that he ignored Aristotle's theory of education, and for the sake of his honour, it should be noted that Freeman died relatively young, at twenty-four years old. This book is based on his dissertation and was published posthumously, edited by M. J. Rendall. He also withheld part of the original dissertation from publication: "[...] some chapters, dealing with Sokrates, Plato, and Aristotle, did not appear sufficiently complete to justify publication: there, therefore, we have withheld" (Freeman 1907, xi). Since this comment suggests that Freeman himself discusses Aristotle, I, against Marrou, would like to adopt a neutral attitude towards his work.

¹³ On the high evaluation of their works, see the following comments: on Jaeger's works; although Marrou rates the previous works as relatively poor in general, he appreciates Jaeger's work: "its tremendous insight into Greek cultural ideals and consequently Greek education, the great work" (Marrou 1956, 354). On Marrou's work; Clarke comments that "[i]t is sometimes said that no books are duller than those on education. M. Marrou's is an exception" (Clarke 1957, 237); Too also adds: "Clarke made explicit what most scholars have thought about the history of education" (Too 2001, 20).

¹⁴ Jaeger (1939–1945, Vol. I, ix; Jaeger's italics). Being different from the English translation, the original reads: "Ich übergebe der Öffentlichkeit ein Werk geschichtlicher Forschung, das sich die bisher nicht in Angriff genommene Aufgabe stellt, die Formung des griechischen Menschen, die Paideia, zum Gegenstand einer neuen Gesamtbetrachtung des Griechentums zu machen" (Jaeger 1933–1947, Vorwort).

noble spirit, he discusses the history of education from Homer to classical Athens.¹⁵ In particular, he devotes the bulk of the chapters to Plato. However, not a single chapter is devoted to Aristotle. Although reviewers of this work at that time already mentioned this fact,¹⁶ Jaeger himself does not explain this point clearly.

Why does Jaeger assume that he does not need to discuss Aristotle's concept of education when outlining the concept of education in antiquity? In the preface of volume II of the English translation, we find two useful passages that seem to indicate the reason for this. These are not included in the original German edition.¹⁷ The first passage is his own vindication: "Aristotle will be discussed with Theophrastus, Menander, and Epicurus, at the beginning of the Hellenistic period, an era whose living roots go deep into the fourth century. Like Socrates, he is a figure who marks the transition between two epochs".¹⁸ Recalling the English proclamation mentioned above, that his study is "a basis for a new study of Hellenism as a whole",¹⁹ one might defend his vindication by mentioning that he can end his book before Hellenistic period without mentioning Aristotle, insofar as

¹⁵ One might doubt that I understand his *Paideia* to be a book about ancient Greek *education* rather than *culture*. Although the Greek expression *παιδεία* has several meanings (see Appendix), I suppose that Jaeger admits both aspects of *παιδεία*: I assume that he thinks that what education achieves is culture, and that culture is nothing but the achievement of education. For example, in the Vorwort, he states that the aim of his *Paideia* is to acquire "die Wesenserkenntnis des griechischen Bildungsphänomens", and, in the following chapters, he mentions "die (menschliche) Erziehung" as the translation of *παιδεία*. See also note 107.

¹⁶ For example, Morrow (1944, 74) states that "Aristotle left over for treatment with Theophrastus, Menander, and Epicurus, at the beginning of the Hellenistic period, in a volume which the author expects to write later"; Robinson (1945, 84) states that "I will mention some of the more notable opinions expressed. To get at the essence of Socrates' *paideia* Professor Jaeger uses both Plato and Xenophon, but rejects Aristotle" (see also p. 89). More euphemistically, Kuhn (1947, 472) states that "I do not think that his chapters on Plato are proportionate in importance to the space allotted to them".

¹⁷ In volumes II and III, the English translations based on Jaeger's German manuscripts were published earlier than the original German edition. Jaeger revises the manuscripts when he published the original German edition. For this reason, the content of these volumes in the English translations sometimes differs from that of the original German edition. Furthermore, some descriptions in the English translations are missing from the original German edition. Therefore, I refer to both editions, as the context demands.

¹⁸ Jaeger (1939–1945, Vol. II, xi).

¹⁹ In the original German texts, there is no term used to denote "Hellenism". Jaeger might have deleted this word for some reason.

Jaeger understands that Aristotle was nearer to Hellenism than were Socrates and Plato. However, it can be doubted whether this defence is sufficient to entitle Jaeger to treat Aristotle's theory of education so lightly.

Jaeger includes the other and more striking passage immediately after this vindication, that explains the lightness more reasonably: "And yet," he says, "with Aristotle, the Master of those who know, the notion of *paideia* undergoes a remarkable decrease in intensity, which makes it difficult to set him beside Plato, the true philosopher of *paideia*. The problems involved in the relation between culture and science, which are characteristic of Hellenistic Alexandria, first come out clearly in the school of Aristotle".²⁰ This judgment of Aristotle's theory of education suggests that he considered Aristotle to be less the "true" philosopher of education than Plato, possibly based on his belief that the Aristotelian notion of education "undergoes a remarkable decrease in intensity" or that "the relation between culture and science" in Aristotle makes his theory of education boring. At any rate, since Jaeger offers no further explanation, it remains unclear why Jaeger regarded Aristotle as less the "true" philosopher of education than Plato. Thus, although we cannot assess his thinking about the significance of Aristotle's theory of education in his *Paideia*, his discussion there indicates that he regards Aristotle's theory of education as less important than that of Plato or Isocrates.

In addition, we find the same point in Jaeger's other work written before WWII, *Aristoteles* (1923). Although this book claims that the developmental theory in Aristotle's philosophy itself marks the gradual breaking away from the Platonic philosophical system, his theory of education is also notably missing. He refers to Aristotle's educational aspect merely in the context of the *Protrepticus*, that is highly influenced by Platonic philosophy.²¹ This absence might suggest that Jaeger does not see any development in Aristotle on this point, or perhaps might think that

²⁰ Jaeger (1939–1945, Vol. II, xi).

²¹ On the Platonic colouration in the *Protrepticus*, see also Gerson (2005, 60–67). One may argue that Jaeger discusses how Plato and Aristotle's exhortation to follow a "theoretic life" circulated in antiquity and that the discussion can be understood as a kind of Aristotle's theory of education. Jaeger certainly discusses this point in his Appendix II (especially see 438–439; see also chapter XIII). As Hadot (2002) point out, Aristotle's philosophy can be regarded as an exhortation to follow a specific kind of life and this exhortation can be educational. However, this sort of theory of education is not what I and the scholars since the 1980s want to investigate. On this point, see Appendix.

Aristotle's theory of education includes no original features that would differentiate it from that of Plato. Also in this book, it is not apparent why he does not refer to Aristotle's theory of education. However, at least, it is clear that Jaeger does not refer to Aristotle's theory of education in his work either about ancient Greek education or about Aristotle's philosophy as a whole. As a matter of fact, therefore, he does not write about Aristotle's theory of education in spite of his great concern with both Aristotle and ancient Greek education.

It is natural, then, for us to expect that Aristotle's theory of education would feature in any other history of ancient Greek education from Homer to Hellenism. Henri-Irénée Marrou produced just such a work. Through his great scholarship, he produced a voluminous work entitled the *Histoire de l'Éducation dans l'Antiquité* (1948), which investigates the history of ancient Greek education from Homer not only to Hellenism, but also to the Roman Empire. Therefore, we might expect Aristotle's theory of moral education to feature in this work. However, although he devotes chapters to both Plato and Isocrates, astonishingly, he, like Jaeger, does not devote even a single chapter to Aristotle. What is characteristic of him, however—unlike Jaeger—is the fact that he clearly and straightforwardly explains the reason why he does not think he should discuss Aristotle's theory of education as follows:

Aristotle and education. The reader may be rather surprised to find that in this *History* so little attention is paid to the great philosopher and that he should be mentioned only in passing. The fact is that Aristotle's educational work does not seem to me to have the same kind of creative originality as Plato's and Isocrates'. His ideas and his actual practice as the founder of a school, a brotherhood of philosophers supported financially by the generous benefactions of Philip and Alexander, simply reflect the ideas and practice of his age; and though in more than one case they may seem to prefigure those of the Hellenistic age, the reason for this is that Aristotle lived at a time which was a kind of watershed between the two separate phases of Greek history.²²

Although I cannot accurately evaluate the influence of his academic judgment on Aristotle's theory of education over the historical study of ancient Greek education,

²² Marrou (1956, 381, n. 2; Marrou's italics). Later, Marrou (1981, 201) says that "the English translation (New York and London, 1956) is wholly unreliable". The original note can be seen in Marrou (1948, 374).

it seems greater if we recall the academic value of his work in this field. It is clear, at any rate, that Marrou neglects Aristotle's theory of education because he judges that it has nothing original to offer.

In this way, both of the distinguished prewar scholars of ancient Greek education fail to refer to Aristotle's theory of education, because they judge that it contains nothing original that would differentiate it from Plato or Isocrates's theory of education, though in the case of Jaeger this remains only a suggestion. Here, we may observe the features of the research undertaken during this period. In this section, thus, I have surveyed how the great prewar scholars, such as Jaeger and Marrou, failed to discuss Aristotle's theory of education. It is difficult to find a significant discussion about his theory of education in the field of pedagogy, history, or philosophy,²³ so we may conclude that it was of little interest to prewar scholars, or, at least, we may suggest that few academic results were anticipated from any investigation of Aristotle's theory of education. This is incorrect when we survey the circumstances after WWII. In the following sections, I will examine how the postwar scholars discussed Aristotle's theory of education.

1.2. From the 1950s to the 1970s——Revival

In the 1950s to the 1970s, we begin to find some works that are concerned with Aristotle's theory of education in the field of both philosophy and history.²⁴ In the field of philosophy, we find two features. First, the postwar works in this period take up *not* Plato's theory of education *but instead* Aristotle's theory of education in the light of the representative theory of education by philosophers from whom we should learn.²⁵ Second, the works produced during this period refer to *Physics*,

²³ At best, in the field of philosophy, I find several significant warnings that are relevant to my concern in Burnet (1903): "[i]f we would appreciate the contributions of Plato and Aristotle to the theory of education aright, we must not only master the details of what they say; we must learn to see these details in their true perspective" (p.129); "[n]either Plato nor Aristotle would ever have dreamt of discussing education as a science by itself, and it is a mistake to suppose that we can get an independent treatise on the subject by the simple process of detaching a portion from a larger whole. For it is by no means an accident that the theory of education is treated by Plato and Aristotle as a part of Politics, and Aristotle has told us why" (p.131).

²⁴ Here I use "philosophy" and "history" in a broad sense; that is, philosophy covers the philosophy of education, and history covers classics.

²⁵ Gallagher (ed. 1956); Frankena (1965).

Metaphysics, *On the Soul*, and others, as well as *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Politics* when they summarize or extract his theory of education.²⁶ These postwar works in the field of philosophy are in clear contrast to the prewar works. As we have seen, the works of Jaeger and Marrou focus solely on the educational theory of Plato, virtually ignoring the significance of Aristotle's theory of education, while these postwar works pay attention to his theory of education even when referring to his non-ethical treatises.

Also in the field of history, scholars start to focus on Aristotle's theory of education. Patrick Lynch provides a delicate analysis of the system of the Lyceum in his book published in 1972, in which he casts doubt on Marrou's disregard for Aristotle's theory of education.²⁷ In addition, Jaeger also begins to mention the significance of Aristotle's theory of education in his book (1961) that discusses the influence of the ideal of Greek education on the idea of Christian education. In the discussion, he mentions the influence of not only Plato's education but also Aristotle's education,²⁸ commenting that: "[i]t will be remembered that Aristotle himself in the *Nicomachean* version of his *Ethics* keeps referring to the problem of *paideia*. He was inspired in this by Plato's *Laws*, to which he expressly refers. He occupies an important place in the history of Greek *paideia* in more than one regard".²⁹ Moreover, he refers to "the question how this Christian form of the Greek *paideia* affected the Latin world [...]. The details of this great process are to a large extent still unexplored, but they can be pursued through the Middle Ages".³⁰ These passages are surprising when we recall that he did not devote a single chapter to Aristotle in his *Paideia*, in spite of his loud proclamation. In this way, also in the field of history, scholars start to refer to the importance of Aristotle's theory of education, though these references remain slight and tiny in nature.

This survey suggests that Aristotle's theory of education was revived after WWII

²⁶ Howie (1968); Braun (1974).

²⁷ Lynch (1972, 2–3 and 83ff.).

²⁸ On the influence of Plato, see Jaeger (1961, 99–100, 144 n. 25); on the influence of Aristotle, see Jaeger (1961, 96).

²⁹ Jaeger (1961, 144 n. 24; Jaeger's italics).

³⁰ Jaeger (1961, 100).

in the field of both philosophy and history.³¹ Of course, some books still ignore Aristotle's theory of education.³² Nonetheless, generally speaking, we can say that, since the 1950s, Aristotle's theory of education has been paid more attention than previously.³³ Although the works in this period are informative from our perspective, however, simply speaking, they provide a merely summary or brief reference, and therefore, we can hardly find any philosophical discussions yet.

1.3. Since the 1980s——Flourishing

In the 1980s, we observe far more change than ever in the fields of both philosophy and history. In the former, we see the first genuine philosophical discussions of Aristotle's theory of education in Myles Burnyeat's "Aristotle on Learning to Be Good" (1980), which few would deny is the monumental work in this realm. In this article, concentrating on the earlier stage of moral development, he discusses how one, based on a good upbringing, grasps what kind of action is good/just/beautiful in a particular situation and feels pleasure in such an action when he grasps a "fact (*ᾠτι*)". Although Burnyeat's discussion concerning the relationship between grasping fact, action, and feeling is, as such, impressive, what impresses us here is rather the context in which he locates his discussion. He announces that he tries "to place his problem [*i.e.*, the problem of *akrasia*] too in the perspective of his development through time".³⁴ Demonstrating that the akratic person is on the road to becoming good, he claims that the real problem of *akrasia* and also of the *Nicomachean Ethics* is to answer the following question: "[h]ow do we grow up to become the fully adult rational animal that is the end toward which the nature of our species tends? [...] the whole of the *Nicomachean Ethics* is Aristotle's reply to this question, so that this paper is nothing but a prolegomenon to

³¹ Why is it that, after WWII, scholars paid attention to his theory of education? Although this question must be studied by historians, I will discuss an important factor in section 3.

³² For example, Beck (1964), under the subtitle of "Theory and Practice of the Great Educators", devotes chapters to the Sophists (chapter III), Socrates (chapter IV), Plato (chapter V), Xenophon (chapter VI), and Isocrates (chapter VII) respectively, but no chapter is devoted to Aristotle as in Jaeger and Marrou. Although Reeve (1998, 64) introduces this book positively, Aristotle is only mentioned to support or enrich the contexts.

³³ Since my survey begins with the late 19th century, the word "previously" refers to the beginning of this period.

³⁴ Burnyeat (1980, 70).

a reading of the work”.³⁵ In this way, by analyzing Aristotle’s ethical concepts, such as action, feeling, and *akrasia*, from the educational point of view, Burnyeat (1980) enables us to regard the *Nicomachean Ethics* as a treatise on moral development and education.³⁶ This article analyzes the ethical concepts as such in the *Nicomachean Ethics* from the educational point of view. This approach to the *Nicomachean Ethics* has never been seen. Therefore, Burnyeat (1980) is an epoch making article in the sense that it makes it possible to discuss Aristotle’s theory of (moral) education by focusing on the ethical concepts in the *Nicomachean Ethics* from the educational point of view, and causes a drastic change in scholars’ way of thinking about his theory of education, especially prewar scholars’ way of thinking.

Thereinafter, many books and papers begin to appear that discuss Aristotle’s theory of education from the philosophical and educational points of view. They may be classified into three styles. The first style is the *interpretative* approach to Aristotle’s theory of education. The works in this style analyze the ethical concepts in Aristotle’s *Ethics* from an educational point of view. For example, Nancy Sherman is one of the most active scholars on this subject. In her dissertation of 1982, she first concentrates on certain ethical concepts of moral education in Aristotle.³⁷ She then discusses the theory of moral education from the viewpoint of habituation in her book of 1989.³⁸ In this book, she states that she is attempting to “consider virtue in a general way as a complex of capacity—perceptual, affective, and deliberative—and suggest how these capacities are cultivated” at the stage of habituation.³⁹ During this attempt, her basic interpretation is that “[e]motions thus have cognitive components and are partially shaped and informed by these elements. But it would be a mistake to try to fully untangle these elements”.⁴⁰ Many other scholars also discuss Aristotle’s theory of education from various philosophically interpretative viewpoints.⁴¹

³⁵ Burnyeat (1980, 86).

³⁶ Following this line, what Burnyeat shows is that the first (or at least earlier) stage of Aristotle’s theory of moral development/education is the training of feeling into reason.

³⁷ Sherman (1982).

³⁸ Sherman (1989).

³⁹ Sherman (1989, 166).

⁴⁰ Sherman (1989, 170).

⁴¹ For example, Kraut (1998) discusses his theory of education by considering its relationship with the major topics in Aristotle’s *Ethics*. Curzer (1996) logically analyzes the

There is another style of investigation into Aristotle's theory of education, *i.e.*, the *applicative* approach to Aristotle. This attempts to apply his theory of education to contemporary research. For example, the work of Kristján Kristjánsson, entitled *Aristotle, Emotions, and Educations* (2007), follows this approach. Kristjánsson states that he aims to contribute to the realm of "values education", especially "character education" and "social and emotional learning", that are, particularly in the USA, "two of the most prominent recent trends in value education".⁴² He declares this, as "an important caveat", adding: "I do not pretend to be a classics expert, let alone an Aristotelian scholar, and my goals are not exegetical: I have unearthed no new readings of Greek texts or hit upon novel interpretations that are destined to shake the classics world. I rely upon existing translations and my own natural and unsullied — or so I hope to persuade readers — understanding of them. Whenever interpretative controversies are invoked, I try to locate their practical relevance, as my eventual aim is to say something germane about moral education rather than about Aristotle. Aristotle's position in this book, in other words, is not to be viewed as a relic of ancient philosophy, but as food for current educational thought".⁴³

It is worth noting the third approach, whereby these two styles—the interpretative or classical approach such as that of Sherman, and the applicative approach such as that of Kristjánsson—are in fact merely a matter of degree. The third one may be named the *intermediate* approach to Aristotle. For example, the work of Randall L. Curren, entitled *Aristotle on the Necessity of Public Education* (2000), is just such a case. He acknowledges both sides when he explains the aim of his book as follows: "[m]y threefold aim in these chapters will thus be to develop an

inconsistency in several educational passages of *Nicomachean Ethics*. Homiak (1990), criticizing Burnyeat (1980), investigates the significance of political activity in Aristotle's theory of moral education and claims that political activity integrates non-rational desires with rational desires. Lawrence (2011) investigates the stages of moral development.

⁴² Kristjánsson (2007, 2).

⁴³ Kristjánsson (2007, 5). Another example of this style is Spangler (1998) that analyzes Aristotle's works so that we can understand more accurately the way in which we learn scientific knowledge. Regarding this, Bauman (1998) considers the education concerning demonstrative syllogism and scientific knowledge. More recently, Fink (2009) considers the dialectic in Aristotle. Also in the field of philosophy of education, scholars pay attention to virtue theory as "an ongoing research program" for investigating how we systematize moral education (Haydon 2003, 325ff.).

interpretation and analysis of Aristotle's arguments for public education which places them in the larger context of his practical philosophy, and in the context of Socratic thought generally; to assess the strength of these arguments; and finally to weigh and elaborate their importance for current debates about the nature of and grounds for educational equality, the place of moral education in public schools, and school choice and privatization".⁴⁴

In this way, in the field of philosophy since the 1980s, scholars have begun to investigate Aristotle's theory of education itself through his *Ethics* and *Politics* from various angles, rather than merely summarizing it. This is qualitatively different from the features in the previous two periods (from the late 19th century to the 1940s, and from the 1950s to the 1970s). In other words, being forestalled by Burnyeat (1980), Aristotle's theory of education becomes a topic that is subject to philosophical investigation.

In the field of history, we can see a broad tendency to restudy ancient Greek education as a whole. For example, Yun Lee Too claims the need for "a rewriting of the history of education after Marrou", adding: "[i]n the twenty-first century the task is now to edit a new history of education in antiquity".⁴⁵ Related to this, in the study of medical education in antiquity also, scholars have started to undertake a holistic study of how medical knowledge and skills are taught and learnt in antiquity.⁴⁶ Against this background, Philip van der Eijk points out that the studies on ancient medicine have rapidly progressed "[o]ver the last three decades" and therefore enable scholars to explicate its relationship with philosophy and other cultural aspects.⁴⁷ Remembering the many close connections between Aristotle's ethics and ancient medicine,⁴⁸ we may expect that the explication of medical education in antiquity as well as the restudying and re-writing of ancient Greek education as a whole will contribute to the explication of ethical or moral education in Aristotle. In this way, in the field of history since the 1980s, scholars have begun to reconsider ancient Greek education as a whole.

This survey reveals that, since the 1980s, the study of Aristotle's theory of

⁴⁴ Curren (2000, 8).

⁴⁵ Too (ed. 2001, 10).

⁴⁶ Horstmanshoff (ed. 2010).

⁴⁷ Van der Eijk (2005, 1).

⁴⁸ Jaeger (1957).

education has flourished in the fields of both philosophy and history. In the former, being forestalled by Burnyeat (1980), Aristotle's theory of education has become a topic that is subject to philosophical investigation, while in the latter, there is a tendency to reconsider ancient Greek education as a whole, that may lead us to revise Marrou's view of it.

So far, I have surveyed how Aristotle's theory of education has (or has not) been studied in our century. During the 20th century, until relatively recently, Aristotle's theory of education has been largely neglected by both historians and philosophers. This circumstance appears most apparently up to the 1940s. The most influential scholars up to this point, Jaeger and Marrou, entirely ignore Aristotle's theory of education when they survey the history of ancient Greek education: Marrou even explicitly claims that there is almost nothing worth learning from it. In contrast, Plato's theory of education remains a popular topic. After WWII, in the 1950s–1970s, works begin to emerge that take up or refer to Aristotle's theory of education in the fields of both philosophy and history, though they are relatively unargumentative, providing instead a kind of survey or brief comment. Since the 1980s, philosophers on the one hand have begun to discuss and investigate Aristotle's theory of education philosophically, while historians on the other hand have worked on reexamining Marrou's view on the history of ancient Greek education. In short, we can classify the research history of Aristotle's theory of education into the three periods, as follows:

1. From the late 19th century to the 1940s: scholars such as Jaeger and Marrou neglect Aristotle's theory of education as they maintain that it appears to offer nothing original.
2. From the 1950s to the 1970s: scholars begin to pay attention to this because they start to notice that it appears to offer something worth learning and investigating.
3. Since the 1980s: philosophers investigate his theory of education mainly in his *Nicomachean Ethics* from the educational point of view. Historians reconsider ancient Greek educational thought as a whole.

This survey shows that only in the last sixty years has Aristotle's theory of

education attracted the attention of philosophers and historians, and *only* in the last thirty years at best has it been investigated philosophically. How so? What can we point out as the background of the transition of the research history of Aristotle's theory of education?

2. What Prevents Jaeger and Marrou from Appreciating Aristotle's Theory of Education

As shown in section 1.1, both Jaeger and Marrou adopt a negative attitude towards the significance of Aristotle's theory of education. Although we do not have a good deal of evidence about the background to their attitude, we may guess two reasons by virtue of comparing Aristotle with Plato and Isocrates in two ways. The first comparison concerns the compromising standpoint of Aristotle. There is some testimony based on which both Jaeger and Marrou claim that Aristotle eclectically makes a compromise between Plato's educational theory and that of Isocrates. The testimony in question is this: as some testify, Aristotle, while at the Academy, after writing an *étude* entitled *Grullos* (*Περὶ ρητορικῆς*), inspired by Isocrates, begins to give lessons about rhetoric, beginning around B.C. 360, or at the least by B.C. 355.⁴⁹ Both Jaeger and Marrou mention this testimony as evidence of Aristotle's compromise between two different styles of the theory of education, *i.e.*, philosophic culture and oratorical culture.⁵⁰ This compromise might reduce the importance of Aristotle's theory of education in the field of history.⁵¹

The second comparison concerns Aristotle's text. To make this point clear, it seems that by the research procedure followed offers the best way to obtain statistical data, step by step. First, I selected words that related to education, such as "teacher", "student", "teach", "learn", "study", and "habituate". Here, I tentatively

⁴⁹ Diogenes Laërtius (D. L. V3) and Philodemus the Epicurean (*De Rhet.* II col. 48. 36, col. 57. 45) testify to this. See also Hirokawa (1999, 162–165); Hirokawa (2005, 237–241).

⁵⁰ Jaeger (1939–1945, Vol. III, 147, 185–186); Marrou (1956, 91). This is consistent with a common understanding that Aristotle incorporates two different styles of philosophy into his philosophical system: the first, which comes from Plato, is philosophy as the strict science; the second, which comes from Isocrates, is rhetoric as the probable science.

⁵¹ Jaeger as well as Marrou regards his work as historical science (Jaeger 1939–1945, Vol. I, xxix).

classify the related Greek words into six groups as follows:⁵²

1. the first group consists of “*παιδεία* (education)”, “*παιδεύω* (educate)”, their morphological words, and their inflections.
2. the second group consists of the words prefixed by “*παιδεία* (education)” and “*παιδεύω* (educate)”, their morphological words, and their inflections.
3. the third group consists of “*παιδιά* (childish play)”, “*παιδία* (childhood)”, and their inflections.
4. the fourth group consists of “*μανθάνω* (learn)”, “*μάθησις* (the act of learning)”, their morphological words, and their inflections.
5. the fifth group consists of “*ἐθίζω* (accustom)”, “*ἐθισμός* (education)”, their morphological words, and their inflections.
6. the sixth group consists of “*διδάσκω* (teach)”, “*διδασκαλία* (teaching)”, their prefixed words, their morphological words, and their inflections.

The related words in each group are as follows (tables 1-1 and 1-2):

⁵² The English translation of each Greek word comes from Liddell, Scott, and Jones (1996). Although I have complete data on “*μουσική*”, “*μουσικός*”, their prefixed words, their morphological words, and their inflections, I do not allocate them as a seventh group, because this group seems to be mainly used as “musician”.

Table 1-1: lists of the words related to education (Groups 1 and 2)

Group 1	Group 2		
παιδεία	ἀναπαιδεύω	ἐκπαίδευμα	παιδευτήριος
παίδευμα	ἀναπαίδευτος	ἐμπαιδεύω	παιδευτικός
παιδεύω	ἀντιπαιδεύω	ἐμπαίδευτος	πεπαιδευμένως
παίδευσις	ἀπαίδευτος	ἐρωτοπαιδευμένος	προεκπαιδευω
παιδευτέος	ἀπαιδευσία	εὐμορπηερωτοπαίδευτος	προπαιδεύω
παίδειος	ἀπαιδευτέω	εὐπαίδευτος	προπαιδευτικός
παιδευτήριον	αὐτοπαίδευτος	εὐπαιδευσία	προπαίδευμα
παιδευτής	διαπαιδεύομαι	πηλοπαιδευτήριος	προπαιδευσις
παιδευτικός	δοξοπαιδευτικός	ἡμιπαίδευτος	θεοπαίδευτος
παιδευτός	δυσπαιδευτέω	καλοπαίδευτος	συναπαιδευτέω
	ἐκπαιδευσις	καταπαιδεύω	συμπαιδεύω
	ἐκπαιδεύω	μεταπαιδεύω	συνεμπαιδευτος
	ἐκπαιδευτής	παίδευτρια	ὑπαπαίδευτος
	ἐκπαίδευτος	παιδευμός	

Table 1-2: lists of the words related to education (Groups 3, 4, 5, and 6)

Group 3	Group 4	Group 5	Group 6
παιδιά	μανθάνω	ἐθισμός	ἀναδιδάσκω
παιδιά	μάθημα	ἐθιστέον	διδασκαλείον
	μάθησις	ἐθιστός	διδασκαλική
	μαθητής	ἐθίζω	διδασκαλία
	μαθητικός	ἐθικός	διδασκαλικός
	μαθητός	ἐθιμός	διδάσκαλος
	μάθηος	ἐθίσμα	διδάσκω
	μαθητεία		ἐκδιδάσκω
	μαθητέος		κωμωδοδιδάσκαλος
	μαθητεύω		προδιδάσκω
	μαθητικενόμαι		τραγωδοδιδάσκαλος
	μαθητρίς		χοροδιδάσκαλος

Second, to investigate the rating of the frequency of those related words in Aristotle, I contrasted them with their frequencies in the works of Plato and Isocrates. For comparison, I surveyed the *Corpus Aristotelicum*, *Platonis Opera*, and *Isocrates Discours*.⁵³ To obtain the raw data, I use *THESAURUS LINGUAE GRAECAE: A Digital Library of Greek Literature*, powered by the University of California.⁵⁴ I use *Excel* for the data processing. The totals for each group and the frequency of use are shown in the following tables (table 2):


Table 2: the totals for each group and their frequency of use by the authors

	Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4	Group 5	Group 6	Total	Total Words	Frequency
Plato	371	43	125	961	43	425	1968	600,533	0.322%
Isocrates	127	7	49	120	61	68	432	125,214	0.345%
Aristotle	134	15	76	266	45	84	620	838,871	0.074%


This table (table 2) shows the total number of the frequency of occurrences of these related words, and it is found that, in the works of Aristotle, these words occur less than a quarter as frequency as in the works of Plato and Isocrates. This indicates that Plato and Isocrates pay more attention to the role of education in their works than Aristotle. We can see this more vividly from the following table (table 3):

⁵³ On *Corpus Aristotelicum*, I survey only the so-called authentic works. That is, *Cat.*, *Int.*, *Apr.*, *Apo.*, *Top.*, *SE*, *Ph.*, *Cael.*, *GC*, *Mete.*, *DA*, *PN*, *HA*, *PA*, *MA*, *IA*, *GA*, *Metaph.*, *NE*, *EE*, *Pol.*, *Rhet.*, *Po.*, *Ath.*, and *Protrepticus*.

⁵⁴ <http://www.tlg.uci.edu/>



This table is the sequential line graph of table 2. This line graph vividly shows the frequency gap between Plato and Aristotle for groups 1, 4, and 6. Why does Aristotle fail to use these words to this extent? Perhaps, he might wish to avoid using words that may have a Platonic colouration. Although we cannot examine this further, it would also contribute to our understanding of his theory of education. At any rate, these tables are insufficient because these are based on the total numbers, and the total number of words in their writing are very different (see the boxes for “total words” in table 2). To compare the frequency of use between Aristotle, Plato, and Isocrates, we need to compare their frequency of occurrence within their own writings respectively. The following table (table 4) shows the percentage of use in the writings of each of the philosophers:



This table shows more accurately that Aristotle uses the related words in his writings much less than Plato and Isocrates do in theirs. For example, Aristotle uses the words in group 1 less than a quarter as often as Plato and a seventh as often as Isocrates; those in group 4, less than a fifth as often as Plato and about a quarter as often as Isocrates; and those in group 6, less than a seventh as often as Plato and about a fifth as often as Isocrates.⁵⁵ The statistical analysis shows that the related words occur far less frequently in the works of Aristotle than in those of Plato and Isocrates and, therefore, that it is natural for us to find it more difficult to investigate Aristotle's theory of education than that of Plato or Isocrates.⁵⁶

The two reasons mentioned in this section—the compromising position of Aristotle and the lower frequency of occurrences in his text—explain, at least partially why Jaeger and Marrou neglect Aristotle's theory of education, compared to that of Plato or Isocrates. It does not explain, however, of course, why Aristotle's theory of education has come to be revived in the 1950s. Given that these two reasons remain even now, his theory of education could still be treated lightly. What then lead to the revival of his theory of education?

3. Plato Politicized and Aristotle Revived⁵⁷

To find the reasons why the focus on Aristotle's theory of education increased compared with previously, we must comprehend thoroughly the environment

⁵⁵ In conflict with my comment in the previous paragraph, this table shows that Aristotle uses the words in group 5 almost as often as Plato. If so, this group may be uncharacteristic of Aristotle. In contrast, Isocrates uses these words about seven times more often than Plato and Aristotle, which may suggest that this group is characteristic of Isocrates, and that, for the Athenian, these words had Isocrates' colouration at that time. (Of course, to examine this possibility in detail, we would have to survey thoroughly the frequency of these groups throughout the ancient Greek world.)

⁵⁶ For more detail about the statistical analysis, see my dissertation, Tachibana (2012).

⁵⁷ In this section, I am deeply indebted to Sasaki (2000) and his scholarship, for I learnt much from this book and follow the structure of its argument. In this sense, this enterprise is forestalled by his work. However, I add some new information that Sasaki does not refer to. I also refer to primary sources, bibliographical details, and references which Sasaki omits. Thus, I am responsible for any bibliographical sources and references. (I hope that this book will be translated into English, and that this section will promote this need.)

surrounding Aristotle's theory of education up to the 1950s and what happened at that time. Although this will explain the reason for the shift in focus, that is, the reason why Plato was evaluated highly before WWII and Aristotle after it, we have to await sociological and historical investigations on it since the challenging task lies beyond the scope of the current work. As the first step towards this enterprise, in this section, I offer a brief survey of how Plato's philosophy of education was viewed up to WWII, a period that witnessed a series of drastic events during a turbulent period of the twentieth century and drew the whole world into a maelstrom of upheaval, including WWI, the Russian Revolution, Nazi Germany, and WWII; especially, I will focus on the social, political, and academic environment surrounding Plato's *Republic*. This suggests that the environment has an enormous influence on the revival of Aristotle's theory of education after WWII.

3.1. The Influence of World War I

This survey will help us to understand what it was like to read Plato at that time and why the focus shifted from Plato to Aristotle after WWII. In *Plato To-day*, written by Richard Crossman in 1937,⁵⁸ his intention was "to show what Plato would think of the modern world".⁵⁹ Crossman describes a certain change in Plato's *Republic* as follows:

Before the Great War [*i.e.*, WWI], the *Republic* was often treated as the 'Ideal State' which Plato never intended to put into practice. Its whole conception seemed far-fetched and remote to a generation which assumed liberal ideas as self-evident truth of human nature. A world which believed that, under the flags of science, general education, and democracy, it was marching to perfection, could not swallow Plato's estimate of the common man, or seriously approve his educational programme. Unaware of the class-war, it could not understand his hatred of democracy and acceptance of dictatorship. But because Plato was a famous philosopher, he was rarely condemned outright as a reactionary resolutely opposed to every principle of the Liberal creed. Instead, he was elevated to a higher rank, and became an idealist, remote from practical life, dreaming of a transcendent City of God.

The war has changed all that. Plato's so-called 'idealism' is now seen for what it is—a grimly realistic estimate of the moral and intellectual capacities of the masses. Knowing what class-war and revolution mean, we can understand

⁵⁸ Crossman was, at the time, a fellow and tutor at New College, Oxford, later becoming a Labour MP. This book is based on his BBC radio programme, *If Plato Lived Again*.

⁵⁹ Crossman (1937, 11).

why Plato advocated dictatorship to prevent them. Having some experience of the effects of propaganda, we can treat 'the noble lie' not as an amusing phantasy but as an extremely practical instrument of government. If we have any objection to Plato it is because he is too 'realistic' in his analysis of human nature.⁶⁰

Crossman clearly indicates his impression that it was WWI that causes the drastic change in the view of Plato, from an idealist to a realist. This change was inevitably accompanied by another change in Plato's works, especially in the *Republic* (or what we should call the *Politeia*, especially in this context); that is, from a pure research subject to an actual political thought or ideology. From the viewpoint of modern Plato being resuscitated, setting the dialogue between modern Plato and the delegates of these societies, Crossman examines several "contemporary" societies, including British democracy, Nazi Germany, and the Soviet Union. In chapter 6, entitled "Plato Looks at British Education", modern Plato has a discussion with a British educationalist, and the former is finally labeled as a fascist by the latter. Near to the end of this book, Crossman explains: "[t]he result will, I fear, shock many readers of Plato. They will be unwilling to accept the picture which I have presented, and will urge that it is a caricature, not a portrait, of Plato whom they admire. There are two comments to be made upon this criticism. In the first place great philosophers have often been bad political and social critics. The political influence of Hegel, for instance, was disastrous, and it is rare to find men like Aristotle and Hume who combined profound philosophical insight with an eye for practical affairs. There is a danger that, out of respect for his eminence as a metaphysician, we should swallow Plato's political opinions too easily, and it was partly to meet this danger that *Plato To-day* was written".⁶¹

We can provide another example of Plato being resuscitated. Three years before this work appeared, in 1934, Warner Fite also summoned Plato as a contemporary political thinker:⁶² "[a]nd if Plato were alive today he would find his notion of an

⁶⁰ Crossman, (1937, 132–133). He explains the "noble lie" as follows: "[b]y the 'noble lie' Plato meant propaganda, the technique of controlling the behavior of the stupid majority" (Crossman 1937, 130).

⁶¹ Crossman (1937, 290–291).

⁶² Fite was an educator, philosopher, and author, as well as the Stuart Professor of Ethics in the Philosophy Department, Princeton University.

organized state illustrated on a grand scale—doubtless very imperfectly, but the idea is there—in the Russian Union of Soviet Republics” and “the Soviet state is the first attempt in history to realize Plato’s notion of a state organized from top to bottom on scientific principle”.⁶³

Although Crossman and Fite have different opinions regarding the modern Plato’s prescription for which regime best suits Platonic thought, this is not our current concern.⁶⁴ What matters here is the fact that Plato is being resuscitated not as a pure philosopher but as an actual political thinker. As Crossman holds, WWI and the drastic events that followed it changed the context in which Plato and his works were set. In the next section, we will see that more philosophers and classicists entered (or became entangled in) this dispute. As the battlefield, I will roughly survey *The Journal of Education* from November 1944 to August 1945.⁶⁵

3.2. The Dispute over Plato’s *Politeia* in *The Journal of Education* 1944–1945

In November to December 1944, Otto Neurath and J. A. Lauwerys raised the question of “the re-education of Germany” after WWII.⁶⁶ As is well known, Neurath was an Austrian philosopher who fled to the U.K. in the wake of the Nazi occupation. He and Lauwerys describe the contrast in the attitude towards Plato as follows: “[o]ver here [*i.e.*, in the U.K.], when Plato is praised, people usually have in mind his religious outlook, his poetic gifts, and the importance of the questions he discusses. Little harm may be done to the widespread atmosphere of personal freedom—though maybe more than we realize to-day—through the fact that many young people are made to study the *Republic*. On the Continent things are different, for the tradition of scholarship differs somewhat from the tradition over here. When a German philosopher characterized Hitler’s advent as the victory of Platonism, he was expressing widely-felt sentiments: It would certainly be a mistake to say he

⁶³ Fite (1934, 218).

⁶⁴ However, it is worth noting that both agree that Plato would be displeased with British democracy.

⁶⁵ Although they refer to the relationship between Plato and Nazi Germany, some direct data help us to understand how Plato is read in Nazi Germany. For example, see Günther (1928). See also Heidegger (1933), who closes his inaugural speech with a quote from Plato’s *Rep.* 497d9, *i.e.*, “Alles Grosse steht im Sturm... (τὰ ... μεγάλα πάντα ἐπισφαλῇ ...)” (S. 19).

⁶⁶ This phrase itself can be seen in Neurath and Lauwerys (1945a, 57).

was falsifying the views of Plato. [...] Plato was, after all, a totalitarian reformer”.⁶⁷ They also express a fear that “[i]n future years a German text-book writer, afraid openly to praise Hitler and Nazism, may praise Plato and recommend the reading of the *Republic*, carefully quoting well-known English and American scholars who are reputed to be democratic and kind”.⁶⁸

As might be anticipated, many scholars challenged their opinion. In the following month, January 1945, F. W. Garforth began his first correspondence over their article as follows: “I am constrained to take up my pen to defend Plato”.⁶⁹ He stated “I suggest that the writers of the article have confused the Republic with the constitution and society of ancient Sparta, of which Nazism is a lineal descendant”.⁷⁰

In the following month, February 1945, in response, Neurath and Lauwerys published another article entitled “Plato’s Republic and German Education”, in which they stated “[i]n a recent article we expressed the view that there may be teachers in Germany who will wish to promote the ideals of Nazism even after its defeat, and that the *Republic* could be used for that purpose without falsifying the views of Plato” and that “[t]he book, indeed, teaches many lessons but none about the human background required for government of the people, by the people, and for the people. On the contrary, Plato despises such democratic ideals”.⁷¹ They conclude their discussions as follows: “[t]his small selection from the *Republic* must suffice to explain why we said that one found in it, plainly and openly expressed, the view that the main purpose of the State (i.e. the legal and civic administration) is to preserve the purity of the race and to organize the people for war. Surely one could hardly object to a Nazi teacher quoting Plato’s authority as justification for praising institutions aimed at preserving a master-race and at fitting them to fight”.⁷²

⁶⁷ Neurath and Lauwerys (1944b, 575).

⁶⁸ Neurath and Lauwerys (1944b, 575). They repeated this fear at the end of a series of discussions in August 1945: “a German teacher, afraid to praise Hitler and Nazism openly might yet attain his ends by praising Plato and recommending the reading of the *Republic*” (Neurath and Lauwerys 1945c, 394).

⁶⁹ Garforth (1945, 14).

⁷⁰ Garforth (1945, 16).

⁷¹ Neurath and Lauwerys (1945a, 57).

⁷² Neurath and Lauwerys (1945a, 58).

In the following month, March 1945, McNicholas replied,⁷³ and, in April 1945, two professional philosophers published articles against Neurath and Lauwerys. G. C. Field, Professor of Philosophy at Bristol University, in his correspondence entitled “Plato’s ‘Republic’ and Its Use in Education”, offered a kind of academic criticism of Neurath and Lauwerys’ naivety, stating “I think it is clear that Messrs. Neurath and Lauwerys completely misinterpret Plato on some of the most important points”,⁷⁴ and that “[a]ltogether, I can see no grounds for the suggestion that there is any real tendency to regard Plato ‘with undue reverence’ or ‘too kindly’ and still less that there is any serious danger of the study of the *Republic* producing a state of mind sympathetic to Nazism. And the manifold advantages that the Republic offers as an introduction to philosophical studies remain unaffected”.⁷⁵ The second criticism came from C. E. M. Joad, Head of the Department of Philosophy at Birkbeck College, London. who suggested that “MESSRS. Neurath and Lauwerys’s treatment of Plato is vitiated throughout by a simple error”.⁷⁶

In the following month, May 1945, the fighting spread. Although several scholars engaged in correspondence,⁷⁷ the following comment by Bertrand Russell is particularly worthy of note:

SIR,—I do not feel inclined to join in the controversy about Plato’s Republic, though *I strongly agree with Neurath*. My reason for not joining is that I have a long history of philosophy in the press, which, incidentally, sets out a similar point of view, and I prefer the fuller statement which is possible in a book.⁷⁸

Compared with the other correspondence, Russell’s is conspicuous because he is the only one to express clear and strong support for Neurath’s claim. What is “a long history of philosophy in the press” that led him to support Neurath’s claim so strongly? As Sasaki (2000) also indicates, it will be his book, *A History of Western Philosophy and Its Connection with Political and Social Circumstances from the Earliest Times to the Present Day* (1945), in which he evaluates Plato as follows:

⁷³ McNicholas (1945a).

⁷⁴ Field (1945a, 161).

⁷⁵ Field (1945a, 162).

⁷⁶ Joad (1945, 163).

⁷⁷ Neurath and Lauwerys (1945b), McNicholas (1945b), and Prentice (1945).

⁷⁸ Russell (1945a, 224: Russell’s italics).

It is not, therefore, surprising that he should turn to Sparta for an adumbration of his ideal common wealth. Plato possessed the art to dress up illiberal suggestions in such a way that they deceived future ages, which admired the *Republic* without ever becoming aware of what was involved in its proposals. It has always been correct to praise Plato, but not to understand him. This is the common fate of great men. My object is the opposite. I wish to understand him, but to treat him with as little reverence as if he were a contemporary English or American advocate of totalitarianism.⁷⁹

After these two correspondences with Neurath and Lauwerys in June 1945,⁸⁰ in August 1945, Neurath and Lauwerys closed this series of discussions about the relationship between Plato's political and educational thought and that of Nazi Germany as follows:

German youth, not acquainted with democratic arguments, are unlikely to learn from the *Republic* anything about that co-operation of free citizens or that tolerance towards people of different types which are the foundation of life in free societies. Instead they will be encouraged, to follow trends already sadly familiar within the human climate of Germany—such as praising something “superhuman”, be it “the State”, “the nation”, “the arts”, “the race”, or something else. Such young Germans come sooner than some scholars over here think to a state in which they devote themselves with sincere enthusiasm to a leader-genius, to the intuitions of a Fuehrer, and to an excitement which very frequently becomes merciless and intolerant.⁸¹

In point of fact, I find it difficult to imagine the social situation prevailing at that time with any accuracy. However, my survey reveals that Plato was resuscitated not as a pure philosopher but as an actual and contemporary political thinker. It is less difficult to see that one of the main causes of this resuscitation was in his theory of education in the *Republic*. As we have mentioned, Crossman vividly described how the British educationalist finally labels Plato's theory of education and politics as fascistic while Russell labeled him as totalitarian.⁸²

⁷⁹ Russell (1945b, 108–109: Russell's italics, my underlining).

⁸⁰ Field (1945b); Pilley (1945).

⁸¹ Neurath and Lauwerys (1945c, 394).

⁸² Karl Popper maintains the same thing in his book, especially in chapter 6, entitled “Totalitarian Justice”, as follows: “[i]n spite of such arguments [done by Crossman and Joad] I believe that Plato's political programme, far from being morally superior to

We have also seen that philosophers whose main subject is ancient Greek philosophy claim it to be naïve and misleading to read Plato in the light of the actual politics. That may be true on the one hand, but it is also true, on the other hand, that Plato's theory of education and politics had, even if it were misunderstood, an actual influence on the real world and politics at that time and on the way in which people made or discussed their countries. Plato's *Republic* was, for them, *Politeia* exactly.

Plato's theory of education and politics has, or at least had, a certain kind of spell. As Crossman states, WWI and the following drastic events changed the context in which Plato and his works are set; that is, from a purely research subject to an actual political thought or ideology.⁸³ In other words, Plato became politicized. This change reached a peak during WWII and Nazi Germany. Here, we may be able to see why, after WWII, Aristotle's theory of education replaced that of Plato as a focus.⁸⁴ We may well be right to point out that the revival is stimulated by external rather than intrinsic pressure. This interpretation will partially explain why his theory of education is revived in the 1950s, even though the two reasons that lead

totalitarianism, is fundamentally identical with it" and "[i]n view of all that Plato says about Goodness and Justice and the other Ideas mentioned, my thesis that his political demands are purely totalitarian and anti-humanitarian needs to be defended" (Popper 1950, 93, 94). Cf. Taylor (1986), who distinguishes three kinds of totalitarianism; (1) what Popper ascribes to Plato, such as Orwell's Oceania in his *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, (2) those like fascism and Nazism; and (3) the paternalistic one. Although he admits that Plato's *Republic* is totalitarianism in a sense, he denies that it is (1) or (2), classifying it instead as (3). On studies of totalitarianism, for example, see Schapiro (1972) and Kamenka (2007).

⁸³ This happened not only in Europe but also in Japan. Since the end of the 19th century, Japanese scholars have struggled to access Western philosophy: Plato's *Republic* has also been read and translated. In the course of this history, before WWII, Plato's *Republic* was discussed in the context of totalitarianism. However, in contrast to the case of the western post-war world, this fact has not been reflected consciously in post-war Japan. Worse, this fact itself has been forgotten. On this point, Noburu Notomi (2012) provides a respectable survey. As another recent work in Japan, for example, see Iwata (2010, esp. 237ff.), who notes that Aristotelian public education as such is not totalitarian. On the relationship between the brief history of Japanese moral education in the 20th and 21st centuries and the Aristotelian concept of civic virtue, see Tachibana (2008).

⁸⁴ See also Sasaki (2000, 331–335, 346). Unfortunately, I can say no more because this important work is beyond our expertise. However, I will note that this does not mean that the prewar scholars were committed to totalitarianism; for example, Marrou was said to oppose totalitarianism. On this point, see Too (2001, 15 n. 45).

Jaeger and Marrou to adopt the negative attitude towards Aristotle's theory of education—the compromising position of Aristotle and the fewer occurrences in his text—remain unsolved.

4. What Makes It Possible to Study Aristotle's Theory of Education

Even if the external pressure has brought about the revival of studies on Aristotle's theory of education, it, as such, would not cause the flourishing of the study that we can see since the 1980s. Some kind of countermeasures are necessary for such a flourishing. Namely, if we point out the flourishing since the 1980s, we must find some countermeasure within the study in the period that deals with the two problems—the compromising position of Aristotle and the fewer occurrences in his text. If we find such a countermeasure, we will be able to propose it as the background for the flourishing of the study since the 1980s.

4.1. Two Available Attitudes——Negative or Positive

In spite of the stream of academic study of Aristotle's theory of education that has appeared in the last thirty years, recognizing the difficulty based on the two factors mentioned above highlights that it is a serious question whether Aristotle's theory of education can be a genuine topic for academic research on Aristotle's philosophy. Two options seem to be available when attempting to combat these problems. The first is this: following Jaeger and Marrou, it is academically correct to assume that Aristotle does not inquire into this topic as much as into the other important topics, such as *ἄν*, *ψυχή*, and *ἐνδαιμονία*, and therefore, that he does not construct his theory of education as systematically and richly instructively as do Plato and Isocrates. Clearly, these topics, such as *ἄν*, *ψυχή*, and *ἐνδαιμονία*, are major protracted subjects for Aristotle. The problem of *ἄν* is discussed mainly in *Metaphysics*; the problem of *ψυχή* mainly in the *On the Soul* and the *Parva Naturalia (Short Treatises on Nature)*; and the problem of *ἐνδαιμονία* in the *Ethics* and the *Politics*. In contrast, there is no (at hand) theoretical discussion on *παιδεία* in his texts. It turns out that there is nothing worthy of investigation in his texts regarding his theory of education. This option, therefore, recommends that we adopt a *negative* attitude toward the possibility of conducting this investigation; that

is, to abandon hope of being able to carry out this investigation.

However, I would like to present four reasons that would lead us to doubt the persuasiveness of this option—the negative attitude. The first reason concerns the importance of education in antiquity. There is no doubt that topics such as *ζῶν*, *ψυχή*, and *ἐνδαιμονία* are important to Aristotle. Their importance is, however, not unique to Aristotle, but also shared by other ancient Greek philosophers. These topics are central and traditional throughout the ancient Greek world: Aristotle knowingly locates himself within the course of this tradition, as his detailed, persistent analyses of the views of previous philosophers regarding these topics prove. This fact explains that he, and none better, is entitled to be the perfecter of the history of ancient Greek philosophy. On the other hand, *ἀρετή* and *παιδεία* are also central, widely debated topics in the ancient Greek tradition. As I noted at the beginning and the scholars referred to have discussed, *παιδεία* is an important concept in antiquity. Given that, it is strange that Aristotle does not pay attention *only* to this concept.

The second concerns the era in which Aristotle lives, which occurs between the period of classical Athens and Hellenism, at a time when, as I mentioned above, many philosophers and sophists, including Plato and Isocrates, were disputing with each other over the nature and aim of education. Aristotle should have vividly witnessed these sharp exchanges. Ancient commentators suggest that Aristotle was influenced by a lecture on rhetoric delivered by Isocrates.⁸⁵ Gerard Verbeke mentions that, as Aristotle was already seventeen years old when he arrived in Athens, he “had to choose between two institutions, that of Plato and that of Isocrates, which represented two systems of education”.⁸⁶ Therefore, it would be natural for Aristotle himself to be concerned about the problem of education.

The third concerns Aristotle’s activity. As is well known, he establishes an educational and research institution, the Lyceum, and so must have sought to devise an efficient system for both education and research. In addition, he himself lectures at the Lyceum. In particular, this aspect will be enhanced if we regard the lost works, called “popular arguments (*ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι*)”, as his popular arguments for

⁸⁵ See note 49.

⁸⁶ Verbeke (1990, 5).

the ordinary citizens who are outside his Lyceum.⁸⁷ Recalling his activities, as Hadot also suggests, it would be natural to assume that Aristotle was concerned with the problem of education both practically and theoretically.^{88, 89}

These three reasons lead us to assume that, throughout most of his life, Aristotle must have been interested in the problem of education, both practically and theoretically: the ancient Greek tradition, the era in which he lives, and the Lyceum all require him to be so. Furthermore, we can present another reason for us to assume that Aristotle must have been so, especially in his *Ethics*. This reason will show that Aristotle takes seriously the educational point of view in his ethical treatises, that both Burnyeat (1980) discerns and this paper tries to demonstrate in a different way. I would like to present this as the fourth reason, which is concerned with Aristotle's own words in his *Ethics*, where he sometimes, though not frequently, discuss the importance of the educational point of view. Here, I would like to refer to two passages. In the *Eudemian Ethics* I6, when referring to the Socratic intellectualism, he emphasizes the importance of the educational point of view during ethical investigations as follows: "Socrates, then, the elder, thought the knowledge of excellence to be the end, and used to inquire what is justice, what bravery and each of the parts of virtue [...]. Therefore he inquired what excellence is, not how or from what it arises. [...] But the end of the productive sciences is different from science and knowledge, e.g. health from medical science, law and order (or something of the sort) from political science. Now to know anything that is noble is itself noble; but regarding excellence, at least, *not to know what it is, but*

⁸⁷ "Popular arguments" is an English translation of these troublesome Greek words (Liddell, Scott, and Jones 1996). These words occur eight times in Aristotle's texts (*Phys.* IV10, 217b31; *Metaph. M*1, 1076a27-28; *NE* I13, 1102a25-26; *NE* VI4, 1140a3; *EE* I8, 1217b21-22; *EE* II1, 1218b34; *Pol.* III6, 1278b31; *Pol.* VII1, 1323a22-23). Although they have attracted various interpretations since ancient times, Bos (1989) provides a good survey of this problem, mentioning the well-known interpretation that I referred to above. See Gerson (2005, 46ff.), where he investigates how these exoteric works help us to understand a sort of development of Aristotle's thought in his philosophy, which he names the "harmonists' position" and differs from what Jaeger (1948) sees. See also Pangle (2003, 202 n. 17).

⁸⁸ See Hadot (2002, 77ff.), where he claims that Aristotle's educational recommendation as the way of life is theoretical in nature based on collaborative research (see especially 87ff.). See also p. 274, where he says that "Aristotle's treatises are, to large extent, preparations for oral teaching".

⁸⁹ Complaining about Marrou's negative attitude, Hummel also comments: "[y]et Aristotle devoted as much time to teaching as to research" (Hummel 1997, 1).

to know out of what it arises is most precious”.⁹⁰ The same attitude appears in the *Nicomachean Ethics* II₂, where he explains the reason why we should investigate the nature of virtue as follows: “for we are not inquiring into what excellence is for the sake of knowing it, but for the sake of becoming good, since otherwise there would be no benefit in it at all”.⁹¹ Taking into account the fact that his ethical treatises explore ethical topics, such as happiness, habit, action, justice, practical wisdom, and friendship, in relation to the inquiry into virtue, these ethical topics as well as virtue may well legitimately be said to be explored not for the sake of knowing about them but for the sake of becoming good. Inquiring into these topics in his *Ethics* for the sake of becoming good provides sound evidence that he considers carefully the educational point of view in his *Ethics*, that is, his ethical theory. Therefore, it is natural to assume that Aristotle theoretically bears in mind the educational point of view in his *Ethics* as well as in his everyday and practical life.

These four reasons together suggest that Aristotle may well pay a certain attention to the problem of *παιδεία* both overtly and covertly and both practically and theoretically. It seems to be justified, therefore, to assume *methodologically* that he is concerned with the theory of education and its coherency with his other philosophical theories, especially when he constructs his own ethical theory. This is

⁹⁰ “Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν ὁ πρεσβύτης ᾧ ἐστὶ εἶναι τέλος τὸ γινώσκειν τὴν ἀρετὴν, καὶ ἐπεζητεῖ τί ἐστὶν ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ τί ἡ ἀνδρεία καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων αὐτῆς. [...] διόπερ ἐζητεῖ τί ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ, ἀλλ’ οὐ πῶς γίνεται καὶ ἐκ τίνων. [...] τῶν δὲ ποιητικῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἕτερον τὸ τέλος τῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ γνώσεως, οἷον ὑγίεια μὲν ἰατρικῆς, εὐνομία δὲ ἡ τι τοιοῦθ’ ἕτερον τῆς πολιτικῆς, καλὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ τὸ γνωρίζειν ἕκαστον τῶν καλῶν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ γε περὶ ἀρετῆς οὐ τὸ εἰδέναι τιμωτάτον τί ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ γινώσκειν ἐκ τίνων ἐστίν” (*EE* I₅, 1216b2-21; my italics). When I quote Aristotle’s passages, I use the English translation of Barnes (ed. 1984). However, where I am dissatisfied with the translation, mainly because of a difference of interpretation, I translate the passages by myself or use other translations, and draw attention to this fact.

On this passage, Woods comments that Aristotle’s approach to this problem is, after all, the same as that of Socrates, that is, an inquiry into what virtue is: “[t]hroughout the *E.E.* and *E.N.* Aristotle poses, and attempts to answer, questions of the ‘What is X?’ form. It is difficult to see how ethics can contribute to the practical aim which is here insisted on except by answering theoretical questions of this kind” (Woods 1992, 56–57). However, as Nussbaum also suggests, Aristotle accuses Socratic intellectualism of neglecting the role of the educational aspect of habituation (see *NE* II₄, 1105b12ff.; Nussbaum 1980, 80–81).

⁹¹ “οὐ γὰρ ἵνα εἰδῶμεν τί ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ σκεπτόμεθα, ἀλλ’ ἵν’ ἀγαθοὶ γενώμεθα, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲν ἂν ᾗν ὄφελος αὐτῆς” (*NE* II₂, 1103b27–29).

the *positive* attitude towards the possibility of investigating his theory of education. Following the attitude, the difficulties mentioned above are not as something that should prompt us to abandon our investigation, but rather as something that we should resolve. This is the second option that scholars are reasonably able to choose. In the next section, I will consider how recent positive-minded scholars put this attitude into practice through academic research and what kind of countermeasure they adopt.

4.2. A Countermeasure Adopted——Reconstruction

We have good reason to adopt this positive attitude towards the possibility of investigating Aristotle's theory of education. Furthermore, we may even say that it is those who choose the first option rather than the second who must justify their position: if one assumes that Aristotle does not consider his theory of education at all nor its coherency with his other philosophical theories, this stance requires justification. However, this does not mean that the second option is entirely immune from justification, because it does not reduce the difficulties associated with investigating Aristotle's theory of education (the compromising position of Aristotle and the fewer occurrences in his text). This means this: even if we have good reason to adopt this positive attitude, we must still justify the way in which we can investigate his theory of education as an academic and philosophical research endeavour: the positive attitude itself does not enlighten our way. Therefore, in this section, I will consider how recent scholars may put this positive attitude into practice through academic research.⁹²

We can find hints from the path of suffering that recent positive scholars have followed. As a matter of fact, although Aristotle's theory of education has become a popular topic in the last thirty years compared with previously, as we saw in section 1, scholars must still justify their enterprise because it is still minor compared to the other major topics and, therefore, it still makes conservatives suspicious of this challenging enterprise. Here, I would like to see a research style that positive

⁹² In this sense, although we share the positive attitude with Hummel, we must take a further step forward his statement that: "[a]lthough Aristotle's work has reached us in incomplete form and many important texts are missing, his theory of education can be seen to occupy an important place in his philosophical thinking as a whole" (Hummel 1997, 9).

scholars have suffered to maintain, but must appear to them relatively hopeful when attempting to put the positive attitude into practice. We can detect the research style and the necessary suffering in the words of three scholars. The first is Nancy Sherman, who seeks to justify the validity of her method of investigation as follows:

The absence of explicit discussion in the ethical treatises of the idea of character development as requiring emotional changes through changes in evaluations does not mean there isn't room for such a story in a more worked-out version of his view. Nor does the account of habituation preclude this.⁹³

It is not difficult for us to guess her suffering or anxiety about her method of investigation being attacked. Her interpretation might be attacked, or worse condemned, due to the fact that her argument is unsupported by any clear textual evidence. She responds to such an attack by claiming that her interpretation is consistent with both Aristotle's explicit discussion on habituation and the worked-out version of his view. One might think that her response is weakened because her manner of response is partially hypothetical. This would be correct. However, it would also be correct to regard her response as her decision about the way to investigate the problem of Aristotle's theory of moral education, for which there is inadequate textual evidence to allow a sound interpretation. The same problem arises even when we turn to the *Politics*. Christopher Reeve is the second scholar to share this suffering. He comments as follows:

What should the goals of education be? And how are they best achieved? Because our manuscripts of the *Politics* break off in the middle of what is itself no more than a preliminary discussion of education (1336b24-7), Aristotle's answer to both questions, especially the latter, is unfortunately somewhat incomplete. What we are told, however, together with what we can glean from other writings, provides us with a vivid, though not always incontrovertible picture.⁹⁴

I would like to emphasize that the suffering and anxiety of these two scholars are

⁹³ Sherman (1997, 88).

⁹⁴ Reeve (1998, 51).

common in a sense.⁹⁵ Both Sherman's justification and Reeve's gleaning must become involved in *reconstructing* Aristotle's theory of education in any sense. If Sherman's argument is justified, it is because it is consistent with the worked-out version of his view as well as his argument for habituation. Since the worked-out version of his view does not exist as a matter of fact, there is no way to check whether her argument is consistent with it. Therefore, if she claims this consistency, her argument must be a *plausible* reconstruction of his argument for habituation. What she actually does is to try to claim plausibly that her interpretation could be what Aristotle would have presented had he outlined in greater detail his theory of character development (which I call moral education). Reeve's case is simpler than that of Sherman. Gleaning from his other writings to depict a vivid picture of his theory of education is nothing but reconstructing his view.⁹⁶ In this way, both Sherman and Reeve must become involved in the reconstruction of Aristotle's theory of education when exploring this topic, although neither of them uses the term itself. This is what they share in common. Therefore, the serious problem we face at the beginning of this section turns out to be the problem of whether the reconstruction of Aristotle's theory of education can constitute academic and philosophical research on Aristotle's philosophy rather than the question of whether their reconstruction is appropriate or not.

I would like to refer to the comments of Jonathan Barnes to support their style. Barnes proposes three implications based on the fact that the works of Aristotle were not intended for publication but for his own lectures; namely, the fact that they are only memos or notes. The third one, that Barnes regards as the most important,

⁹⁵ Gavin Lawrence appears to share this suffering and anxiety, when he comments on his investigation concerning character development, as follows: "[o]ne can be suspicious of aspects of these various stages, especially about Aristotle's universalistic model of what it is to understand, to possess a 'why' or explanation; yet the basic perspective of *practical philosophy*, with its view of what it is for a mature human to act and react, and to form a character—to 'grow up'—strikes me as powerful, however many questions it then provokes: for example, how far it is a regulative ideal, rather than a obtainable human reality?" (Lawrence 2011, 283; Lawrence's italics).

⁹⁶ As in the case of Sherman, however, Reeve's style may be attacked because his emphasis on the usefulness of gleaning from other writings may be an insufficient justification for depicting Aristotle's vivid picture. As I show in section 2, even if we try to glean information from Aristotle's other writings, the frequency of the occurrence of the related words remains relatively low.

relates to our concern as follows:

A third implication is more important. In the case of Plato, modern readers have, it is true, considerable and taxing problems of interpretation; but they are at least face with a text which presents in a thoroughly explicit fashion the views and arguments which Plato wanted to be considered. Modern readers of Aristotle have a greater challenge: before they can attempt to understand and assess Aristotle's view—or rather, in the very course of the attempt—they must *reconstruct* them; they must, that is to say, endeavour to hear Aristotle's lecture voice while reading his lecture notes, and they must exercise sympathy and imagination to expand Aristotle's concise arguments and to illustrate his bare abstractions.⁹⁷

Although Barnes claims that the third implication is the one that can be applied to Aristotle's philosophy in general, it will be applied particularly to his theory of education, for that is the very one that needs to be reconstructed by exercising sympathy and imagination towards his apparent arguments, being gleaned from scattered passages in his *Ethics* and *Politics* as well as his other writings.⁹⁸

⁹⁷ Barnes (2004, xv–xvi; my italics).

⁹⁸ A similar point can be observed, I think, in Gadamer's comparison between philosophical research and historical research on the classical texts. He holds that what is important for the former is to re-trace a course of thought even if the historian regards it as obvious and therefore fruitless. Although Gadamer discusses this point in the context of re-tracing the dialectic ethics of Plato's *Philebus*, the following explanation will be useful for our concern here: "[t]his kind of philosophical interpretation of historical philosophemes is not too refined to submit itself to the scrutiny of historical scholarship. It cannot claim to be measured by the special standards of, as it were, a second truth. At the same time, it has goals that are different from those of historical scholarship. No more than it can evade contradiction by historical criticism (when the latter has to contradict it) is it defined, as such criticism is, by the claims of historical investigation. Its relationship to historical criticism is already a positive one when that criticism, thinking that it gets no assistance from such interpretation, finds what it says a matter of course. The endeavor of this kind of philosophical interpretation has always been to construe matters of course; and this is also the case when it is confronted with historical texts. One can put this paradoxically: *as an interpretation of historical texts, it wants to understand, by construing, that in them which is understood as a matter of course*. In this understanding which it wants, which to the historical researcher seems (in relation to his own research) like a preliminary that can be taken for granted, this kind of philosophical interpretation finds difficulties, and thus a task. What is understood as a matter of course, as something self-evident, is always something that strives to evade the explicit grasp of comprehension. It continually loses itself, as it were, in all the other things to which it is related and with

Supported by Barnes' research style, Sherman and Reeve are able to justify their own; that is, what they present as their interpretations and researches are carefully reconstructed as the worked-out and detailed version of Aristotle's view by exercising sympathy and imagination towards his apparent arguments and by gleaning from scattered passages across his writings.

Now, we can find the method that enables positive-minded scholars to study Aristotle's theory of education; namely, the interpretative reconstruction of his theory of education. Stimulated by the external pressure after WWII, and based on the positive attitude, recent positive-minded scholars have come to adopt the interpretative reconstruction as the countermeasure for studying Aristotle's theory of education.

Conclusion

Aristotle's theory of education, having several turning points constituted by various factors, has taken a tortuous course in the history of study. Particularly, three points can be indicated in the meanders. First, we found that the history can be divided into three periods regarding the way of discussing Aristotle's theory of education. The works until the 1940s particularly neglected this topic, as is characteristic of the works of Jaeger and Marrou. In the 1950s–1970s, scholars

which it goes together to form a phase of the history of the spirit—rather than presenting itself with the urgency of its substantive content” (Gadamer 1991, 12–13; my italics).

Although our strategic background is different from Gadamer's in the sense that we do not have the hermeneutic background, we would like to share the spirit. In other words, we want to understand the way Aristotle considers we become good, by construing his theory of education. (On the approach Gadamer takes when he investigates Plato's *Philebus*, I understand that he is concerned with the way or method by which we come to understand what is good, following Davidson's understanding of it (see Davidson 1997).) Of course, however, this does not mean that we are permitted to interpret Aristotle's historical texts arbitrarily. On this point, see the following passage: “[t]hus, what is understood as a matter of course is a positive feature of the opinion contained, historically, in a text itself. An elucidation of it indicates the matter-of-course, yet difficult and easily lost path of an interpretation that conceptualizes what we understand in a historical text when we proceed from a substantive understanding of our own of what is discussed in it—but not with the intention of misusing history in order to promote this understanding of our own but rather (in reverse) solely to understand what was understood there” (Gadamer 1991, 13).

began to focus on it. Scholars of history, such as Lynch, started to criticize Marrou's view of it. And scholars of philosophy (of education) began to describe it. Since the 1980s, full philosophical investigations of Aristotle's theory of education have appeared. In the field of philosophy, Burnyeat's article (1980) blazes a trail. And in the field of history, scholars, such as Too and his company, began to re-assess education in antiquity.

Second, we found that there were various factors that influenced the history as it was, such as textual, academic, or social factors. Compared with Plato and Isocrates, Aristotle's theory of education has two troubling characteristics, that especially lead prewar scholars to adopt negative attitude towards his theory of education, that is, Aristotle's compromising position in educational thought and the fewer occurrences of words related to the theory of education. The two World Wars, as a kind of external pressure, enable his theory of education to be revived.

Third and finally, we also found that the reconstructive approach, being based on the positive attitude towards Aristotle's theory of education, enables current scholars to study his theory of education fruitfully. This approach, as a countermeasure, causes the study of Aristotle's theory of education since the 1980s to flourish.

How has Aristotle's theory of education been studied? And why has it taken such a tortuous course in the history of study? These questions have been systematically ignored by scholars of pedagogy, history, and philosophy. This essay sheds light on these problems and reveals why it has been challenging to study Aristotle's theory of education and the way in which this might be surmounted. However, further investigations are eagerly awaited to facilitate the full understanding of the research history of Aristotle's theory of education as well as his theory of education itself. Although these must be our tasks in future, I hope that this essay will, as a blueprint, help us work on these tasks.

Appendix

“Education” as the English Translation of “*παιδεία*”, Its Several Aspects, and the Philosophical Investigations of Aristotle’s Theory of Education

Following the previous great scholars, in this essay, I use the word “education” as the English translation of the original Greek word “*παιδεία*”.⁹⁹ However, since this English translation might give a misleading or even false impression to the readers, I note here the meaning of this English translation in this essay. On the one hand, the central meanings of this Greek word are “rearing of child”, “training and teaching”, and “education” as educational processes; this also means a “(mental) culture” as a result.¹⁰⁰ Based on the *OED*, on the other hand, the English word “education” also means both “[t]he process of nourishing or rearing a child or young person, an animal” and “[c]ulture or development of powers, formation of character, as contrasted with the imparting of mere knowledge or skill”. Accordingly, insofar as it is described in this way, we do not find any gap between “education” and “*παιδεία*”: “education”, as the English translation of “*παιδεία*”, means (1) an educational process and (2) its result as well. Although I follow these implications of this translation, this translation itself fails to suggest a misleading gap between “education” and “*παιδεία*”.

Rather, the gap can be seen in the implications that each type of education has. The English word “education”, on the one hand, has various implications in our century. For example, this word conjures up various images, such as schools, schoolteachers, students, their platonic relationship, a systematic curriculum, the legal framework, and so on. On the other hand, the ancient Greek word “*παιδεία*” does not imply any of these images. Before Hellenism, at least, there did not exist a public educational system apart from a totalitarian one, such as Spartan education.¹⁰¹ In this sense, there is no school, no schoolteacher, no student, no

⁹⁹ Of course, however, we may detect an exception in Latin where Cicero translates this Greek word as “*humanitas*”, or “acculturation” might be a candidate.

¹⁰⁰ These translations come from Liddell, Scott, and Jones (1996).

¹⁰¹ See Marrou (1956, 103), who comments as follows: “[i]n the Hellenistic era, education stopped being a matter of private initiative and became, generally speaking,

curriculum, and no legal framework as we imagine them.¹⁰² Furthermore, ancient Greek education has a strong connection with pederasty, that is, boy-love.¹⁰³ A kind of sexual relationship between a senior (a so-called teacher) and a junior (a so-called student) is an important factor for understanding ancient Greek education. This point vividly illustrates the fact that education in the ancient Greek world differs from that in more recent times in many ways. Accordingly, this English translation might give a misleading or even false impression to the readers if those images are conjured up. Therefore, each scholar must clarify what he or she puts into question when using “education” as the translation of “*παιδεία*”.

Partially because of these differences, ancient Greek educational thought has been one of the most important subjects in the historical investigation of antiquity. Scholars of pedagogy and history are keen to investigate how the ancient Greeks teach their children or what kind of position education occupies in their society. These are major aspects of a theory of education that scholars consider.

Not only in the case of antiquity, a theory of education in general concerns these and other aspects. A theory of education can be a theory that achieves effective results: a theory of this sort will lead to an educational curriculum that will be expected to educate children or students effectively. It may be a theory that

subject to official control. This was something new, at least on such a large scale. It is true that Aristotle makes it a legislator’s strict duty to legislate on education—*νομοθετητέον περὶ παιδείας*—but in this the great philosopher was speaking prophetically (2), for in his own time any system of “public instruction” under the control of the State was a peculiarity of “aristocratic” states like Sparta and Crete, whose totalitarian tendencies I have already mentioned (3). To the men of Hellenistic times, however, legislation on school affairs had become the normal thing, one of the necessary attributes of the civilized State—hence their surprise when in Republican Rome they came across an archaic stage of development in which education was still outside the control of the State”. (“*παιδείας*” seems to be a misprint of “*παιδείας*”). See also Kraut (2002, 206), who states that “[i]n Aristotle’s time, no polis provided the sort of education he prescribe in Books VII and VIII for the children of citizens. Sparta organized the training of children, but the education it promoted was designed above all to promote warriors, not the cultured and thoughtful citizens that Aristotle favors”.

¹⁰² Of course, this does not mean that there is no teacher, no school, no teacher, no curriculum, and no legal framework in any sense.

¹⁰³ Marrou emphasizes the role of pederasty in ancient Greek education as follows: “*Παιδεία* found its realization in *παιδεραστεία*. This seems strange to a modern, or at any rate to a Christian; but it must be realised that it was an integral part of the ancient system” (Marrou 1956, 31).

legitimizes teachers to educate them uniformly in a specific way: a theory of this sort will provide its own argument that justifies the violence of education.¹⁰⁴ It is certain that Aristotle considers these problems: he discusses the curriculum and the need for public education in his *Politics* VII and VIII. In this sense, therefore, reconstructing these theories in Aristotle's *Ethics* and *Politics* can provide a reconstruction of his theory of education in a genuine sense. In fact, some scholars in the field of the philosophy of education and history have been interested in these aspects of his theory of education.

However, this is not the only thing that we can reconstruct as Aristotle's theory of education. When some positive-minded scholars such as Sherman or Reeve explore Aristotle's *Ethics* and *Politics* from educational points of view, they explore neither the curriculum nor the legitimacy of education, but rather what it is like for human beings to become good: it may be correct to say that they try to reconstruct a sort of moral psychology and moral epistemology in Aristotle from the developmental point of view.¹⁰⁵ Although I believe that this can be named legitimately *a theory of moral education*, if the term usually means a theory of the curriculum or justification, I am pleased to state that what they will explore is a sort of reconstruction of the *philosophical basis* of Aristotle's theory of moral education or, in short, his philosophy of education.¹⁰⁶

It is not difficult to understand the reason why I call this sort of exploration the

¹⁰⁴ Harvey Siegel (2009, 3) lists the basic problems of philosophy of education as follows: "what are the proper aims and guiding ideals of education? [...] what are the appropriate criteria for evaluating educational efforts, institutions, practices, and products? Other important problems involve the authority of the state and of teachers, and the rights of students and parents [...]"

¹⁰⁵ Pakaluk and Pearson (eds. 2011, 1) briefly comment on the current situation concerning moral psychology in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. I sympathize with their enterprise, although there is a difference between us. They focus on the link or reunion between moral psychology and philosophy of action in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. However, I wish to focus on the link or union between moral psychology and moral education in it though not excluding his theory of action.

¹⁰⁶ Scholars may not regard the exploration as one that belongs to the philosophy of education. Furthermore, from the viewpoint of the philosophy of education (rather than moral psychology), one may complain that I do not distinguish moral education from moral development (on the difference, see Haydon 2003, 321). Although it does not matter for me whether this exploration is and should be in the field of philosophy or the philosophy of education, I would like to claim to be "bringing philosophy of education back to philosophy", following Siegel (2009, 7).

reconstruction of the philosophical basis of Aristotle's theory of *moral* education rather than, simply, education. In the classical Athens period, the figure of the ideal human being began to be emphasized. As mentioned at the beginning of this paper, the aim of *παιδεία* changes from time to time. The educational processes and their resulting culture also change accordingly from time to time. Especially in the classical Athens period, to which Aristotle as well as Plato and Isocrates belong, this Greek word implies the colouration of the ideal for human beings. In this period, therefore, *παιδεία* is primarily something that makes human beings ideal, but does not train them in a profession such as shoemaking or building.¹⁰⁷ Both Plato and Aristotle share this implication when they emphasize the importance of education for citizens rather than professionals.¹⁰⁸ In this sense, the education in question is moral or ethical rather than professional in nature because the ideal of human beings is an ethical matter. Thus, we can call this sort of exploration the reconstruction of the philosophical basis of Aristotle's theory of *moral* education.¹⁰⁹

Given that, it will be less problematic if I characterize some positive-minded scholars' explorations as follows: they explore (1) what Aristotle considers the psychological and epistemic processes and alternation are, by which human beings become good as human beings in several ways but not incidentally; and (2) what Aristotle considers the results of the processes and alternations should be.¹¹⁰ Accordingly, I can make it explicit what the English word "education", as the English translation of "*παιδεία*", means in this essay, especially in section 4: that is, it means (1) a certain process through which people become good and virtuous, and

¹⁰⁷ Jaeger expresses this point skillfully. He translates this troublesome word into "die (menschliche) Erziehung", whereas he explains its central meaning as "die Formung/Bildung des griechischen Menschen", claiming that his investigation is "die Wesenserkenntnis des griechischen Bildungsphänomens" (Jaeger 1933–1947, Vorwort and S. 5).

¹⁰⁸ *Leg.* 643d6–644b4; *Pol.* VII.9, 1328b39–40

¹⁰⁹ Guthrie (1962–1981, Vol. VI, 399 n. 2) states: "*παιδεία* is a word used for education in general, though here [*i.e.*, *NE* X.9, 1180a14ff.] A. is evidently thinking primarily of moral training". As he understands that these passages connect *NE* with *Pol.*, he will agree with me that these works concern moral education rather than professional or other kinds of education. Also in the field of the philosophy of education, referring to Plato, this position is introduced as follows: "all education is in a sense moral education" (Haydon 2003, 320).

¹¹⁰ Therefore, this essay does not consider the educational aspect as an exhortation to a life whereby each Greek philosopher shows their way of life *via* their philosophical writings and activities, as Hadot (2002) analyses.

(2) the virtuous state and happiness as its results. Thus, what they reconstruct when they reconstruct Aristotle's theory of education *is* his philosophical thoughts about what it is like for human beings to become good and virtuous. Since these thoughts provide the philosophical basis for his theory of moral education, their explorations are concerned with the philosophical basis of his theory of moral education and, therefore, genuinely philosophical investigations of his theory of moral education. This is, I think, the philosophical motivation that enables the flourishing since the 1980s.

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