

【論文】

Administrative Rhetoric Revisited: Investigating Rhetorical Identification between Ruler and Ruled

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Abstract. The notion of commonplace, or common opinion, is one of imperative elements of politics. Machiavelli shows how the ruler manipulates the commonplace to embrace his private interests as the social needs. This study investigates rhetoric of Machiavellian politics in the attempt to reveal ways in which the ruler guides people to identify with his private interests. The study firstly investigates the relationship between politics and rhetoric to examine how Machiavelli locates these two arts. Then, this inquiry discusses Machiavelli's political theory by focusing on his notions of republic, people, and appearance. Thirdly, focusing on the rhetorical theories of Aristotle and Burke, this inquiry explains how the commonplace plays a critical role. This section also examines their notions of commonplace, deductive reasoning based on opinion, and identification will reveal techniques of the ruler to use the commonplace to guide people to accept his private aims. Lastly, this study discusses Machiavellian politics and the current politics in order to call for the need of healthy commonplace for our engagements in politics.

Whose could these men be? What were they talking about? What authority could they represent? K. lived in a country with a legal constitution, there was universal peace, all the laws were in force; who dared seize him in his own dwelling? He had always been inclined to take things easily, to believe in the worst only when the worst happened, to take no care for the morrow even when the outlook was threatening. . . . But he was still free.

(*The Trial*, Kafka, 1925/1992, pp. 4-5)

1. INTRODUCTION

Imagine yourself as a soldier gathered in a battalion with hundreds and hundreds of bloodthirsty, well-disciplined warriors beside a battleground. It is extremely quiet. No one around you speaks, yet somehow you are sure every fellow soldier is ready for whatever may come when the trumpets sound. You might be able to hear your commander saying something, but only faintly. You see the enemy far away. Suddenly, you hear trumpets blaring, a signal that the battle has begun. You witness hordes of soldiers wounding and killing each other, but so far, you have survived, and then the realization of where you are breaks over you. You understand that you do not want to risk your life—only it is too late to do anything about it. You see the enemy rushing toward you. You must fight or be killed. With no choice but to confront the fact you have no way out, as you engage an enemy soldier, you demand of yourself, “How in the world did I get here anyway?”

Or, allow yourself to reset the clock 30 minutes prior to the trumpets' call. You now have the opportunity to express these uneasy, unshakeable feelings to your commander. Some fellow soldiers might join you in

complaint asking, “Why risk our lives for a country?” In response, the commander eloquently holds forth to unite all the soldiers in his army. He highlights how brave and honorable it is to fight to preserve your country’s beliefs. He successfully brings everyone, even unenthusiastic soldiers like you, together. Now your mind is firmly set, you are determined and ready for battle. Words from the commander, so eloquently and persuasively woven, fall on your ears and pierce your heart. You do not bother to listen to that inner doubting voice.

In fact, both situations exemplify rhetorical power. You are manipulated to do what a political ruler wants you to do in both cases. However, there is a vivid distinction between the two circumstances. In the first example, the army can be described as a political entity; in the second, the army appears bonded by sentiments. The soldiers attain *sentimental* unity, rather than *political* unity. In the first example, the army is well organized and disciplined by a leader who has mastered the art of politics. Manipulation exists not in force or sentiment, but in an invisible, undetectable, and unforceful manner. Simply put, you are manipulated, yet you do not know it. Machiavelli famously required two crucial characteristics of a prince—the power of a lion and the cautious, deceptive mind of a fox. Indeed, the image of a merciful lion represents Machiavelli’s theory of politics: Politics is a rhetorical process, through which a prince leads the people to where he wants them by making them want to be where he wants them. For Machiavelli, as a matter of fact, rhetoric is not a forceful process; rather it is a deceptive process. To some extent, rhetoric is an attractive invitation to the battleground.

This study investigates the mind of Machiavelli’s political fox in order to disclose how the ruler—fox persuades and attracts followers, in particular how he persuades followers to embrace his private interests. In other words, this inquiry aims to reveal how rulers manipulate the place common between him and the people in order to have them embrace his private interests as social needs. This investigation is divided into four stages. The first stage examines the relationship between politics and rhetoric to clarify how Machiavelli locates these two arts. In the second stage, the investigation focuses on Machiavelli’s notions of the republic, people, and appearance. Third, the study explains how a place common to ruler and ruled, that is, a common place, plays an important role in Machiavellian theory. This section also discusses the rhetorical theories of Aristotle and Burke. Their notions of a common place, i.e., deductive reasoning based on opinion and identification, reveal how the ruler uses the common place to guide the ruled to accept his personal aims. The last section examines more recent political situations to demonstrate that Machiavellian rhetoric still exists centuries later, even in a democratic society.

2. POLITICS AND RHETORIC

2.1. From Civilizer-Orator to Ruler-Orator

Rhetoric and politics are closely tied. Discussing the relationship between the public sphere and politics, Hauser (1999) describes the critical role of public discourses among citizens in the Athenian democracy. According to him, Protagoras, responding to Socrates in Plato’s *Protagoras*, does not differentiate rhetorical skills from political techniques because Protagoras believes “deftness at public argument... [is] a prerequisite for influencing public policy” (p. 15). The reciprocity between the quality of public decisions and that of

persuasive discourse is important to Protagoras, and Aristotle further elaborates by emphasizing the ethical characteristics of politics and relating rhetoric to them. Unlike Plato, who in *Phaedrus*²⁾ unwillingly admits the use of rhetoric in politics, Aristotle (trans., 1954) argues that rhetoric is the offshoot of politics. As Bizzell and Herzberg (1990) assert, for Plato, rhetoric serves as a means to “persuade others to true knowledge,” while Aristotle states that rhetoric has a role in decision making among people who have no true knowledge on matters (p. 145). Plato envisions a city that exists in unity, ruled by a philosopher—ruler who knows that truth leads people. Arendt (1958/1998) observes that Plato’s political theory is “the implication of ordinary mastership” (p. 227). In contrast, Aristotle, although he favors the monarchical state, critiques the Platonic sense of political unity because one person’s rule over the state can easily destroy it by ignoring the people’s interests. The state is to provide a common advantage—the good life. Aristotle does not reject that politics is an art or that the masses can judge an artist who exercises the art. Simply put, the distinction between the place of rhetoric in the politics of Plato and that of Aristotle is that Plato’s rhetoric is the art to rule, and Aristotle’s rhetoric is the art of participation in politics, available not only to the ruler, but also to the people.

By reiterating Aristotle, Cicero believes that rhetoric—oratory—is a political weapon for opposing tyrannical rule. Cicero insists on the effectiveness and importance of rhetoric in political debate and public deliberation in constructing the republic. The ideal orator serves not only the dignity of the orator’s own safety, but also that of members of the entire state. Cicero (trans., 2001) argues that the art of rhetoric allows rhetoricians to be virtuous through “service to your friends, and benefit to the State” (p. 65). He theorizes rhetoric as a political tool. As Rebhorn (1995) suggests, Cicero holds rhetoric in republican terms, as “a contest among free citizens” (p. 38). Even though Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero do not hold identical notions of rhetoric, they do share one understanding: Rhetoric is only a means to persuade people, and rhetoric as a powerful instrument can be used correctly or incorrectly. This characteristic leads Plato to neglect rhetoric’s use and guides Aristotle and Cicero to emphasize the fatality of using rhetoric for good cause. For some people, such as Renaissance tyrants, rhetoric is just another manipulative political weapon for ruling the state.

An absolute monarch’s rise changes the perspective of the state from a civil society to something resembling a political organization.³⁾ Politics becomes a power game in which “the doctrine of absolute monarchy [is] the only viable mode of governance” (Hauser, p. 21). Players in the game have great possessions, enabling them to raise effective, independent armies. Roeder (1933/1966) adds that mercantile civilization fuels the creation of *organization*, just as society changes the notion of service from the feudal tradition of loyalty into economic occupation. In the game of politics and an *organization*-like society, warfare becomes mercenary, and diplomacy transforms into “an honourable form of eavesdropping” (p. 201). Rhetoric, or public discourse, is no longer a part of the art of creating a civil society; it is a means for controlling a large organization—a game for powerful people.⁴⁾ For Renaissance thinkers, the dark side of rhetoric is not something to be left out or valued less than its role in the implementation of virtuous activity. Their conception of rhetoric offers two points regarding the relationship between politics and rhetoric. The first point is that rhetoric is a manipulative, political tool for ruling. The second is that oratory has limited political power when compared to the oppressive tyranny.

Concerning the first point, Rebhorn (1995) argues that Renaissance rhetoricians theorize rhetoric as a

political tool, not to “enable free political debate and discussion... [but to give] its possessor the ability to subjugate others, to place the world beneath his feet” (p. 15). Rhetoric is not a competitive public discourse among free citizens; rather it is a political instrument for ruling. Rhetoric for Renaissance writers, Reborn explains, appears as a weapon of empire because “words are swords” (p. 41). Both Plato and Renaissance thinkers agree that rhetoric functions as a means to rule common people; yet what separates Plato from these thinkers is that Plato’s rhetoric is a way to lead people to higher knowledge, while Renaissance rhetoric serves only the ruler’s purpose. Rhetoric, once called *cooker*y because it eased the bitterness of medicine (truth), becomes a sword in the hands of a tyrannical leader. Cicero might believe the orator as effective as a sword for common people to use against tyranny. According to Bizzell and Herzberg, Cicero represents “the power the orator commanded in Republic of Rome, power that made him real political threat”; however, his death resulted from defense against a military tyrant, demonstrating “the powerlessness of rhetoric under the emperors, when no one dared to speak political issues” (pp. 196-197). This brings up the second point about political rhetoric in the Renaissance: the limited power of eloquence before a tyrannical political leader. To some extent, the Renaissance view of rhetoric teaches us that eloquence can be as powerful as a sword in the political arena, but like using a sword, rhetoric contains the risk of death. In other words, if an ordinary, common person plays with a sword, s/he will surely be wounded and perhaps killed. Only a strong person, a soldier perhaps, trained in the art of swordplay, must use a sword.

As political leaders gain the power to become military tyrants, rhetoric is equated to a forceful, manipulative political weapon. A Renaissance thinker, Francesco Patrizi, according to Reborn (1995), believed that rhetoric is tied with “deception, violence, disorder, and crisis, not at all with orderly government” and that orators are “rabble-rousers... [seeking] tyrannical power as each strives to dominate all others in the public arena,” instead of achieving public justice or the public good (p. 47). The orator is no longer equated to the civilizer, but to the manipulative ruler. Machiavelli’s political theory resides in this line of argument.

2.2. Machiavelli: Ruler-Rhetorician

Known for his political theory of deception, Machiavelli is commonly labeled the father of political science. His study *The Prince* provoked a number of negative responses, from which emerged the term Machiavellianism, referring to the tyrannical control, and which associated his first name, Niccolò, with the devil, thus “Old Nick.” Because of *The Prince*, many scholars, viewing Machiavellian rhetoric as deceptive, explain a Machiavellian rhetorician as a devilish figure with a talent for manipulative eloquence.⁷⁾ Of course, this sort of understanding—Machiavelli as a devilish figure—does not inform more complex theories of Machiavelli, as discussed below. The power of eloquence does not concern Machiavelli. Even though he does not ignore the importance of oratory, he does not believe it plays a crucial part in ruling the state.

At the beginning of *The Prince*, Machiavelli declares that the book does not contain any “form of rhetorical or unnecessary ornamentation” to enrich his discussions (p. 5). In other words, he asserts that his subject matter contains effective knowledge that a prince must have to rule the state. Kahn (1990) argues that the Humanist and Ciceronian identification of the *honestum* (usefulness) and the *utile* (good), “substituting the criterion of

efficacy for that of moral idealism,” cannot be found in Machiavelli (p. 470). Placing a method of ruling as the primary goal, Machiavelli believes that the moral question does not matter since a ruler might have to behave in an evil manner to maintain peace. He is interested in what works in politics and what does not. Eloquent deliberation may be needed in a certain situation, as he discusses the commander’s speech to his army before battle in *The Art of War*; however, the power of eloquence alone does not unite the state, just as forceful and oppressive actions do not always provide an effective method of ruling. To borrow Kahn’s explanation (1994), “Machiavelli does not supplant rhetoric with a more realistic view of politics but rather makes politics more deeply rhetorical than it has been in the earlier humanist tradition” (p. 8). Rhetoric for Machiavelli is not only eloquent public discourse, but also persuasion that consists of both verbal and nonverbal conditions of politics. If a prince rules the state solely by tyrannical power, he is no wiser than a lion, a wild animal, ruling the jungle by power alone. Machiavellian politics requires a ruler to have not only the power of a lion, but also the mind of a fox. With the mind of a fox, the art of ruling the state becomes all about rhetoric.

3. MACHIAVELLI’S THEORY OF RHETORICAL POLITICS

3.1. Principality and Republic

After reading Machiavelli’s works carefully, one realizes that his negative reputation is somehow too simply generalized to represent the essence of his political theory. Although his theory is surely full of ideas of deception and manipulation, he is not sufficiently naïve to think that exercising tyrannical power is enough to rule the state. Machiavelli’s primary concern is how to rule the state most effectively, not how to create a tyrant. In other words, maintaining power and the order is, of course, more crucial than gaining power. A temporal success can be accomplished with forceful measures, which, however, does not guarantee prolonged prosperity. Machiavelli is aware of the downfall of gaining power. As Foucault (1994/1997) eloquently explains, “For if it is true that slavery is the great risk that Greek freedom resists, there is also another danger that initially appears to be the opposite of slavery: the abuse of power” (p. 288). The tyrant who abuses power to oppress others is “the slave of his appetites” (p. 288). Machiavelli (1532/1988) pronounces, “As men do almost always, the more authority they have, the worse they use it and the more insolent they become” (p. 88). To avoid the prince becoming a slave of his own desire, Machiavelli envisions a society formed like his ideal state—the Roman Republic. As he explains in *The Prince*, he is interested in “the effectual truth”—the useful knowledge concerning what works and what does not to rebuild his beloved Florence so that it becomes as great as the Roman Republic (p. 52).

Machiavellian politics requires both principality and republic. In *Discourse*, Machiavelli divides the state into three classes: the ruler (principality), the noble (aristocracy), and the people (democracy). To prevent corruptions of all classes—principality to tyranny, aristocracy to oligarchy, and democracy to anarchy—Machiavelli insists that the ideal state is maintained when these three classes “keep watch over the other” (p. 215). The state must be led by a powerful leader, yet the state must prevent that leader from becoming a tyrant. In order to do so, the state must be formed as a republic. Elsewhere, Machiavelli (1532/1988) critiques the

decline of Italy as resulting from its lack of principality and republic. He believes that Italy became corrupt because “in the princes there is no appetite for true glory and in the republic no order that deserves to be praised. (p. 53). Since the principality pursues glory and the republic brings order, the state requires both forms. Mansfield (1996) points out that “the excellence of a republic lies not in denying princely virtue but precisely in releasing it and then checking it” (p. 23). Kahn (1994) follows Machiavelli adding that since a republic can maintain greater longevity and *virtù* than a principality, “if the prince [is] to be a man of *virtù* in the long run, he must found a republic” (p. 40). To some extent, a powerful ruler brings glory to the state, and the republic sustains glory for a long time. Yet, what does the Machiavellian notion of *virtù* mean and how important is it in his theory of politics?

The Machiavellian republic consists of three essences: *virtù*, fortune, and order. Unlike Aristotelian political theory that coexists with ethics, Machiavellian *virtù* is exclusively tied to politics. Kahn (1994) explains that there is no fixed characterization of *virtù*, since it can be ethical, immoral, and violent, depending on what a particular situation demands. *Virtù* “is structurally like the classical and humanist notion of prudence or practical reason, as opposed to technical or instrumental reason” (p. 37). What differentiate *virtù* from non-*virtù* are the consequences of conduct; acts of *virtù* must bring glory to the state. According to Wood (1965), *virtù* is a required element in “effective military and political leadership, and it is essential to the survival and well being of people in this alien and hostile world” (p. lix). Machiavellian *virtù* can be explained by militaristic qualities such as boldness and bravery; it can be learned through discipline and training. Since fortune, like destiny, influences human life, having *virtù* is not enough to maintain the republic; fortune must be tamed. Illustrating fortune as a woman, Machiavelli (1998) asserts that men must seize the advantage by keeping her down, beating, and struggling with her. How are fortune, *virtù*, and order related in the republic? MacFarland (1999) argues that, since the state must be maintained by having *virtù* and by taming fortune, “one must found the orders that endure after one’s virtue has been reclaimed by fortune” because “only such orders can supply the line of similarly virtuous men who will maintain one’s state” (p. 145). *Virtù* and fortune allow the ruler to create a great republic with order, and virtuous ways of life will be learned and maintained under its order. In the attempt to achieve this sort of state, necessity drives Machiavelli’s theory. Deceptive and manipulative techniques are reliable means to achieve the end if necessity demands them. However, Machiavelli’s rhetoric cannot be simply described as the theory of deception; rather, Machiavelli’s rhetoric is more complexly intertwined with the whole political system. For Machiavelli, politics is rhetorical. A ruler persuades his subjects to follow him. That people live under the ruler means that people are kept persuaded by the ruler, in order to maintain the ideal state, the Roman Republic.

3.2. Nature of People

In *The Prince*, Machiavelli asserts that the art of war is the most important profession the ruler must master. Machiavelli’s art of war, however, is not only about winning wars, but also about governing the state. If the ruler neglects this art—“war, its institutions, and its discipline”—and concerns himself only with his personal luxuries, he will lose the state (p. 49). The art of war is crucial not only to defend the state from foreign

powers, but also to rule the state. Note that Machiavelli does not assert that war itself is the sole art; its institutions and discipline are also important. Machiavelli does not mean that the military force creates the well-governed state or that defeating its enemies unifies the state. For example, in *The Art of War*, he emphasizes that a wise ruler should not let his subjects be occupied with “the acquisition of glory” even during times of peace (p. 19). Winning wars and governing a state are not distinct activities for Machiavelli. In fact, they are interrelated, and the one cannot exist without the other. According to Wood (1965), the military art and the art of politics share “a common style” in Machiavelli’s theory (p. xlvii). Wood states that military cohesion is the essence of civil society, and that its establishment unifies society. Military power provides security to the state, and well-organized civil order secures the discipline of the army. To some extent, to maintain a well-organized state, the ruler must have a powerful army; simultaneously, to maintain a powerful army, the ruler must have a well-organized state.

The arts of war and politics are both mastered by the ruler; therefore the ruler is the rhetorician, and his subjects are his audience. As Aristotle suggests, audience analysis is a crucial part of successful persuasion. Machiavelli (1532/1998) explains that the ruler must “know well the nature of the people” (p. 6). Then, how does Machiavelli view people? What is their place in Machiavellian politics? First of all, Machiavelli does not believe that humans are caring by nature; rather, “Men are wretched creatures” (p. 56). As Burke (1950/1969) asserts, Machiavelli’s universality is that humans are “at odds with one another” (p. 165). Therefore, Machiavelli naturally has little trust and sympathy for people. People are often depicted as wild animals in opposition to the ruler who is a master to “chain... [them] up” (1531/1975, p. 252). Machiavelli argues that even a prince with the most powerful armies “needs the support of the inhabitants to seize a province” (p. 8). The reason the ruler needs people is simply because the state does not exist without them. The people are “useless... without a head,” but with a head, they are *useful* (1531/1975, p. 312).

To make them *useful*, the ruler needs to *chain them up* in a proper way because people easily “fool themselves” into thinking that they are better than the prince and acting against him with arms (Machiavelli, 1532/1998, p. 8). At the same time, Machiavelli knows well that people act like wild animals when they are mistreated. Kahn (1990) explains that if the prince aims to preserve the state, he eventually must “take into account the interests of his subjects” (p. 470). What kind of interests do people tend to have? Pointing out the difference between the nobility and the people, Machiavelli (1532/1998) suggests that less concern is required on the ruler’s part for the nobility because ruling the people is actually more difficult. The common people desire not to be dominated, while the nobility aims to dominate. The ruler cannot “honestly” satisfy the nobility’s desire for domination “without harming others” (p. 34). If the prince must choose which class to please, he should satisfy the people, not the nobility because, for the ruler, the nobles are disposable. Since the prince cannot *honestly* satisfy the nobility’s desire for domination, it is inevitable that the nobility becomes enemies of the prince. It should, however, trouble him little. The prince can easily dispose nobles because they are few compared to the common people. Additionally, the prince does not have to abide the nobility—if he does not like them, he can abandon them—but he cannot abandon the common people. Machiavelli asserts that maintaining friendships with common people is crucial for the prince; however, one can easily guess that his notion of friendship is not equivalent to Aristotle’s. Being friends in Machiavelli’s theory, de Alvarez (1999)

suggests, means they “are to spend when the time comes; that is why one acquires them” (p. 83). In this sense, utility is the essence of friendship, and this usefulness plays a great role, especially in war.

The important characteristic of people can be found in Machiavelli’s combining the arts of war and politics. In politics, where these two arts are closely tied, people are not only citizens, but also soldiers. For the army, Machiavelli (1521/1965) favors a citizen militia, but critiques mercenaries. He explains that professional soldiers fight for money and would not die for the country. Machiavelli also states that paying salaries to hired soldiers and their commanders is a corrupt system. The issues of professionalism and economy, however, are not the main reason for his rejection of mercenaries. Mercenary soldiers might be better skilled than citizens, but they lack the *virtù* that is a crucial element in Machiavellian politics. Compared to mercenaries, the citizen army has the crucial *virtù*. In war, all soldiers know that they have to kill or be killed. The fear of losing one’s life might be overcome by skill. Yet Machiavelli would go further to require soldiers to overcome fear by embracing the possibility of tragic consequences. The worst scenario is, of course, death. Jackson (2000) explains that, valuing the civic *virtù* of a republic, Machiavelli envisions “a citizen army to cement the bond of citizens to the city and each other” (p. 434). Mercenary soldiers undermine the *virtù* of a republic; however, the citizen army does not, and they would die for the republic. Their committed servitude is the manifestation of their *virtù*, and it raises each individual soldier higher than any mercenary.

Harmony between skill and discipline and between power and *virtù* is crucial in Machiavelli’s politics. In fact, a ruler, like his army, must not lack these two elements. For example, Machiavelli (1532/1988) highly praises Godfrey, Eustrace, and Baldwin of Bouillion, leaders of The Crusades, for their servitude: “Many kings and many peoples participated in it with money, and many private individuals fought without any pay—so great a power did religion have then on the spirits of men” (p. 28). Machiavelli, of course, does not value the holiness of their religious mission. He is pleased by the effective influence of religion that drives people to bond with each other, evoke their fidelity, and devote and sacrifice themselves to a greater cause. This strong sense of soldierly devotion is crucial in Machiavelli’s notion of an army. Machiavelli (1521/1965) also explains the necessity of *jurati* (taking an oath) in constituting an infantry. In his note on *The Art of War*, Wood explains that soldiers are united by an oath, and “this oath, sanctioned as it is by religion, is of the utmost importance in maintaining good discipline and respect for authority” (p. 60). To make citizens good soldiers, the ruler must train and discipline them properly. Through training, citizens gain battle skills, and through discipline, they obtain *virtù*. When the ruler successfully persuades his citizens to have *virtù*, he can govern a well-organized state and lead a powerful army.

In addition, Machiavelli (1532/1998) mentions Moses as one of the most excellent princes, what he calls “armed prophets” (p. 22). Machiavelli requires a prince to bear both arms and prophecy, thereby uniting his subjects in common beliefs to lead his state to glory. He explains that the state of Girolamo Savonarola collapsed “when the populace began no longer to believe in [his new institutions], since he had no way of holding steady those who had believed nor of making the disbelievers believe” (p. 22). How can a prince make people believe in something? Employing force would do the job; however, we must not forget that the power of the lion alone does not make an admirable prince. The question we should ask now is how the fox would rhetorically lead the people to believe what he wants them to believe.

3.3. Appearance and Creation: Sense of Sight and Sense of Touch

The arts of war and politics are interrelated in Machiavelli's theory, and they are to be mastered by the ruler. People are literally subjects of the rhetorician-ruler. How does the ruler persuade people? The key to this question is Machiavelli's notion of appearance—appearance as deception—one of the ideas he most discusses. The ruler should appear in certain ways because, most of the time, appearance is enough to persuade citizens effectively. For example, Machiavelli (1532/1998) suggests five qualities a prince should have, namely, being merciful, faithful, humane, trustworthy, and most importantly, religious. However, the prince does not actually have all these qualities; he should only appear to acquire them. Machiavelli goes on to state that practicing these qualities “at all times is harmful; and appearing to have them is useful” because ruling the state obligates the prince to engage in conduct counter to these qualities (p. 59). As mentioned above, there is no Humanist, Ciceronian equation of the good and the useful. Kahn (1994) argues that Machiavelli embraces what Humanists know, but fear to admit: “What appears to be virtue may in practice turn out to be vice” (p. 19). The ruler does not have to remain purely good, but must know when to commit evil acts under necessity. The prince, however, should remember one thing when engaging in evil: he must appear to be undertaking the actions for the good for the state. One might ask whether the ruler's manipulating his appearance would evoke people's caution. Machiavelli would answer that the ruler does not need to worry about it because “ordinary people are always deceived by appearances... and in the world there is nothing but ordinary people” (p. 60). In the beginning of *The Prince*, he insists that he composed the book for the prince to learn effectual ruling skills, and that he did not use any “rhetorical or unnecessary ornamentation” to illuminate his discussion. In other words, *The Prince* is about political tactics and explains what works and what does not so that the ruler can learn *the way it is*. Clearly, Machiavelli believes deceptive appearance is a rhetorical technique for the ruler.

The difference between the ruler as the deceiver and the people as the deceived provides an intriguing notion about two distinct realities in Machiavellian theory: politics is the art of the ruler who creates realities with his hands, and, in contrast, people create, or accept, realities through their eyes. As de Alvarez (1999) points out, Machiavelli emphasizes seeing is tied to deception and touching tied to understanding. He states, “Understanding... is truly ... of comprehension or grasping, not of gazing or contemplation. Truth cannot be seen from a distance; it must be taken in hand, as fortune is to be taken in hand” (pp. 87-88). de Alvarez offers an interesting comparison between Machiavelli and Rousseau who *disbelieves* that seeing allows people to create and understand reliable knowledge. Rousseau allows Emile—a child raised in the wilderness apart from any corrupt social influence—to be exposed to the optical illusion created when a straight stick, submerged partially in water, appears bent. Then Emile realizes the straightness of the stick by touching it. Unlike Emile, people in Machiavelli's state are exposed only to the optical illusion; they are not allowed to touch the stick.

Machiavelli knows touch is a fatal component in creation of the state. Learning from moral philosophers, Machiavelli (1531/1975) mentions that “two most noble instruments to which man's nobility is due... [are] his hands and his tongue” (p. 505). Ordinary citizens might be allowed to use their tongues because Machiavelli permits people to engage in accusations when the ruler or the nobles overstep their authority, but does not permit them to use their hands. Ordinary people judge by seeing rather than touching. Machiavelli

(1532/1998) asserts, “Men in general judge more by their eyes than their hands; for everyone can see but few can feel. Everyone sees what you seem to be, few touch upon what you are” (p. 60). The ruler should not be concerned with those who *can* touch him, for there are only few of them.

To some extent, the Machiavellian ruler is an artist. With his hands, the ruler creates the art of politics. Plato (trans., 1999) does not appreciate this sort of theory of politics because any form of art is imitation and does not provide “a taste of the real thing” (p. 193). In contrast, Machiavelli (1532/1998) insists that imitation is a component of learning, stating that the prince must examine histories of great rulers in order to learn about the actions and deeds through which these rulers won their victories. Following this line of argument, Machiavelli seems to offer the following: the ruler is an artist of politics who learns the art by imitating great artists before him, and as long as his subjects, or his audience, are pleased to see the art product, it does not matter if the artist truly masters the art. The point here is that the ruler-artist creates politics with *his hands*, and his subjects-audience may approach the product only with *their eyes*. Machiavelli does not concern himself with Plato’s assertion because, for Machiavelli, good politics does not have to offer *a taste of the real thing*. In this Machiavellian art, people’s participation is not considered in the creative process. People can be there to see the art. They can be pleased if they like what they see. And they might violently act if they do not like what they see. The problem the ruler faces is how to create what the people want to see.

3.4. Commonplace and Identification

Although Machiavelli separates politics into two distinct parts, one to rule and the other to be ruled, he recognizes the importance of a common place between them. The source corrupting the state is the strong private concern that blinds everyone, both ruler and ruled, to the importance of public matters. Authority or power alone might be essential for wild animals to survive, but both are totally useless in politics without a common place. Machiavelli uses Fabrizio Colonna, the protagonist in *The Art of War*, to emphasize this point clearly. As Colish (1998) asserts, Machiavelli’s choice of Fabrizio as the main interlocutor to suggest the beneficial aspects of a citizen militia is interesting because, in actual history, Fabrizio was the critical figure of a mercenary troop in the Spanish conquest over northern Italy and the fall of the Florentine republic ruled by Piero Soderini. By making the mercenary army’s commander confess the superiority of a citizen militia, Machiavelli aims to increase his discussion’s credibility. In fact, Fabrizio states that leading soldiers would be impossible if the commander had nothing to share with them, or nothing in common with them. He states:

What rewards could I promise them of sufficient weight to make them love me, or what threats could I use to make them fear me when they know that once the war is over, I shall have nothing more to do with them? How could I ever make those who have no shame in them ashamed of anything? How can they respect me when they hardly know my face? By what God or what Saint must they swear: him whom they worship, or those whom they blaspheme? What God they worship I know not; nor do I know what Saint they do not blaspheme. How could I hope they would ever keep any promise when I saw they did not pay the least regard to their world? How could I imagine they would revere man when they show so much dishonor to God? What good form, then, could I impress upon such matter? (pp. 208-209)

Without a common place, nothing unites the ruler and the ruled. Machiavellian politics can be undertaken when the ruler and the ruled share the same beliefs, values, stories, times, and intimate relations. But why? How importantly and effectively does this concept of a common place function in Machiavelli's policies? Examining what Aristotle and Burke have to say about a common place can show us a way to answer the question.

Aristotle (trans., 1984) begins his discussion about rhetoric by condemning thinkers before him for ignoring enthymeme, which is "the substance of rhetorical persuasion" and "the most effective of the modes of persuasion" (p. 20, 22). He explains two critical types of reasoning: example is inductive reasoning, and enthymeme is deductive reasoning. Inductive reasoning allows the audience to learn facts without much effort because example is a proof offered by a series of similar cases. In contrast, enthymeme guides people to reach a particular idea from the general and then to reason from the common opinion. In the simplest explanation, enthymeme is reasoning based on common opinions. Enthymeme presupposes shared understandings about subject matter; it does not apply to individual opinion. In this sense, enthymeme is reasoning derived from a common place, or common opinion.⁶ Additionally, according to Arnhart (1981), enthymeme is not merely a kind of reasoning. It is a form of reasoning combined with passion, embracing all three types of proofs—logos, ethos, and pathos. Arnhart states, "Enthymemes may be used not only to establish a conclusion as a probable truth but also to alter the emotions of the listeners or to develop their confidence in the character of the speaker" (p. 10).

Interestingly enough, Aristotle also insists upon the notion of a common place when discussing the concept of metaphor. Metaphor, Arnhart explains, is a form of reasoning similar to enthymeme, to "discover the likeness among things and to view one thing through the mirror of another" (p. 175). Metaphor, residing between strange words that confuse the audience and ordinary words that do not excite them, gives listeners new ideas. Arnhart points out that the effective metaphor is created by combining familiar ideas with unfamiliar ones because "metaphorical resemblance should be neither too familiar (and thus commonplace) nor too unfamiliar (and thus obscure)" (p. 173). Metaphor leads us from a common place to the unfamiliar place, and according to Aristotle, the process of moving to the unfamiliar, or to obtain new ideas, is exciting for listeners. Since listeners expect something different, the acquisition of new ideas impresses them. If one applies Aristotle's discussion about a common place to Machiavellian politics, the mercenary commander Fabrizio's confession of failing to construct an excellent army starts making sense. Without enthymeme, a commander must lead soldiers or mercenaries by money or force. Machiavellian rhetoric works as it manipulates the common place. A prince's rhetoric guides people to reason from their common place to grasp a conclusion. The prince rhetorically constructs this process of syllogism to lead the people to a certain conclusion, one that he aims to make them believe. The more people engage in deductive reasoning, the more they become attracted to the prince logically and emotionally. This excites people because it is a learning process; they believe they find a particular conclusion by themselves. The manipulation of a common place is what Machiavelli demands a ruler to employ to lead his people.

Burke offers an in-depth explanation of how the manipulation of a common place functions in Machiavellian rhetoric. Examining Aristotle's rhetoric as persuasion, Burke offers another way to explain rhetoric: identification. Burke's intention is to expand Aristotelian rhetoric to include common ideologies that play a

critical role in rhetoric. Burke (1966) argues that Aristotle approaches rhetoric from the speaker's intention when confronting an audience; however, "there are also ways in which we *spontaneously, intuitively, even unconsciously* persuade ourselves. In forming ideas of our personal identity, we spontaneously identify ourselves with family, nation, political or cultural cause, church, and so on" (p. 301). Individuals implicitly and explicitly find their personal identities as members of certain groups. Burke (1950/1969) calls the common ideology consubstantiality, and it is "necessary to any way of life... [as] an *acting-together*" (p. 21). When people act together, they share common ideas, sensations, attitudes, and beliefs. This *acting-together* allows individuals to identify with one another and makes them consubstantial. Of course, identification occurs between a speaker and an audience when the speaker aims to make the audience identify with the speaker's interest, "and the speaker draws on identification of interests to establish rapport between himself and his audience" (Burke, 1950/1969, p. 46). This sort of identification typifies political rhetoric when politicians appear friendly, family oriented, or even baseball loving, to earn voters' favor. Burke suggests that these kinds of acts are closely related to administrative acts designed "with an eye for their appeal" (p. 161). Readers likely realize this sounds familiar to the previous discussion. In fact, in analyzing Machiavelli's *The Prince*, Burke offers the notion of administrative rhetoric.

Administrative rhetoric, Burke (1966) pronounces, is similar to what he calls the bland strategy, including more than mere verbal persuasion. It is a combination of "symbolism and definite empirical operations" (Burke, 1950/1969, p. 161). According to Burke, Machiavelli shows how private acquisitive motives can be described in sacrificial terms in public. Machiavelli transforms interests of the ruler to public concerns by making them "*nationalistically identified*" (p. 165). In this case, the ruler's interests are described as the state's need, that is, to protect it from other states. After having the private motive identified with the national motive, national identity can be seen as an individual; therefore, the condition of the state as *individual* can now be illustrated in sacrificial terms. In *The Prince*, Machiavelli first discusses how to obtain and maintain political power. He advocates exercising political power in sacrificial terms by suggesting the ruler's power as *the* remedy for corrupt Italy. This process of administrative rhetoric shows not only how the ruler's private interests can be disguised as national interests, but also how the ruler obtains legitimacy for practicing his power. Burke states that when the ruler presents himself as the person who can save Italy from its captivity, what we find is "the ultimate *identification* of ruler and ruled, since all will benefit, each in his way, by the liberation of their country" (p. 163). This is the ultimate goal Machiavelli aims to achieve.

4. DISCUSSION

4.1. Machiavellian Rhetoric and Commonplace

The examination of Machiavelli's political theory reveals how the ruler leads the ruled to *the battleground*, understood both metaphorically and literally, by identifying them as one. The citizens are subjects-soldiers governed and commanded, respectively, through the arts of politics and war. The ruler must master both arts in order to maintain a state as virtuous as the Roman Republic. The ruler creates political art with his hands,

but the citizens-audience are pleased by their eyes. In other words, the art product has a plausible appearance, and the audience is allowed to enjoy the surface, but prohibited from touching because they might learn what lies beneath. The ruler knows what products please the citizens' eyes because they share a common place. The ruler derives his rhetoric from this common place and leads his subjects to the unfamiliar. The subjects are pleased because they obtain the new knowledge and believe that they have found it themselves. To some extent, the prince's rhetoric functions by reversing a premise and a conclusion. First, the prince creates a certain conclusion that serves his interest. Then, he chooses a common place from which the people seem to reason, so that they naturally, logically, and emotionally come to his desired conclusion.

Edelman (2001) offers a similar insight in his discussion of misidentification as a political technique. Edelman explains the relationship between misidentification and deductive reasoning (enthymeme, in Aristotle's terms) ; deductive reasoning on political issues mostly reflects ideological biases.

If one begins with the assumption that welfare recipients are cheaters or lazy, conclusions about desirable welfare policy will reflect that assumption, although it is invalid in most cases. If one begins with the premise that women or blacks or homosexuals are in some way less competent than others, policy conclusions are similarly wrong. (p. 70)

Misidentification is not explicitly deliberate, but it is grounded on widespread social ideology. As its consequences, misidentification not only adopts and strengthens political agendas that serve the elite's private interests, but also maintains and enlarges "the inequalities that give rise to the problem in the first place" (p. 68). In other words, misidentification functions to strengthen a certain political agenda by creating a problem to justify actions and solutions "that a group already favors and from which it will benefit" (p. 68). Although the claims follow logical reasoning, their conclusions are unacceptable because the reasoning derives from unacceptable premises. Edelman's discussion reminds us that "a baby-kissing politician" is a wrong premise from which to derive logical reasoning. No harm would be done if Machiavelli's theory was actually about kissing babies. Quite unfortunately, that is not the case. Manipulative political rhetoric invites people to *assemble at the battleground*.

If readers go back to the beginning of this investigation, notions such as a common place, *the battleground*, metaphoric and deductive reasoning, administrative rhetoric, and the ultimate identification will now function as focal points in a big picture. While living under the ruler, people are disciplined in accordance with certain virtues, just as Machiavelli admires the virtues of the Roman Republic. Since ruler and ruled live in a common place—the state—they share common identities, beliefs, and sensations based on the common place's essence, i.e., virtue. The ruler presents his private interests in public by disguising them in sacrificial terms, guiding people to identify their motives with what appear to be social interests. The ruler might ask his subjects, "Our precious Italy faces a dangerous threat from other countries. What can you do to save our country?" The ruler also tells the ruled to listen to common opinion, and then their metaphoric reasoning, which they value as original, guides them to the unknown. They do not realize *the unknown* is actually the ruler's private goal. Soon, they find themselves on the battleground; however, nothing bothers them because nobody forced them. They choose to fight for the country; they choose to be there; they chose the ruler to lead them to victory... so they think.

Machiavelli's theory of political rhetoric shows the crucial role of a common place and common opinion. Thinkers who dislike democracy—Plato, Aristotle, and Hobbes, to name a few—would tell us that ordinary people are not credible because they reason with opinion, not with intellect. In Machiavellian terms, people only see politics; they do not touch it. Thus, politics can manipulate a common place to influence our reasoning.

4.2. The Manipulation of Commonplace and Propaganda

It must be emphasized that manipulating a common place is not propaganda, as no one would claim that a politician kissing a baby is propaganda. The manipulation of a common place can be done as a part of a propaganda campaign, as Hitler used Germany's economic depression as the common place from which to justify inhuman persecution against the Jewish people.⁸⁾ However, the manipulation of a common place is grounded in vernacular (commonplace) communication, such as private hobbies, values, likes, and dislikes. The manipulation of a common place can be propaganda in the sense that it employs and strengthens a certain ideology. However, the manipulation of the common place is not propaganda when the manipulation does not try to "sell a belief *system* or *dogma*" (Larson, 1998, p. 339).

The political sphere, for example, becomes where people gather to discuss the importance of private economic success. Examining former President Reagan's address, Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, and Tipton (1985) explain that Reagan defines people by occupation. People are an economy, not a polity, and what they represent is "an all-inclusive 'interest group'" (p. 263). According to them, Reagan's rhetoric shows that the government protects peace and security to "allow self-reliant individuals to pursue their largely economic aims in freedom" (p. 263). Reading a similar discussion in Machiavelli is intriguing. In *The Prince*, Machiavelli expresses the importance of economy, advising the prince to encourage his people for freely pursuing any trade because the prince should appear "a lover of talent by giving recognition to men of ability and honouring those who excel in a particular field" (p. 78).

Manipulating the common place does not occur in the political sphere; rather it happens in the realm of private interests. When a politician kisses a baby, he or she employs the image of a family-loving person. When a politician appears on a television program wearing a New York Yankees baseball cap, he or she uses the image of your neighbor who happens to like the same team you do. These are examples of the manipulation of a common place, but they are not propaganda. The manipulation of a common place exists not only in propaganda, but also in un-systematized, un-dogmatized ideologies. It can occur through vernacular forms of communication. Manipulating a common place as a political tactic proves that the political sphere is not where only political concerns are discussed and judged. Machiavelli acknowledges that political concerns are not the only matters people discuss in the political sphere. In other words, he knows that people do not judge political matters only by their political concerns; instead, they discuss politics by identifying themselves with some other issues.

4.3. The Quasi-Democracy and the Deathly Kiss

Machiavellian politics best works when a ruler plays the game and when people see him play. It is like gambling: the ruler spins the wheel, and people *participate*, but only indirectly by betting their money and their lives. Indirect participation of people in politics is the inescapable consequence of the complexity of modern political systems and the greater roles of the marketplace and the mass media than in earlier times. Habermas (1975) discusses the quasi-democratic aspect of the current democracy where people are left to be voters. The times when public discourse built society seem long gone; this fact forces Hauser (1991) to state “the public’ is moribund” (p. 35). The rise of Machiavellian politics is highlighted in a comment by NBC’s Katie Couric on political candidates’ ways to gain trust and credibility: “So, it’s not so much what you say but how you say it and how you look when you say it” (qtd. in Hauser, p. 2). When a politician kisses a baby, the politician knows that the kiss is a more than a kiss. The kiss is the camouflage a prince employs to hide his lion claws in the appearance of the fox. We must not forget that this *kiss* can be deathly during wartime. Examining the current political and public situations surrounding the Iraq War, Artz (2005) analyzes how the Bush administration campaigned to gain public approval by providing several themes, such as the possession of weapons of mass destruction and the connection with Al-Qaeda. The U.S. corporate media functioned to create positive consideration and promotion for the administration by frequently broadcasting points similar to those the administration emphasized. Artz (2005) states:

Media practices in general reflect and reinforce identifiable cultural norms, individual behavior, and public expectations. This is most apparent at times of unexpected or anticipated crises, when political agents and media gatekeepers modify their communication practices to protect or implement dominant political interests and goals (p. 8).

Machiavelli argues that ordinary people are easily deceived by appearance, especially when appearance is elaborated with administrative rhetoric. The cunning persuasion does not require a grand scheme; it could start with a simple *kiss*.

5. CONCLUSION

This study has investigated the mind of the Machiavellian fox and characteristics of its rhetoric. The ruler-fox persuades and attracts followers to embrace his *private* interests. This manipulative persuasion can be described as a warm invitation toward people; the ruler leads them to *the battleground* in a way that they voluntarily want to be there. As mentioned above, the core of this type of persuasion is misidentification, which not explicitly deliberate but grounded on widespread social ideology.

However, interestingly enough, Machiavelli does not disregard the fact that people *can touch* the prince, and that they can make a difference in politics. Machiavelli (1950), agreeing with Cicero, suggests that the citizenry “may be ignorant,... [but is] capable of grasping the truth and readily yields when a man, worthy of confidence, lays the truth before it” (p. 219). People have two choices: they can *see* or *touch* politics. If they choose to touch, the common place and common opinion will change to prevent the ruler’s administrative

rhetoric from occurring. By touching politics, people can take politics into their own hands—this is what democracy is all about. If, however, they choose only to see, they may find themselves on *the battleground* asking, “How in the world did I get here?”

NOTES

- 1). The author would like to place on record, his sincere gratitude to Igata, Kubota, Nagano, Numata, Tanaka, and Takeishi for their valuable guidance.
- 2). In *Phaedrus*, Socrates insists that rhetoric must be undertaken in accordance with proper knowledge, not with a brief glance.
- 3). Hauser explains Hobbes’s view of society as a “political organization... [which] suppressed features of social contract theory positing that the existence of society was prior to the state’s” (p. 21). Opposing Hobbes, Enlightenment thinkers hold that humans’ creation of community under natural law existed before the government.
- 4). In *The Book of the Courtier*, the Renaissance thinker Baldesar Castiglione explicitly depicts politics becoming a game and rhetoric as a means to control an organization, not a civil society. Characters discuss the notion of a perfect courtier at the Court of Urbino, yet this discussion is begun as a new game after they have enjoyed other entertainments. The character Ottaviano’s argument about how a perfect courtier opposes the prince when the prince is wrong is especially intriguing. To oppose and help the prince remove wicked intentions and become virtuous, a perfect courtier must win a favor from the prince. The courtier can do so through “the flower of courtiership,” which includes dancing, entertaining, singing, and playing games. Platonic *cookery*, leading people closer to absolute knowledge, becomes the perfect courtier’s *game* to win a personal favor that, in turn, leads the prince closer to knowledge.
- 5). A number of scholars discuss Machiavellianism in Shakespeare’s works, especially in *Othello*, where Iago is a Machiavellian rhetorician. For instance, in his argument about the relations between Shakespeare and Renaissance-Elizabethan thinking, Lewis (1967) explains, “Iago is a typical Elizabethan *Machiavel*” (p. 66).
- 6). Machiavelli’s understanding of Moses is clearly incongruent with other depictions of Moses, and in fact, he sometimes differently reads history and historical figures from reality for persuasive impact. For Machiavelli’s misconceptions of Moses, see Boyle’s discussion (2004) about the notion of grace in Machiavelli.
- 7). Aristotle explains that enthymeme is rhetorical syllogism because it depends on probability, in contrast to scientific syllogism that rests upon absolute truth. Conclusions of enthymeme are embedded in common opinions; therefore, they are not absolutely certain.
- 8). See Burke’s “Hitler’s Battle,” published in 1939, to gain insight on Hitler’s rhetoric.

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