【論文】

Alfred Schutz on Race, Language, and Subjectivity: A Viennese Jewish Sociologist's Lifeworld and Phenomenological Sociology within Transition from Multinational Empire to Nation-State

Mitsuhiro TADA*

要旨（Abstract）

This paper clarifies the sociohistorical background against which Alfred Schutz, the pioneer of phenomenological sociology, chose to pursue a subjectivist sociology and targeted the issue of typification, by considering his linguistic view as a guiding thread. In the multinational Austro-Hungarian Empire, German-speaking persons were administratively considered Germans, and, ultimately, nationality was founded on one's subjective sense of identification. "Enlightened" Jews then also became "Germans having faith in Judaism" by acquiring the German language, the ticket into Western civilization. However, the objective-scientific-seeming racial ideology in post-1918 Austria a priori excluded Jews from full membership in the new German nation-state, based on a homogenized racial type. Schutz, a Viennese Jew born in 1899, proposed his subjectivist sociology under this "blood"-based typification of "They" by "We." Like many Viennese Jews, he believed that minority individuals should be able to choose their group affiliation according to their own identification, and considered language to be a medium for their assimilation into the civic lifeworld; the concept of lifeworld (*Lebenswelt*) could thus work as a counter-idea against the Nazis' blood community of *Lebensraum*, which disallows "another race" from assimilation.

✉　Mitsuhiro Tada

　　tada.mitsuhiro@gmail.com

*　Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Kumamoto University, 40-1, Kurokami 2-chome, Chuo-ku, Kumamoto 860-8555, Japan

But the Jews of the twentieth century were, already, no longer a community. They had no common faith, they felt their being-Jewish as a burden rather than a pride, and were not conscious of any mission. They lived away from the commandments of their once holy books, and they no longer wanted the old, common language. To settle in, to integrate themselves into the peoples around them, to dissolve into the universal, was their ever more impatient striving to have only peace from all persecution, rest on the way of the eternal fleeing.

—From *Die Welt von gestern* (The World of Yesterday) (Zweig 1942: 483–484)[1]

1. Introduction

This paper explores the sociohistorical background against which Alfred Schutz, the pioneer of phenomenological sociology, chose to pursue sociology, especially a subjectivist sociology, among the social sciences and targeted the issue of typification. Thus far, the social conditions in which Schutz developed his unique phenomenological-sociological ideas have mostly been overlooked even by his followers. However, as explored in detail below, Schutz, as a Viennese Jew, lived in the midst of great transitions, when an racialistic anti-Semitism that pretended to scientific objectivity was rapidly developing and his homeland, the multinational Austro-Hungarian Empire, was dismantled into small-to-mid-sized nation-states. As Schutz was a real live person and a man of his times, it would be reasonable to presume that such turbulent circumstances had some influence on his social-scientific perspective. He did not live just in the scholars' world of logic, much less in a vacuum. This would remain true even if he had been a full-time researcher from the beginning, not concurrently a bank employee. Thus, we should reconstitute his sociological thought in his lived context to understand it deeply, putting "Schutz ideal-typified as an abstract theoretician" into brackets.

To avoid any misunderstanding, it must be established in prior that this paper is not intended to be a biographical work on Schutz. Rather, it aims to be a practice of phenomenological sociology, which has so far almost never been done in the literature. That is, I will apply to Schutz his own phenomenological sociology (i.e., the self-application of Schutz's phenomenological sociology to itself) to *understand* the "because-motive" (*Weil-Motiv*) and "in-order-to motive" (*Um-zu-Motiv*) that determined his choice of subjectivist sociology and focus on typification as his subject matter, and I do so by taking a close look at his *pre-scientific lifeworld*, which is assumed to be the foundation of his scholarly work. In this respect, our discussion is intended to be an intellectual-historical case study to answer more general questions. In other words, by analyzing this Viennese Jewish thinker's writings as empirical materials, with a consideration of their sociohistorical background, I will

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[1] All translations of non-English sources in the paper, except that of the Treaty of Saint-Germain (*Staatsgesetzblatt für die Republik Österreich* 1920 = 1919), Deutscher (1968b), and Schutz (2009a), are my own, because maintaining consistency in translation choices is crucial for the discussion in this paper. As for Magris (1963 = [1966] 1988), I refer to the German translation. It should also be noted that some of the quotes contain expressions that are not gender-neutral or are considered inappropriate by today's standard, but that I have left them in their original forms.

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clarify how "strangers" were (and are) tossed about by the waves of racism and nationalism in modernity—being unwillingly demarcated as "They" by "We" through typification—and, therewith, show why a phenomenologically observed subjective point of view remains indispensable to research on social realities.

For this purpose, I will take particular note of *the meaning of language for Schutz*. More concretely, I elaborate, as the guiding thread, Schutz's linguistic views in light of the change in his own lifeworld after 1918. While Max Weber, the founder of subjectivist, interpretative sociology (sociology of understanding; *verstehende Soziologie*), mostly neglected the role of language in understanding others, Schutz, who extended Weber's ideas phenomenologically, showed consistent interest in language. At 26 years of age, in his so-called "Bergsonian period," he began to write a manuscript known as "*Spracharbeit*" ("Language Work") (Schütz [1925–1927] 2003)[2]; he also often mentions language in *Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt* (The Meaningful Construction of the Social World) (Schütz 1932, hereafter *Aufbau*). In the 1950s, he delivered a series of lectures titled "Sociology of Language" (Schutz [1952] 2010) at the New School for Social Research, and published on Kurt Goldstein's study of linguistic disturbances (Schutz [1950] 1982) and on the symbol concept (Schutz [1955] 1982). He remains concerned with language in *Strukturen der Lebenswelt* (The Structures of the Lifeworld), coauthored with Thomas Luckmann (Schutz and Luckmann 1975; see also Schütz 2020).[3] The reason for this continued interest seems to be Schutz's own characteristic interpretation of the lifeworld and intersubjectivity.

Edmund Husserl, in *Cartesianische Meditationen* (Cartesian Meditations), tried to solve the problem of intersubjectivity in terms of the constitution of the transcendental ego. Schutz, instead, viewed intersubjectivity as an *ontological* basic category of human existence—a datum (*Gegebenheit*) of the lifeworld (Schutz 1957: 105). In this sense, "Our everyday world is, from the outset, an intersubjective world of culture" (Schutz [1940] 1982: 133). For Schutz, the given thing is not an isolated I, but a We(-relationship), despite his subjectivist position. His non-transcendentalist starting point would be grounded on the fact that language is always pre-given to individuals in the social world, held in common as the most important basis of common knowledge and mutual understanding; hence intersubjectivity is a given ([1955] 1982: 347–356; see also Schutz [1953] 1975: 38; Landgrebe 1985: XXXIV; Knoblauch, Kurt, and Soeffner 2003: 12; Y. Satō 2020): we ourselves experience daily life naturally as intersubjective because of the pre-givenness of language.

The primary goal of the social sciences is to obtain organized knowledge of social reality. By the term "social reality" I wish to be understood the sum total of objects and occurrences within the social cultural world as experienced by the common-sense thinking of men living their daily lives among their fellow-men, connected with them in manifold relations of interaction. It is the world of cultural objects and social institutions into which we all are born, within which we have to find our bearings, and with which we

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[2]   Schutz also made a presentation on "Theory of Language" at a study circle known as the *Geistkreis* (Wagner 1983: 12). The exact date of the presentation is unknown, but it was probably between 1926 and 1928 or between 1931 and 1932, the only periods for which no record of presentation titles is available during the years of the circle's existence, from 1921 until 1938. See Mori (1995: 133–136).

[3]   For Luckmann's own linguistic view, see Tada (2015).

have to come to terms. From the outset, we, the actors on the social scene, experience the world we live in as a world both of nature and of culture, not as a private but as an intersubjective one, that is, *as a world common to all of us, either actually given or potentially accessible to everyone; and this involves intercommunication and language*. (Schutz [1954] 1982: 53, emphasis added)

For Schutz, a sociologist, no one lives in a vacuum (or "no man is an island"); rather, each concrete individual is embedded in a concrete, socially and historically bound situation, within which that individual's own biographical situation is also constituted. Even our knowledge is not purely our own, as it was largely acquired socially, for example through parents and teachers (Schutz [1955] 1982: 347–348)—with language as the crucial mechanism. "[I]n the social world into which we are born, language (in the broadest sense) is admittedly *the paramount vehicle of communication*; its conceptual structure and its power of typification make it the outstanding tool for the conveying of meaning" (Schutz [1951] 1976: 160, emphasis added).

The language Schutz refers to in his discussion is, in principle, not artificial (formal) language, but everyday, ordinary language (*Umgangssprache*)[4]; this would have played a harbinger role for the linguistic turn in sociology since the mid-1960s (Schutz [1945] 1982: 257–258; Schutz [1950] 1982: 285; Schutz [1953] 1982: 14; Schutz [1955] 1982: 328; see also Luckmann 1962: 516; Luckmann 1979: 12–13; Tada [forthcoming]). However, at least from the current viewpoint, Schutz's notion that (everyday) language is a given medium for communication is in itself no longer so special. In research about daily social life, it would be much harder to justify as a starting-point an ego transcending the givenness of a language. On the other hand, recall here that there was (and remains) a close bond between language and modern nation-building. Language releases humans from the world of sensual perceptions, letting us imagine what is not in front of our eyes or what does not even exist. In the social world, then, language enables communication beyond face-to-face situations—that is, beyond what Schutz referred to as *Umwelt*—and thereby allows an imagined "We" at the anonymous societal level.[5] In modernity, language indeed plays an even more central part in constituting such a particular solidarity as "We," since the unity of the state is no longer based on religion; as Benedict Anderson ([1983] 1991) notes, the modern nation with its own (vernacular) language was constructed in the imaginary via print capitalism emerged in the mid-nineteenth century. Especially in Central Europe, where Schutz lived, nationalism first took an ethnolinguistic form, in which nationality is determined depending on one's spoken ethnic language (Kamusella 2011; see also Meillet [1918] 1928: ix–xii, chap. XXV; Judson 2016: 145–154).

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4   For examples of Schutz's use of the German term *Umgangssprache*, see his draft of *Strukturen der Lebenswelt* (Schütz 2020: 118, 187, 190, 310–311, 322–323, 350, 358). What this German word meant in the multinational Austro-Hungarian Empire will be clarified below. It should be pointed out here that there are two (albeit overlapping in content) places in the draft in which the word "*National*" (national) is struck through by a line immediately prior to "*Umgangssprache*." Schutz probably first began to write "*Nationalsprache*" (national language), but stopped and rewrote it to "*Umgangssprache*." Incidentally, in English, Schutz uses "everyday language" in the same context of discussion (Schutz [1953] 1982: 14).

5   Schutz also discusses "symbolic appresentation of society" from a perspective of phenomenological sociology, citing Voegelin (1952). See Schutz ([1955] 1982: 347–356, in particular, 352–356).

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However, sociologists in today's era of "world-life" (*Weltleben*)[6] can no longer assume, out of some methodological nationalism, that members of a society by default share a common language. Many people move across and beyond national borders, and a multilingualized lifeworld is found even in the family and in school. But Schutz also lived in a lifeworld where it was not always self-evident that others shared the same language as his. Schutz was born into the multilingual and multinational (or originally even *anational*; see Judson 2005: 221, 240) Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1899 (see Figure 1),[7] for the sake of which he even voluntarily took the aptitude test for Austrian military service in 1917 and was on the front lines of World War I in Italy from 1917 to 1918 (Mori 1995: 27–28; see also Barber 2004: 4–5).[8] He certainly experienced the nation-state after the Empire's defeat in the war, which led to the emergence of the successor nation-states when he was barely out of his teens, but he then forced himself into exile in the US in 1939 and switched the language of his research writing from German, his mother tongue, to English, the vernacular of his host country. In brief, Schutz's own lifeworld rather precludes the easy presupposition that people would by default (i.e., as native speakers) share a common (national) language and thus asks us to "put into brackets" a methodological nationalism that takes for granted the congruence of national borders after the World Wars with linguistic borders. Instead, to understand what it means for Schutz to view language as a given medium for communication, even in his turbulent era and despite his subjectivism and individualism, we must consider the actual sociohistorical background in which this view was formed and, as suggested, apply to Schutz himself his own conception of the lifeworld, because "the basis of meaning (*Sinnfundament*) in every science is the pre-scientific life-world (*Lebenswelt*) which is the one and unitary life-world of myself, of you, and of us all" (Schutz [1940] 1982: 120).

A similar approach has been applied to the unique linguistic thought of a Viennese philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein, by Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin, who note the crucial role of the contemporary Viennese social background, "The problem of identity and communication plagued Viennese society at every level—political and social, individual and even *international*" (1973: 65, emphasis added). Further:

> By 1907, when universal manhood suffrage was introduced into the western half of the [dual] monarchy, the Czechs could no longer communicate with the Germans, because the Germans failed to recognize the Czech language. As with all the minorities, this was their means of identifying themselves within the Empire; language was the basis of social as well as political identity in the bitter struggles for civil rights which marked the final years of Habsburg rule before the cataclysm of 1914. (Janik and Toulmin 1973: 65)

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6   The term "*Weltleben*" itself also appears in Husserl ([1936/54] 1976), although he uses it, for instance, to define a "lifeworld" of universalist connotation.

7   For the multilingual situation in Vienna at that time, see also Waugh ([2008] 2009: 3–4).

8   In Schütz and Gurwitsch (1985: 7), one can see a picture of Schutz in an army uniform, but with a face that still has a childlike innocence. Incidentally, the majority of the Habsburg army units were of course multilingual (Deák ([1990] 1992: 99–102).

Distribution of Races in Austria-Hungary

Figure 1. "Distribution of Races in Austria-Hungary"

Note: Color tone is slightly corrected.

Source: Shepherd (1911: 168). Scanned by University of Texas Libraries (Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection). Available online at https://maps.lib.utexas.edu/maps/historical/shepherd_1911/shepherd-c-168.jpg (Accessed October 25, 2022)

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As already noted, Austria-Hungary was facing the forces of *ethnolinguistic nationalism* at that time, a sociopolitical situation that could have urged Schutz, Wittgenstein, and others (e.g. literary authors such as Fritz Mauthner and Karl Kraus) to pay particular attention to language, even if they did not thematize the nationalistic politicization of language per se.[9] I focus on Schutz's view of language in light of his identity as a Viennese Jew,[10] inquiring about the meaning of the linguistic fact in his period and context: the fact that Viennese Jews had already been using German, and no longer used Yiddish, as their mother tongue and daily language. It is true that Yiddish is linguistically close to German, but Viennese Jews' language shift from Yiddish to German obviously accompanied and facilitated their assimilation into Vienna's civic-liberal German culture.[11]

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[9] To add regarding the social conditions of those days, the year of Schutz's birth, 1899, was the year in which the 1897 Badeni Language Ordinances (*Badenische Sprachenverordnungen*) that followed the Stremayr Language Ordinances (*Stremayrsche Sprachenverordnungen*) issued by the prime minister Eduard Taaffe in 1880 were withdrawn; the Badeni Language Ordinances had caused a stir that shook Austria and had irrevocably divided the ethnonational groups in Austria. The left too was not immune to such conflicts. As Magris (1963 = [1966] 1988: 211–212) points out, ethnonational confrontations developed even within the Proletarian International in the final years of the Empire, and the socialist movement was divided into the originally pro-monarchical, democratic-federalist faction of Karl Renner (who published books such as *State and Nation* [Renner 1899] under the name of Synopticus, *The Struggle of the Austrian Nations for the State* [Renner 1902] under the name of Rudolf Springer, and *The Right of Self-Determination of Nations in Special Application to Austria* [Renner 1918]) and the faction of Otto Bauer (who published *The Question of Nationalities and Social Democracy* [Bauer 1907] but later changed his position on separatists from the Renner-like one in the book). Consequently, despite certain successes of Austro-Marxism, the socialist movement lacked unity and strength as an alternative.

[10] It should be noted that although Wittgenstein, "objectively" viewed, was also born into an assimilated Jewish family, the just-cited book of Janik and Toulmin (1973) treats him first and foremost as a Viennese rather than a (Viennese) Jew. On this point, this paper's approach differs somewhat from theirs. However, as suggested in fn. 11 below, the subjective sense of belonging of Viennese Jews, including that of Wittgenstein and Schutz, would originally not have been something that could be settled into one "either – or." On whether Wittgenstein thought of himself as Jewish, several authors have discussed this point by focusing on Wittgenstein's own statements and his family relationships. For a concise summary of such discussions, see Stern (2001). However, the question of Wittgenstein's identity should also be investigated sociohistorically. I cannot discuss further on the question of this philosopher's identity in this paper; instead, refer to the following statement of his: "The Englander—the best race (*Rasse*) of the world—*can*not lose! But we can lose and will lose, if not this year, then next! The thought that our race is to be beaten depresses me terribly, for I am entirely German (*deutsch*)!" (Wittgenstein 1991: 34, emphasis original). This passage from Wittgenstein's diary, written while he was serving in the Austro-Hungarian army during the First World War, should be understood in light of the social context in Austria of those days, which this paper clarifies regarding Schutz.

[11] This paper uses the term "assimilation" for the integration of Jews into German(-Austrian) culture. However, as Rozenblit (1983) shows, their "assimilation" did not always mean "full fusion" ("marital assimilation" in Milton Gordon's term). Viennese Jews maintained relatively intense interrelationships (as did Schutz himself, who married another Jew). In terms of Viennese Jews' identity, which is relevant to the following discussion in this article, Rozenblit (1998: 135–137) indicates that it has three aspects of sense of belonging, besides being Viennese: 1) politically as "Austrians," 2) culturally as "Germans," and 3) ethnically as "Jews" (see also Hobsbawm 2002: 21–22; 2013: chap. 7). If we consider this point, it

It should be acknowledged that what is presented below regarding the relationship of Schutz's Viennese Jewish identit(ies) to his sociological theory is hypothetical, as there are, at least in published writings, virtually no texts in which Schutz explicitly refers to his own identity. However, this should not hinder a logical, plausible inference on this topic through the analysis of Schutz's texts as well as other relevant historical documents recording the circumstances of Viennese Jews. Note that such a hypothetical-logical reasoning is originally the rationalist method of interpretative sociology for understanding others. I hope that better interpreting the influence of Schutz's "Viennese Jewishness"—or, we might also say, "Non-Jewish Jewishness," after Deutscher (1968: chap. 1)—on his linguistic thought will inform our whole picture of his subjectivist sociology and interest in typification. Again, Schutz did not live in a vacuum, but rather in his own lifeworld.

In what follows, I first describe the situation of the Viennese Jews and the changes that occurred with the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In the multinational Empire, those who spoke German were administratively regarded as Germans, and what was ultimately crucial for judging nationality was the person's subjective sense of identification. In contrast, the objective-scientific-seeming blood logic of race ideology in the newborn Austria, a German nation-state, after World War I precluded such approaches to group membership and totally turned assimilated Jews into strangers again. Second, I will clarify the connections between Schutz's subjectivist theory and his linguistic views. He insisted on subjectivism in the determination of group membership, demanding that minority individuals be allowed to choose their affiliation themselves, as Viennese Jews had previously done. His sociology of knowledge pertaining to the typified distinction of "We" and "They" seem to spring originally from assimilated Jews' experience of exclusion, as the imaginary, constructed "They," from the "We" of the new Austria. In this sense, Schutz's conception of a *Lebenswelt* into which people can, of their own will, enter as citizens by sharing a common language, had potential as a counter-idea against Nazi *Lebensraum*, in which Jews would be excluded a priori as "another race." In fact, upon emigration, Schutz promptly attempted to assimilate into the civic life, or *civic lifeworld*, of the United States by using English. All in all, it would appear that Schutz wanted to ground civic lifeworld and civic intersubjectivity on language, *because of* his subjectivism and belief in individual freedom.

In addition, as suggested above, this study will also apply toward the understanding of our own current living situation, calling Friedrich Hebbel's following statement to mind: "This Austria is a small world, [i]n which the big one holds its rehearsal" (Hebbel [1862] 1904: 421). In this globalized era, the given, real society is the transnational world society; an ethnically or "racially" homogeneous national society is no more than an ideal construct. If this is the case, the real lifeworld given to an individual also cannot be the one demarcated by some homogeneous "We"; in reality, many "strangers," such as immigrants or refugees, are also living as neighbors in the same lifeworld. In this sense, our daily environment in the world society seems to increasingly

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might be more precise to say, for instance, "Viennese Jews were *included as citizens* in Austrian society" (*civic inclusion*). Yet, I use "assimilation" tentatively in the following discussion, because Viennese Jews are conventionally called "assimilated Jews" and, in fact, many of them viewed themselves as Germans (or Austrians); furthermore, Schutz, too, sometimes uses the term "assimilation" in his applied-theoretical discussions. Regarding "inclusion," I will return to this briefly in section 3.3. and the final section.

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resemble the one in the multinational, multilinguistic Habsburg Empire. This would in turn mean that we are again living in the turbulent age of conflicts between "We" and "They." In the final section, I will discuss this point further.

2. The End of the World of Yesterday

2.1. *The Flip Side of Consciousness: Schutz as a Jew*

From Schutz's published scholarly works, one learns little about the nature or strength of his Jewish identity. Although middle class, worldly, and largely irreligious, in his private sphere he sometimes styled himself a Jew (Barber 2004: 10–11). Visiting the US in 1937, he wrote to his family about the anti-Semitism he witnessed there (Schutz 2009a: 253–254; see also Barber 2004: 67–68). Above all, his choice upon the German *Anschluss* of Austria in 1938 to exile himself and his family to the US in 1939, after a one-year stay in Paris, would show that he was conscious in some way that he was (certain to be categorized as) a Jew. Nevertheless, Schutz never made his own experiences or those of Europe's Jews during the Nazi period an immediate object of social-scientific analysis. This attitude seems exceptional compared with the responses of other eminent Jewish scholars who fled Nazi rule and then wrote extensively on it from exile: Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Hannah Arendt, and so on. Even in his private correspondence with Aron Gurwitsch, a Jewish philosopher born in Lithuania under Imperial Russia and in the end exiled to the United States in 1940, Schutz scarcely mentions Jewish matters, while Gurwitsch does so frequently (see Schütz and Gurwitsch 1985).

However, an interesting passage that could be related to Schutz's identity is found in his "Equality and the Meaning Structure of the Social World" (Schutz [1957] 1976; hereafter, "Equality"), an article first presented at the Fifteenth Symposium of the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion, held at Columbia University in 1955,[12] and then published as chapter III of *Aspects of Human Equality* (ed. Bryson, Faust, Finkelstein, and MacIver) in 1957. The article cites two United Nations documents on discrimination and minority rights (UN 1949a; UN 1949b) and points out that minorities are a social reality which can change under varying circumstances (Schutz [1957] 1976: 265).[13] Schutz remarks: "the problem of minorities is a problem of *subjective* interpretation of group membership" (Schutz [1957] 1976: 266, emphasis original). He continues:

> For example, *should a member who is not religious be considered as a member of a religious minority?* The only answer possible, according to the document ([UN 1949b,] sec. 59), is that the subjective decision of the individual is the governing factor. Each individual should be able to decide voluntarily whether or not he belongs to a specific minority. (Schutz [1957] 1976: 266, emphasis added)

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[12] Schutz was also previously invited to the Conference's 1954 meeting by Louis Finkelstein of The Jewish Theological Seminary of America, a fellow of the Conference, and presented his "Symbol, Reality, and Society" (Schutz [1955] 1982) there. For this history, see Barber (2004: chap. 12) and Barber's introduction to Schutz (2009b). See also Embree (1999b).

[13] UNESCO also delivered a statement about the social constructiveness of race in 1950 as follows: "For all practical social purposes 'race' is not so much a biological phenomenon as a social myth" (UNESCO [1950] 1969: 33).

Thus, Schutz adopts a subjectivist view: A person's belonging to a minority group is determined not by the supposed "objective" indicators but by the person's own choice. However, his example above ("a member who is, despite not being religious, considered as a member of a religious minority") gives an abrupt impression with its abstractness, mentioning no concrete case. Viewed as a whole, this article's main focus (at least ostensibly) seems to be Black Americans' plight in the US, as Michael D. Barber suggests (Barber 2001: 111–112; his introduction to Schutz 2009b: 273–274; see also Embree 2000: 102). But Black Americans were (are) not generally discriminated against on specifically religious grounds.

A concrete case of discrimination not against "a religious minority" but against "a member who is not religious […] considered as a member of a religious minority" does not readily come to one's mind. However, looking at Schutz's own lifeworld, one finds such a case: *the Viennese Jews*. Since the latter half of the nineteenth century, Jews in Vienna had fairly assimilated into modern civil life in the Habsburgs' "liberal empire" (Judson 2016: 218–221), and had become less committed to Judaism. Simultaneously, Vienna had become a center of European anti-Semitism since the turn of the century, and political parties that publicly proclaim their anti-Semitism rapidly emerged and grew. A "lively civic world" was becoming lost (Magris 1963 = [1966] 1988: 210–211). In particular, the win by the Karl Lueger camp in the city election of 1895, according to Schorske (1980: 185), struck a stunning blow to the Viennese liberalism that had provided a theoretical rationale for Jewish emancipation and supported it on that basis.[14] Furthermore, the defeat and breaking-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in World War I resulted in a huge influx of Jewish refugees into Vienna from the ex-empery (i.e., ex-imperial dominion), in particular from Galicia (which in the end became a part of Poland, newly independent for the first time since 1795) and Bukovina (which became a part of Romania).[15] This inflow of "Eastern Jews" (*Ostjuden*), many of whom spoke Yiddish as their mother tongue and retained the "unenlightened" lifeform of Jewish tradition, too contributed to the escalation of anti-Semitism (Nomura 1999: 101–183).

Steven Beller ([1989] 1990: 73–78) notes the difficulty for Jews of opting out of the "Jewish problem" in Vienna, because regardless of self-identity, they were seen on all sides as Jews. Therefore, even though Schutz was almost silent about Jewish matters, they would not have been inconsequential to him. Rather, "A wish not to address the [Jewish] question is also consciousness that there is a question in the first place. It is just that the consciousness involved is a negative one" (Beller [1989] 1990: 74). It may even be that the

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[14]   In the same period, the Jews were becoming "politically homeless" (Simon 1971: 103) with no party to vote for at the national election level as well. The non-nationalist German liberals, whom Jews had supported, lost power in the parliament and drifted to the camp of Lueger's Christian Socialist Party or to that of (ethnoracial) German nationalists; the Social Democratic Party was not anti-Semitic, but ideologically, Jews could not unconditionally vote for it. The Jewish National Party by Austrian Zionists was founded to be a receptacle for Jewish voters in these circumstances. See Nomura (2020: 24–26, 32–34).

[15]   Today, the eastern part of Galicia belongs to Ukraine (former Soviet Union) and the western part to Poland; the northern part of Bukovina belongs to Ukraine and the southern part to Romania.

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deep-rooted anti-Semitism in Austria led many young Jews to the social sciences: they had to ask why they were discriminated against and try to understand their society (Beller [1989] 1990: 205–206, 216–217).

In any case, it is improbable that Schutz, as a sociologist, could have been completely indifferent to the public status and destiny of Jewish people. In fact, in *Aufbau*, superficially a work of pure theory, there are places where he apparently implies concern about the destiny of Jews in Austria. Let us consider one case. As an example of a type of social collective whose particular individual members are in principle directly experienceable (but by ordinary remain anonymous) to an actor, Schutz suddenly cites the German Reichstag (Schütz 1932: 202, 226); furthermore, in arguing about the issue of the social person, Schutz cites as an example the probability that the (ideal-)typical proletarian in Berlin in 1931 would vote social-democratically (Schütz 1932: 219). The reason Schutz referred to German matters so often in such concrete terms is likely because the Nazi Party had made the leap to the second-place party in the 1930 national election, polling sevenfold more votes from the last time, in 1928 (for a comparison of the results of the elections, see Mommsen 1989: 321, 355, 463).[16] It is unlikely that Schutz went out of his way to cite matters concerning the politics of neighboring Germany without considering this obviously unusual situation. In fact, in July 1932, shortly after the publication of *Aufbau*, the Nazi Party became the largest party in the Reichstag, and Hitler became chancellor in 1933 and *Führer* in 1934; that is, the Third Reich replaced the Weimar Republic, whose founding the Social Democratic Party had led.[17] The encroaching fascism of German politics seems to have been a concern for Schutz—and certainly, the 1938 *Anschluss*, welcomed by many Austrians, explicitly entailed the tremendous suffering of Jewish Austrians.

Thus, realistically viewed, Schutz's social-scientific ideas should be revisited with the lifeworldly conditions faced by him and other Viennese Jews in mind. This paper focuses on his linguistic views, but looks outward to consider the overall position of Jews in Austria.

2.2. *Language and Assimilation: Jews and the German Language under the Habsburg Rule*

Schutz's article "The Stranger: An Essay in Social Psychology" ([1944] 1976; hereafter, "Stranger") is often said to be based on his experience of immigration to the US, although he himself never referred to it explicitly.

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[16] The impact on Viennese Jews of the Nazi Party's leap in seats after the German Reichstag election should not be underestimated. Eric Hobsbawm, a historian of Jewish origin who was living in Vienna in 1930, writes of the situation at the time as follows: "All Viennese Jews knew, at least since the 1890s, that they lived in a world of anti-Semites and even of potentially dangerous street anti-Semitism. […] There was even less reason for optimism in the 1920s. There was no doubt in most people's minds that the governing Christian-Social Party remained as anti-Semitic as its founder, Vienna's celebrated mayor Karl Lueger. And I still recall the moment of shock when my elders – I was barely thirteen – received the news of the 1930 German Reichstag election, which made Hitler's National Socialists the second-largest party. They knew what it meant. In short, there was simply no way of forgetting that one was Jewish" (Hobsbawm 2002: 22).

[17] Although it somewhat preempts the discussion below, see also Schutz's following statement here: "A certain tendency to misinterpret democracy as a political institution in which the opinion of the uninformed man on the street must predominate increases the danger. *It is the duty and the privilege, therefore, of the well-informed citizen in a democratic society to make his private opinion prevail over the public opinion of the man on the street*" (Schutz [1946] 1976: 134, emphasis added).

However, if paying attention to his lifeworld before the exile, Jews were already called *Fremdlinge* (strangers) in Austria (Beller [1989] 1990: 204).[18]

In the article "Stranger," Schutz characterizes the assimilation process—that is, the learning of the cultural patterns of the approached in-group—as the acquiring process of the sociocultural knowledge and the language underlying it (Schutz [1944] 1976: 99–101). This fundamentally contrasts with (e.g.) Talcott Parsons, who thought of shared religious normative values as the foundation of social integration, assuming a religious continuity between pre-modernity and modernity. But if religious values, specifically Christian values, determined people's integration, Jews, as non-Christians, would need to convert or remain strangers forever. In contrast, Schutz started with a modern world where freedom of religion was established—a *literally mundane* (i.e., secularized), modern lifeworld, in which people would share a language rather than religion. And the assimilation of Jews under the Habsburg rule in fact took such a form.

Their emancipation began with the 1782 Edict of Tolerance declared by the enlightened despot Joseph II, which, guided by the Enlightenment ideal of common humanity, aimed at the integration of Jews as individuals into the Empire's rational society, as Clermont-Tonnerre insisted on in the 1789 French national assembly (Beller [1989] 1990: 124–125; Vielmetti 1982: 93–95). The goal of this individualist integration policy for Jews was to achieve a pure or general form of human existence beyond the confines of religious traditions. Jews were, as it were, a good material for the experiment of the Enlightenment, because "[t]he Jews were, for Europeans, the obvious group on which to practice these theories, for they were the only non-Christian group in the midst of the Enlightenment" (Beller [1989] 1990: 125). On the other hand, against Vienna's centralizing policies, such as the use of German as the official language of administration, national consciousnesses were being raised, especially among elites, all over the Empire (Judson 2016: chap. 2; see also Jászi 1929: 70–72, 136–137; Anderson [1983] 1991: 84–85), a process inspired by the ethnolinguistic nationalism of Johann Gottfried Herder, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, and Wilhelm von Humboldt, and reaching its first peak in 1848.[19] Pieter M. Judson adequately summarizes this confrontation as follows:

> Just as the French revolutionaries used the assertion of French nationhood to unify their state, the Habsburgs too sought to use a common national citizenship as a way to impose uniformity on their diverse realms. Their opponents used the term "nation" in order to pursue a kind of federalism that would maintain different rights and privileges against imperial centralization. (Judson 2016: 86–87)

Faced with this turbulence, the Empire in the end approved equal language right of the national components (Stourzh 1985: 17–57; Evans 2004: 13–14). Article 19 of the Fundamental Law on the General

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[18] It would also be worthy to recall here that Georg Simmel, a sociologist in Germany who was born to Jewish parents converted to Christianity, already discusses the figure of the "Stranger" (*Fremde*) in his 1908 book and cites Jews in Europe as its classical example (Simmel 1908: 686).

[19] It reality, however, the ethnonationalists in the Empire may have interpreted Herder's (inherently humanitarian) romanticism to suit their own convenience. See Sugar ([1969] 1973: 17–18).

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Rights of Citizens (*Staatsgrundgesetz über die allgemeinen Rechte der Staatsbürger*) in the so-called December Constitution of 1867—the year of the *Ausgleich* with Hungary, after the defeat in the Austro-Prussian War in 1866—guaranteed the equality of ethnic groups (*Volksstämme*) inside Imperial Austria as follows:

> All ethnic groups of the state have equal rights, and each one has an inviolable right to the preservation and cultivation of its nationality and language.
>
> The equality of all province-customary languages (*aller landesüblichen Sprachen*) in school, administration, and public life is recognized by the state.
>
> In provinces (*Ländern*) where several ethnic groups reside, public educational institutions shall be so set up that, without application of enforcement to learn a second provincial language (*Landessprache*), each of these ethnic groups receives the necessary means for education in its own language. (*Reichs-Gesetz-Blatt für das Kaiserthum Oesterreich* 1867: 396)

Thus, from 1880, in the decennial census (*Volkszählung*), a new question asked about respondents' "language of daily use" (*Umgangssprache*); based on the results, the administrative and educational language of each region was decided[20]; and the language the respondent selected was taken to indicate the respondent's nationality, although only one language could be chosen, from only nine options: German, Czechoslovakian, Polish, Ruthenian (Ukrainian), Slovenian, Serbo-Croatian, Italian, Romanian, and Magyar (Nomura 1999: 234–235; see also Bernatzik 1910: 6–7; Taylor 1948: 263–265; Brix 1982: 30–35; Judson 2016: 500, n. 1).[21]

The Empire thus became institutionally multinationalized (Judson 2005: 224–225; Judson 2016: chap. 6; Judson 2019; see also Sasaki 2017: 66).[22] At the same time Yiddish, the mother tongue of many Jews in Galicia

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[20] This measure was also probably in line with the trend toward standardization of the census in Europe during the same period. According to Hobsbawm ([1990] 1992: 96–97), following Adolphe Quetelet's raising of the question of the relationship between (spoken) language (*langue parlée*) and nation or nationality in relation to what the census should be, the issue was repeatedly discussed at the International Statistical Congress from the first one in 1853 onward; in the end, in 1873, the Congress recommended that a question on language should be included in all censuses. However, asking such a question in the census helped fuel the rise of nationalism(s), including in the Austro-Hungarian Empire (Hobsbawm [1990] 1992: chap. 3). But the year 1873 above may be a misprint of 1872 by Hobsbawm (see Brix 1982: 83–97). Incidentally, Haber (1920: 228) says that the Congress in 1874 decided that everyday language, rather than race or mother tongue, should be the mark of nationality (*Nationszugehörigkeit*).

[21] In the actual question about "*Umgangssprache*" in the census, "Czechoslovakian" likely appeared as "Bohemian-Moravian-Slovakian" and "Italian" as "Italian-Ladin." See K. K. Statistische Central-Commision (1882: 60–61) and also Wakita (2017: 247).

[22] The above-quoted Article 19 of the Fundamental Law on the General Rights of Citizens in the December Constitution of 1867 is quite liberal, but Burger (1995) points out that the last provision, which states the prohibition of compulsory learning of a second provincial language in schools, led rather to the escalation of ethnolinguistic nationalisms, the defeat of multilingual education, and ultimately the collapse of the Empire, although we cannot examine this point in further detail because of lack of space. As for the equalization of language rights in school education by the December Constitution of

or Bukovina, was excluded from enjoying linguistic equality in this "*nationalities state (Nationalitätenstaat)*" (Stourzh 1985: 8, emphasis original), meaning that Jews were not recognized as a nation deserving political and cultural autonomy (Nomura 1999: 235, 333).[23]

This measure could have likely seemed discriminatory to native speakers of Yiddish (or Hebrew) (see Berkley 1988: 127; see also Bernatzik 1910: 45, n. 39), but not, in general, to Viennese Jews, who, in combining assimilationism and liberalism, had believed that making them "true Austrians" beyond a particular nationalism would lead to their emancipation (Nomura 1999: 3–98; see also Stourzh 1985: 74–83). Their assimilationism included a language shift from Yiddish to German, the ticket into Western civilization—illuminating, civic-liberal German culture—as argued by Moses Mendelssohn, a Jewish thinker in the eighteenth century (Nomura 1997: 98–103). Enlightened Jews believed that the Jewish emancipation required their self-emancipation from their own traditions, and Jewish people thus saw cultivation and education (*Bildung*) as vital (Beller [1989] 1990: 126–133; Mosse 1985)—and those were mediated by the German culture, a "universal medium of emancipation," and the German language (Hobsbawm 2013: 90; see also Berkley 1988: 50–52; Hobsbawm 2002: 22).

Hence, "German was the name of freedom and progress" (Hobsbawm 2013: 80), whose linguistic hegemony extended over a vast area in the Central and Eastern Europe (Hobsbawm 2013: 89–95). Especially in Habsburg Austria, the German language, which signified not only the dynasty's political dominance but also cultural prestige, could function as an *international* interregional language (see also Meillet [1918] 1928: 209; Jászi 1929: 71, 137–139).[24] As centralist *Staatsvolk* (state people, or a "state-nation"), "German speakers who attached importance to their language in Austria always located their national identity in a set of abstract relationships that had little to do with geographic place and more to do with class and bourgeois culture" (Judson 2001: 86), and many state people "could not understand why those who used other languages did not want to join the *Staatsvolk* by learning, speaking, and *becoming* German" (Judson 2016: 298, emphasis original). In sum total, Germans' national identity in Austria originally consisted not in their ethnicity, but in a liberal civic agenda associated with middle-class cultural values,[25] and they viewed themselves as having a wider perspective on

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1867, Robert J. W. Evans also remarks, "The whole rhetoric of native-language instruction ('muttersprachlicher Unterricht') was increasingly justified *less by practical need than as the vehicle for spiritual-national values*. 'Erst in der Muttersprache ausgesprochen,' said Hegel, 'ist etwas mein Eigentum'" (Evans 2004: 21, emphasis added).

[23]   Recall Weber's following statement as well: "The problem of whether we may call the Jews a 'nation' is an old one; it would be answered mostly negatively, and in any case differently in kind and measure, by the mass of Russian Jews, the assimilating Western European-American Jews, the Zionists, and above all very differently also by the surrounding peoples" (Weber [1921/22] 1980: 529).

[24]   The 1910 *Encyclopædia Britannica*'s entry for "Austria" still reads as follows: "The Germans are in a relative majority over the other peoples in the empire, their language is *the vehicle of communication between all the other peoples* both in official life and in the press; they are in a relatively more advanced state of culture" (Briliant and Lake 1910: 973, emphasis added).

[25]   To add, the category "German(s)" was not always understood ethnoculturally in other German states of those days, either. Through the transformation of the German states from early-modern territorial states to modern membership states

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imperial politics and as fighting against feudalism and absolutism rather than against other national components, like Czechs, Hungarian, or Poles, in themselves (Judson 2001: 86; see also Taylor 1948: 23–26, 160; Mises 1919: 89–97). Even Austro-German nationalist activism, which emerged in the 1880s in reaction to other ethnolinguistic nationalisms, still understood Germanness in relation to a civilizational mission, at least initially, and imagined no special relationship with the Wilhelmine German nation-state (Judson 2005: 225–227, 240).

In Austria, those who claimed German as their ordinary, colloquial language in the census were categorized as Germans in population statistics (Meillet [1918] 1928: 76; see also Nomura 1999: 240, 255, 262–263). Moreover, Jews were judicially and legislatively regarded merely as members of a religious group (Nomura 1999: 236–237; see also Stourzh 1985: 78–80); German-speaking Jews became "Germans having faith in the teachings of prophet Moses."[26] Since the German language was pragmatically the basis for social rise as well, the modern civic culture in which German-speaking Jewish bourgeoisie played a prominent role blossomed and their traditional Judaic belief and identity were attenuated.

This assimilationism, nothing short of the Empire's supra-national state ideal, contrasted the ethnolinguistic nationalism into which other national components merged nationalism and liberalism. Theodor Herzl is one interesting example, showing the degree of Jewish people's linguistic assimilation. This founder of Zionism, who wrote his 1896 book *Der Judenstaat* (The Jewish State) in German, called Yiddish(es) "ghetto languages" and the "furtive languages of prisoners" (Herzl [1896] 1970: 71). Herzl also considered Hebrew unviable as a common language in the coming Jewish state; proposing a language federalism as in Switzerland, he remarked, "Everyone keeps her/his language, which is the dear home of her/his thoughts" (Herzl [1896] 1970: 71).

2.3. *From "Religious Infidels" to "Another Race"*

Assimilation to the illuminating, civic-liberal German culture was, for enlightened Jews in Austria, a precondition of Jewish liberation. What they sought to resist anti-Judaism was not a "Jewishness" that would justify them as a nation, but the inverse: a "Jewishlessness" for perfect assimilation, as exemplified in Jewish cultural elites in Vienna, who, radicalizing the Enlightenment ideal of a pure humanity, tried to cast off their Jewishness to be "individuals without characteristics" (or "without qualities" [*Eigenschaften*]) (see Beller [1989] 1990: 211–212).

The largest turning point came with the collapse of the Empire after its defeat in the war. The Austria Empire, because of its multinationalism, had rejected the idea of a Greater Germany, but Austrian politicians

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and the increase of migrants, the "descent principle" (*Abstammungsprinzip*) happened to become relatively dominant for the legal practice of clarifying the state-membership (citizenship) of each individual. Moreover, nor was the principle tied to ethnonational German identity at the time. See S. Satō (2021; 2022).

[26] Incidentally, Mori (1995: 24, 27) indicates that the religion column on Schutz's school transcripts from elementary school to gymnasium calls him "Mosaic" (*mosaisch*) and that his languages in the record at the aptitude test for Austrian military service in 1917 are German, French, and English. These facts should be understood in the above-mentioned context. The same description about Schutz's religion can also be found in his military certificate. See Leo Baeck Institute Archives (Box 4, Folder 11: 28, 30, 32).

after 1918, regardless of whether right or left, wished to conjoin to Germany, since the new Austria had lost its "warehouse" in Hungary and the industrial areas and coalfields in Czechia, and the rebuilding of Austria by itself was viewed as a very hard task (Nomura 1999: 186; see also Rauscher 2017: 56–57). Thus, Article 2 of the Proclamation of the Republic (*Die Ausrufung der Republik*) stipulated that "German Austria (*Deutschösterreich*) is a component part of the German republic" in November 1918 (Rauscher 2017: 68–69); yet this *Anschluss* was stopped by France, and the term "German" was removed from the name "German Austria" in the so-called Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye (Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria) in September 1919 (see *Staatsgesetzblatt für die Republik Österreich* 1920: 1052, Artikel 88 = 1919: 24, Article 88).[27]

This episode, however, tells that post-1918 Austria, based on the principle of national self-determination, viewed itself as a German nation-state (see also Froehlich 1919/20: 426; Grandner 1995: 61). Symbolically, the first chancellor, Karl Renner, although he himself had originally promoted the idea of a Danubian Federation, declared the above-mentioned Proclamation to Austria as a "German nation," closing his speech with the phrase "Hail our German people (*deutsches Volk*) and hail German Austria!" (Rauscher 2017: 68).[28] This self-identification of Austria as a German nation-state made the position of assimilated Jews unclear. If its German nationalism had been founded exclusively on linguistic affiliation, they would have presumably remained full members of the new Austria as of the old. However, as Mari Nomura (1999: 232–233) depicts in detail, the German translation of the French word "*race*" in the Treaty of Saint-Germain hindered this continuity, presented in Article 80, a remedial provision for those who would become national minorities in the new nation-states that emerged after the dissolution of the Empire:

Persons possessing rights of [local or municipal] citizenship (*l'indigénat; heimatberechtigt*) in territory forming part of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and differing in race ["*race*" in the French original text and "*Rasse*" in the German version] and language from the majority of the population of such territory, shall within six months from the coming into force of the present Treaty severally be entitled to opt for

[27] Furthermore, due to the Treaty, some "German" regions, such as South Tyrol and the Sudetenland, of the territory originally envisioned as German Austria were also ceded to neighboring countries when the First Republic was established.

[28] Renner, trying to somehow make a positive assessment of the Treaty of Saint-Germain, also stated at the meeting of the Constituent National Assembly for German Austria on September 6, 1919, "Now, however, we are finally getting rid of these inhibitions, and in our unhappiness the one thing that is a happiness is that we will really and truly be one nation (*eine Nation*), one national state (*ein nationaler Staat*), equals among equals, people who understand each other, people with the same cultural level, people with the same mental habitus, people with a manageable (*übersehbaren*) territory and equipped with the heritage of German culture, which we will, now more than ever, foster, esteem and preserve, because we need it" (*Stenographisches Protokoll* 1919: 797). In relation to the discussion immediately below, note also that it does not matter to Renner here whether the German nation is "of the same race (*Rasse*)." Incidentally, it was about twenty years after WWII before the opinion that the Austrians were an established nation came to be held by over half the country's inhabitants. See Plasser and Ulram (1991: 143–147, in particular, table 87) and Bluhm (1973: 220–241). As for the post-WWII formation of Austrians' national identity as a "victimized nation," see Mizuno (2020).

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Austria, Italy, Poland, Roumania, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, or the Czecho-Slovak State, if the majority of the population of the State selected is of the same race [ditto] and language as the person exercising the right to opt. (*Staatsgesetzblatt für die Republik Österreich* 1920: 1050 = 1919: 23)

The problem is in fact that of the so-called indeterminacy of translation. In line with the conception of modern France as a social-contractual "community of citizens" (and if thereby interpreting the "will of the lawgiver" of the Treaty precisely), the French word *race* should rather have been translated as *Nationalität* (nationality), which implicates ethnolinguistic differences, but was instead directly replaced by *Rasse*, which has a much stronger biological (or physical-anthropological) connotation (Nomura 1999: 232–233; Froehlich 1919/20: 426–427; Burger and Wendelin 2004: 262–265; Hirschhausen 2009: 560; see also Grandner 1995: 74–79).[29] This rule was then applied not only to Jewish refugees flowing to Vienna after the war, that is, "Jewish Jews" (Nomura 1999: 102), but also to assimilated Jews without the *Heimatrecht* (local or municipal citizenship; right of domicile) in the territory of the new Austria. In February 1921, the Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior (*Bundesministerium für Inneres*) opined that *Rasse* in the Treaty should be definitely understood to mean biological race and that Jews, as Semites, did not racially belong to the German majority of Austria; nonetheless,

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[29]   It may not necessarily be that the German word *Rasse* always referred to a strictly biological notion of race at that time. The usage from Wittgenstein's diary, quoted in fn. 10, may be an example, albeit an obscure one. But there is no doubt that the German word in question had a strong biological connotation. As for the German translation of the Treaty, Hirschhausen (2009: 560) states, "Whilst in [French and] English 'race' contained the notion of 'nationality', for German contemporaries the term evoked vague connotations of immutable genetic make-up, 'blood' and even religion." To begin with, the Austrian negotiators of the Treaty themselves were apparently aware of the difference in meaning between the term *race* in French and English and the term *Rasse* in German (Grandner 1995: 67–71, 79). Therefore, Haber (1920: 228), in interpreting (the German translation of) Article 80, had to suggest that what are called nations in the Austria-Hungary cannot be distinguished from each other in terms of *Rasse*, because of this word's biological implication, although he called *Rasse* a "purely ethnographical concept." Moreover, Liermann (1928: 282–283, 309–315) also remarked that the French term *race* in the Treaty of Saint-Germain should mean "social race (*Sozialrasse*)," which Ludwig Gumplowicz refers to, and not biological (physical-anthropological) race. For the conceptual history of *Rasse*, see Conze and Sommer (1984), which also begins by first referring to the biological connotation of race. The most suggestive example of the general usage of *Rasse* at the time of the Treaty may be Weber's reference to it. At the first Congress (Sociologists' Day) of the German Sociological Association in 1910, he mentions "hereditary types bred in reproduction communities" as the normal image of *Rasse* (Weber [1924] 1988: 458). In contrast, the French and English words of "race" at the time would have had a broader range of meanings. As an English example of its usage of those days directly related to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, again see Figure 1, the map titled "Distribution of Races in Austria-Hungary" by Shepherd (1911: 168), where, the term "races" obviously means "ethnicities" or "nationalities" corresponding to the language dominantly used in each area. See also Briliant and Lake (1910: 972–973). Incidentally, it was the US side that introduced the race concept as a distinguishing mark of a minority into the negotiation process of the Treaty of Saint-Germain. One reason of this was to ensure that Jews, who were not always considered a "national" minority, were included within the range of minority protection, but even in this case, the US side must not have necessarily viewed Jews from a biological perspective. See Viefhaus (1960: 109–114) and Grandner (1995: 68–71).

it did add that the government would preferentially take into account linguistic affiliation when examining the qualifications of applicants to Austrian (state) citizenship (*Staatsangehörigkeit*; state-membership) (Nomura 1999: 247–249; see also Grandner 1995: 75–76).[30] In June 1921, however, the Administrative Court (*Verwaltungsgerichtshof*) denied even this policy. Responding to a Jewish person's motion of complaint about the need to apply for Austrian citizenship, it judged that applicants must share not merely the same language but also the same race as the majority in the state, as race is independent of the individual's free decision (Schuster 1922; Nomura 1999: 251–256; Grandner 1995: 79; Burger and Wendelin 2004: 264–265; Hirschhausen 2009: 561–562; see also Graupner 1944: 36; Stiller 2011: 72–73). Thus, Jews, as belonging to a racially different nation, were not a priori granted full membership in the successor Republic; they became a minority alien race of inferior status deigned to live as if being a guest in the German nation-state, allegedly out of a sense of charity, in a manner of speaking (Nomura 1999: 256–280, 249; Timms 1994: 163; see also Hirschhausen 2009: 560, 562).[31]

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[30] Brubaker ([1992] 1994: 50–51, 167), while noting that the literal meaning of the German term *Staatsangehörigkeit* is "formal state-membership," uses "citizenship," not "nationality," as its English translation from today's perspective. In this paper, I basically follow his choice of translation. For instance, Grandner (1995) also appropriately discusses the above-mentioned issue of options in the Saint-Germain Treaty as the issue over citizenship, relating it to the then formulation of the new (German) Austrian Republic's Citizenship Act (*Staatsbürgerschaftsgesetz*). Meanwhile, it should also be noted that, in the German and English versions of the Treaty of Saint-Germain, the terms "(*österreichische*) *Staatsangehörigkeit*" and "(Austrian) nationality" correspond to each other; "*Heimatrecht*" and "citizenship" do so there as well (*Staatsgesetzblatt für die Republik Österreich* 1920: 1048–1049 = 1919: 21–22; see also Brix 1982: 90). In fact, given the historical background of the time, the use of "nationality" for "*Staatsangehörigkeit*" would also be suitably appropriate: As Stiller (2011: 10–11) points out, in the Third Reich, after the Reich Citizenship Law (*Reichsbürgergesetz*) in 1935, which was one of the two (or three) laws collectively described as "Nuremberg Laws," Jewish fellow-citizens were deprived of citizenship (*Staatsbürgerschaft*) in the sense of equal political and civil rights, although their nationality (*Staatsangehörigkeit*) remained German. In the final section of this paper, I will briefly refer to the issue of Schutz's (state) nationality, which is related to this historical context.

[31] Burger (2014: 137–138) states that, as per the Treaty of Brno in 1920, which mentions that the option set forth in Article 80 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain be exercised in a "liberal manner," i.e., with language as the more important indicator than race, most assimilated Austrian Jews from the territory of Czechoslovakia who professed belonging to Austrian were accorded options. Note that this episode rather shows that assimilated Jews living in the new Austria were not included without condition in this German nation-state; their inclusion required the "liberal" interpretation of Article 80, which emphasized language over race (see also Nomura 1999: 245–246). Therefore, after the appointment of Leopold Waber of the non-liberal, Greater German People's Party (*Großdeutsche Volkspartei*) as Interior Minister in June 1921, the Austrian government became overtly racially anti-Semitic. After his arrival, it became difficult for Jews to obtain Austrian citizenship (*Staatsangehörigkeit*) by relying on Article 80 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain, even those who had been living in the territory of German Austria for many years, if they did not have the *Heimatrecht* there (Nomura 1999: 270–273, see also 188–189, 256–267; Timms 1994: 162). In a letter to Dr. Anton Schalk, dated September 24, 1921, Waber wrote, "Since the Jews, according to race (*der Rasse nach*), are unquestionably different from the majority of the population, I made a provision that not a single option application of a Jew may be granted. *There is only one 'either – or' in this direction,*

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Previously, in the Austro-Hungarian Empire with its complicated national problems, the main method of judicially judging nationality had, since the 1880s, been *subjectivism* (or the so-called "principle of confession [*Bekenntnisprinzip*]"), and the Administrative Court so far had assigned more importance to the individual's subjective sense of identification than to their language (Stourzh 1985: 174, 203–208; Nomura 1999: 233, 253–254; Brix 1982: 29, fn. 34, 46–50).[32] In 1910, Edmund Bernatzik, who was a representative subjectivist jurist and the rector of the University of Wien in 1910–11,[33] wrote,

> [N]ationality means an emotion of sympathy, or a self-awareness to be one (*Sich-eins-wissen*) with the history, the future, and the present of a people (*eines Volkes*), i.e., with its culture. In this sense, it [nationality] is therefore a result of the particular mental activity, something that is maintained by free self-determination, if not acquired. Hence it is not unalterable and rather enables assimilation. (Bernatzik 1910: 26)

That is, nationality was an individual's free choice (see Bernatzik 1910: 30–35; Froehlich 1919/1920: 427; Stourzh 1985: 242–244); language was merely an approximate proxy for one's sense of belonging (see also

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because I cannot possibly say that only the East Galician Jew belongs to another race, but the one living in Vienna does not. I have not made a single exception to this fundamental directive" (Archiv der Republik, Innenministerium, Karton 91, Z1. 525/St. cited in Besenböck 1992: 137–138, emphasis added). For Waber, it was unacceptable that Jews (i.e., non-Aryans) claimed the option in Article 80 as if they were Germans, and he therefore demanded that if they wanted to acquire Austrian citizenship, they should follow the normal procedure (by obtaining the *Heimatrecht* in one of the municipalities of the new Austria) (Nomura 1999: 271–272; see also Hirschhausen 2009: 561). Thus, the assimilated Viennese Jews without the *Heimatrecht* there were placed in a precarious position in the (state) citizenship acquisition process in the new Republic. It is true that almost all Jews who had lived since before the First World War in Vienna and had lived there continuously for more than 10 years as of 1923 were able to obtain the *Heimatrecht*, but this was largely because the Social Democratic Party—the only major party without an anti-Semitic clause—controlled Vienna's city hall which was in charge of the real work of approval (Nomura 1999: 273–279). For Schutz's *Heimatscheine* (certificates of domicile) issued in 1916, 1926, and 1938, which certify his *Heimatrecht* in Vienna, see Leo Baeck Institute Archives (Box 4, Folder 13: 18, 16, 13).

[32] In discussing national problems, Renner (1899; 1902; 1918) and Bauer (1907: chap. 19 and 22) also adopted subjectivism for determining nationality affiliation, calling it the "personal principle" (*Personalprinzip*; also *Personalitäts-Princip*; *Personalitätsprinzip*) as opposed to the "territorial principle" (*Territorial-Princip*; *Territorialprinzip*), although at least Bauer was not a pure subjectivist about nationality attribution. See also Sandner (2005).

[33] Schutz was a student of the Faculty of Law and State (*Rechts- und Staatswissenschaftliche Fakultät*) at the University of Vienna beginning in the winter semester of 1918; he "concentrated on *International Law*" (Wagner 1983: 9, emphasis added) and obtained his doctoral degree there in 1921, under Hans Kelsen (see also Wagner 1983: 11; Barber 2004: 14). Unfortunately, details about whether Schutz took Bernatzik's class at university have not been examined for this paper. Although Fleck (1995: 104) suggests that he did, no record of Bernatzik's class attendance could be found in the list of some of the major courses taken by Schutz compiled by Mori (1995: 31). However, Friedrich A. (von) Hayek, one of Schutz's fellow students of the faculty and a later Nobel laureate in economics, attended Bernatik's lecture, probably in 1918 (Kresge and Wenar 1994: 53).

Bernatzik 1910: 10, 25).[34] To begin with, as Judson (2016: 310) suggests, the term "*Umgangssprache*" in the census implicitly emphasized language as an "instrument of communication," separating language from identification—as compared to, for instance, mother tongue, which ethnolinguistic nationalists think of as the innate foundation of *Volksgeist*,[35] language of daily use as a concept opens more scope for assimilation. One can change the language of daily use according to the circumstances in the lifeworld. In fact, respondents of this census often changed their language of daily use from census to census (Judson 2001: 91; see also Nomura 2008: 114–121).

The translation *Rasse* made it hard to consider language as well as national consciousness in judging nationality; despite its scientific-seeming objectivity, it was arbitrary, since, for instance, one would need to unrealistically examine the applicant's family record going back generations (even if it is possible, how far back should one go?), and what "miscegenation" in the genealogy would mean for one's "race" was unclear (Froehlich 1919/20: 426–427; see also Liermann 1928: 283). Georg Froehlich, a legal scholar and one of the drafters of the 1920 Constitution of the First Austrian Republic, along with Hans Kelsen and Adolf Merkl,[36] had critically pointed out those days, "Such an [racial-purist] interpretation is likely to be impossible in the age of world-traffic (*Weltverkehr*)" (Froehlich 1919/20: 427).[37] Nevertheless, the Administrative Court's judgment became a model for subsequent trials of the same sort. Thus, the deterministic blood logic racially reified a "Jewish nationality"

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[34] Leo Haber also insists that a person's state nationality (*Staatsangehörigkeit*) can be marked "only through the *proven belief* (*Gesinnung*) in connection with the language of daily use, if not the mother tongue" (Haber 1920: 228, emphasis original).

[35] The ethnolinguistic nationalism's theoretical core was a mother tongue, not a daily language (*Umgangssprache*). See Kohn (1961: 25–26).

[36] Under Kelsen's policy, the 1920 Austrian Constitution partly inherited the content of the December Constitution of 1867, which had been maintained until 1918 under the constitutional monarchy. Incidentally, at the University of Vienna, Schutz took courses of Kelsen's titled "The Constitutional Law of German Austria," in the winter semester of 1919, and then "The Constitutional Law of Austria," in the summer semester of 1922 (see Mori 1995: 31; see also Fleck 1995: 104).

[37] It should be indicated here that Ludwig (von) Mises, who, along with Kelsen, was the teacher of Schutz's who influenced him the most as a student, also emphasizes in his book published in 1919 (probably shortly before the signing of the Treaty of Saint-Germain) that nation and race (*Rasse*) do not coincide, and defines the nation as a linguistic community (Mises 1919: 7–17). In his opinion, citizenship (*Staatsbürgerschaft*) is also not an essential element of a nation. He states, "The specific 'national' lies in the language," whose commonality "becomes, independent of its origin, *a new bond* that gives rise to certain social relations" (Mises 1919: 10, emphasis added). According to him, all peoples (*Völker*) originally resulted from racial mixing, and therefore the factor of race or racial community, a collectivist idea newly introduced by racialist politicians (*Rassenpolitiker*) as a counter concept to the *individualist idea of nation or national community*, played no role in the contemporary politics (Mises 1919: 8–9). Mises explains from a historical perspective that the political concept of "nation" or "nationality," owing to the development of modern democracy and modern liberal economy, had become gradually more significant since the late eighteenth century and had become general in the nineteenth century: people increasingly migrate, freeing themselves from the barriers of their previous status or class affiliation; members of minorities become inclined to adopt the language of the majority, for social interaction or upward social mobility. Mises himself rather positively evaluates such *natural assimilation* by individual choice regarding membership, contrasting with

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not authorized in the Empire, and in this sense enabled the German nation-state to exclude Jews from full membership (Nomura 1999: 237).

Indeed, such a racial ideology had already been formed in Europe, and language took a hand in it. The notion of contrasting Aryans and Semites had spread widely among European scholars by the end of the nineteenth century, derived from a spurious concept of biological race compounded by a spurious connection between race and culture (language) after the discovery of the Indo-European language family (also called *indogermanische Sprachfamilie* in German) in the late eighteenth century. Scholars like Friedrich Schlegel deduced a homology of race based on that of language, while, further, Ernst Renan and Max Müller promoted and widely spread the expressions "Aryan" and "Semite," by half-deliberately exploiting this confusion of race and language—although they sheepishly recanted after the Franco-Prussian War, seeing how this confusion was combined with nationalism for political purposes (Poliakov 1971: part 2, chap. 3–5; Imura 2008: chap. 8–10).

"Modern" anti-Semitism (racial anti-Semitism) justified itself based on pseudoscience, and excluded Jewish people on the basis of "race," even if they had no faith in Judaism and spoke only German. Schutz's Vienna was at the crux of this change in the view of Jews, strangers, "from religious infidels to another race" (Imura 2008). As stated previously, what confirmed this turn was the transition of Austria from a multinational empire to a nation-state. The "World of Yesterday," whose evaporation Stefan Zweig nostalgically lamented over during the Second World War, had, in reality, already become disrupted after the defeat in the previous war, as Thomas Mann ([1952] 1968: 270) also suggests.

According to Janik and Toulmin, the fall of the Empire bore most heavily on Viennese born in the late 1880s and the 1890s, because the framework of their social and national existence was dismantled just when they were approaching maturity (1973: 240). Wittgenstein, born in 1889—the same year as Hitler—is included in this generation. However, he had begun to write his book *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (*Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung*) during Great War and was nearly thirty years old, of a mature age, at the Empire's fall (in addition, before the 1938 *Anschluss*, he had moved to the UK in 1929 for academic reasons). In contrast, Schutz, born in 1899, was among the youngest of this generation and experienced the dissolution of the state, and thus of a self-evident reality, in his late teens and transition to adulthood. The multinational Empire for the

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politically enforced *artificial assimilation* (Mises 1919: 22–24, see also 45). That is, he does not consider the nation (i.e., a linguistic community) to be immutable at all; rather, its boundaries can change depending on political and cultural events (Mises 1919: 21–22). This would imply at the individual level that one spontaneously changes one's national affiliation by using the language of the environment, which one's "fellow-men" (*Mitmenschen*) speak (Mises 1919: 22). Hence, this classical-liberal economist of Jewish origin, dismissing even the personal principle raised by the socialists Renner and Bauer as a deception bringing no solution to national-autonomy-based divisions among different peoples living in the same area (Mises 1919: 42–43), remarks, "It is true that the dispute of the nations over the state and over the dominance will not be able to disappear completely from the mixed-language areas. But it will lose its sharpness in proportion as the functions of the state are limited and the freedom of the individual is expanded. Those who want peace between the peoples (*Völkern*) must fight against statism" (Mises 1919: 62, see also 27–31). For the influence of the multinational Austro-Hungarian Empire as a model of a liberal regime on Mises's economic thought, see also Slobodian (2019).

sake of which Schutz had fought vanished immediately after his homecoming.[38] For him, it must have been what he called a "great cataclysm" (Schutz [1943] 1976: 82). Furthermore, the racist exclusion of Jews in postwar Austria was becoming increasingly overt and severe. For instance, as a further step of racial exclusion by the Austrian government, a question about "race-affiliation" (*Rassenzugehörigkeit*) appeared in the 1923 official Austrian census forms (Timms 1994). "This marks," Edward Timms says, "a radical departure from the practice of the late Habsburg Empire, where national identity had been defined in terms of language, not of race" (1994: 162). In fact, (racial) anti-Semitism even became the official ideology of the Austrian government during the period between the two world wars; Nazis also began to appear on the streets of Vienna in 1923, and attacks on Jews were no longer directed at refugee Jews, but at Jews in general (Nomura 1999: 293; see also Mosse 1964: 136–137, 140–141).

All of these events happened in the young Schutz's lifeworld, and such experiences, some of which perhaps had sunk to the bottom of his consciousness, should have offered direction to Schutz's sociological thought, since, as he himself states, "the *meaning problem* is a[n inner-]*time problem*" (Schütz 1932: 9, emphasis original; see also Tada [2018] 2019). In any case, given the above social context, Schutz's silence on anti-Semitism in his publications would rather stand as a matter to be explored: it seems to paradoxically show his strong (but perhaps forced) awareness of his Jewishness. In the next section, I will examine how this "flip side of consciousness" features in Schutz's scholarly work.

3. Imagined Jews: Typification and Language

3.1. *Meaning Problem and Subjectivity*

Inconspicuously in "Equality," Schutz cites minorities' struggle for national language rights in the Austro-Hungarian Empire as evidence that equality has different meanings for majority and minority groups. Classifying the latter into two types, he differentiates them as follows:

> To minority groups of the type (a), assimilation is the kind of equality aimed-at. To those of type (b), however, *real* equality is the kind aimed-at; that is, obtaining special rights such as the use of their national languages in schools, before the courts, etc. The history of the cultural struggle of national minorities in the old Austro-Hungarian monarchy is an excellent instance of the point in question. The predominant group may interpret equality-to-be-granted as *formal* equality, and may even be willing to concede full equality

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[38] Wagner (1983: 6) and Mori (1995: 28–30, 690–691) point out that Schutz's article "The Homecomer" ([1945] 1976) deals with his own experience of the return from the battle front, although it outwardly focuses on the discharged US veterans being sent back to civilian life. As this indicates, Schutz seems to sometimes secretly analyze matters concerning himself by using other materials. Incidentally, Schutz's volunteering for the Empire's army may be linked to his identity, for the First World War was a "perfect opportunity [for Jews] to assert and prove their Austrian identity and loyalty" (Rozenblit 1994: 145).

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before the law and full political equality, and yet resist bitterly any claim to special rights. (Schutz [1957] 1976: 267–268, emphasis original)

According to Schutz, while the dominant majority group understands equality as a legally guaranteed "formal equality of opportunity," the subordinate minority group seeks an "equality of results" (this could be, for instance, as achieved by income redistribution or affirmative action); this interpretative gap leads to conflict (Schutz [1957] 1976: 266–268). "[B]oth the problem of formal equality in terms of abolishing discrimination, and the problem of material equality in terms of minority rights, originate in the discrepancy between the objective and subjective definition of a concrete group situation" (Schutz [1957] 1976: 266).

In the multinational Monarchy, the final outcome of this discrepancy was its own dismantlement; but the problem of equality was not solved thereby, but only shifted, since the newborn independent states in the now-defunct empery, although identifying themselves as homogeneous nation-states based on the principle of national self-determination, were, in reality, in themselves small multinational states (Nomura 2008: 122; see also Judson 2001: 95; Taylor 1948: 252–255). That is, all of them had minorities problems of their own. This was natural because of the ethnolinguistic distribution in Central and Eastern Europe, which Karl W. Deutsch calls a "strange layer cake with raisins" (Deutsch 1969: 47, see also 51).[39] The new Austria was also no exception, but as seen previously, the most complicated issue arose with regard to assimilated Jews. They had no "national homeland" outside, spoke German as *Umgangssprache*, and saw themselves as bearers of civic-liberal German values; they wanted to be true Austrians with their supra-national character (see also Schreiber 1918: 673, 675; Nomura 2020: 24). That is, *the Jews consistently fell into type (a) in Schutz's typology of minorities, meaning equality for them meant assimilation to the majority as citizens, not minority rights*, although Schutz himself never explicitly stated this.[40]

In this social situation, we expect the sharing of language to have appeared differently to Schutz than the case where people belonging to the majority in an established nation-state regard the sharing of (their national) language as self-evident.

Schutz's basic notion of language had already appeared in his Bergsonian period. Bergson himself criticized the rationalist spatialization of time, which he thought derived in part from language. "This so-called homogeneous time […] is an idol of the language, a fiction whose origin one easily finds" (Bergson 1896: 231). In contrast, Schutz considered that language underlies ego's highest lifeform, enabling conceptual thinking and communication. Ego cannot remain in the world of its own living experience; it also lives in a linguistic world

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[39] Deutsch (1969: 48) also relates an episode in which, just after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, in its ex-empery there were still village people who had no sense of belonging to a nation.

[40] Schutz gives no specific example of the type (a) minority in the paper, as he did with the above-cited "member who is not religious [being] considered as a member of a religious minority." However, the concrete case of the type (a) minority in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, in contrast to that of type (b) minority, should be much less self-evident to readers. Considering that Schutz must have known and seen real examples of the type (a) minority in the Empire, his silence seems unnatural and even intended.

(*Sprachwelt*) filled with others' living experiences (Schütz [1925–1927] 2003: 44). Schutz describes language's symbolizing function, which necessarily puts living experiences in the You-relationship, even as "the miracle of language" (Schütz [1925–1927] 2003: 43). As shown in the later *Aufbau*, Schutz maintained Weberian action theory's view of the liberalistic, modern individual who rationally acts toward the projected future goals. Such an individual reflexively must spatialize inner time for their action plan (Tada 2020b: 453–454). The importance of language for such an individual to achieve the goal would be beyond doubt. Language "*hypostatizes living experiences brought into gaze in a certain way […] as behavior, and then predicates the direction of viewpoint itself, which originally transforms such living experiences into behavior, as meaning precisely of this behavior*" (Schütz 1932: 40, emphasis original).

On the other hand, Schutz emphasized that what *first* constitutes meaning is the way of directing a gaze at a particular living experience in inner time (Schütz 1932: 40, 49–50). "Meaning […] is the result of an interpretation of a past experience looked at from the present Now with a reflective attitude" (Schutz [1945] 1982: 201). In his manuscripts of the early Bergsonian period as well, Schutz treated the lifeform of the ego who conceptually thinks with language as merely one of six lifeforms: the "ego's pure duration," the "ego's memory-gifted duration," the "acting ego," the "You-related ego," the "speaking ego," and the "conceptually thinking ego" (Schütz 1981; see also Mori 1995: 231–287). Language does not determine the whole of human life; the pure duration is always maintained in the ego's innermostness. "In language, ego does not find living experiences any more, but only formulas or templates that are possibly suitable to make her/his living experiences communicable" (Schütz [1925–1927] 2003: 44).

Life and thought are different things (Schütz 1932: 275).[41] Life is always pre-predicative (pre-linguistic) and therefore pre-conceptual. In fact, there are always experiences that leave no trace in memory, for example physiological reflexes like blinking (Schutz [1945] 1982: 210). These unreflected-upon experiences never become subjectively meaningful; hence, the whole of life cannot be reduced to meaning, still less to linguistic meaning.

Schutz dealt with language (or symbol system) simply as a "vehicle" of thinking (or of communication at best) (Schutz 1970: 93–94; Schutz [1951] 1976: 160). Certainly, a language, as an independent system, has its own meaning (see Schutz 1970: 93–94). But the linguistic predication is secondary, coming after. Even if the actor conceptually thinks with language, language itself (or linguistic predication) is not essential to the meaning determination of the action. The meaning of an ongoing action (*Handeln*) is determined as the projected outcome of the action (called the *act* [*Handlung*]) by the actor her/himself, and in her/his own inner time (Schütz 1932).

In contrast to the logical empiricism which originated in contemporary Vienna under the influence of

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[41] Schutz also states, "By no means is it the writer's [Schutz's] opinion that life as such has a higher dignity than theoretical thought, a point of view advocated by certain so-called 'philosophies of life,' especially modish in Germany" (Schutz [1945] 1982: 247, fn. 32). This rationalist distancing of Schutz from the philosophy of life may be interpreted in light of the social conditions of the time, for example, the linkage between the Nazis and Nietzsche's philosophy.

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Wittgenstein and tried to reduce the world to the universal logic of language,[42] Schutz started from the insight that the inner sphere of subjectivity has autonomy and that the meaningful constitution of the social world is based on such individual subjectivities. Subjective meaning is neither equal to linguistic meaning nor subordinated to it. The problem of meaning in the real social world, in which autonomous individuals are respectively living their own lives, is irreducible into language.

> [E]verything has reference to my actual historical situation, or as we can also say, to my pragmatic interests which belong to the situation in which I find myself here and now. […] Language is not a substratum of philosophical or grammatical considerations for me, but a means for expressing my intentions or understanding the intentions of Others. (Schutz [1940] 1982: 134)

Language, for "me," is merely a medium used for a moment-to-moment pragmatic concern in a real social scene. To interpret an artifact or an artwork, one primarily reflects the creator's consciousness-experience (see Schütz 1932: 149); the interpreter does not always need a common language (or a common symbol system) with the creator. For Schutz, language was not the sole medium to communicate a thought. He states, "music begins where language ends" (Schutz [1956] 1976: 188; see also Schutz [1951] 1976: 159). One can also glimpse this linguistic view in his reference to Susanne K. Langer's symbol theory (Schutz [1955] 1982: 289–290, 324). Langer insisted that a theory like logical positivism, which implies that "our thought begins and ends with language," is dubious (Langer [1942] 1958: 82); even the metaphysical "unspeakable" could appear to us with some meaning through an artistic symbol (see Langer [1942] 1958: 81–82, 89–90). "The field of semantics [meaning] is wider than that of language" (Langer [1942] 1958: 81); hence, our world recognition is much less reducible to a scientific symbol system (artificial language).

Similar to what is captured in this insight of Langer's, the characteristics of Schutz's language theory could be said to relativize the determining force of language, allowing subjective autonomy in the meaningful constitution of the social world. To begin with, language can never be the unquestioned foundation of theory, contrary to what logical empiricism and naturalism assume (Schutz [1954] 1982: 53). Even an artificial (meta-) language is not a transcendent (ideal or pure) medium of meaning, but a medium used with others, and with various *fringes* of meaning, in this mundane, intersubjective world (see also Schutz [1945] 1982: 257; Schutz

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[42] By the way, one might also suspect that logical positivism also originated from the sociolinguistic conditions then prevailing in Central and Eastern Europe, because it was a movement to artificially construct a sole scientific, formal language that would transcend the diversity of (natural) ordinary languages and thereby remove the metaphysics clinging to them. That is, it seems to have been a radical project in the spirit of the Enlightenment to overcome the confrontation among vernaculars combined with the nationalists' irrationalistic idea of *Volksgeist* through universal (i.e., non-historical and timeless) logic. However, I cannot afford space to argue this further here. Instead, I point as a suggestive instance to the creation of Esperanto in multilingual Central and Eastern Europe. It is no coincidence that the famous artificial language was invented there in the late nineteenth century. Its founder, Ludoviko L. Zamenhof, a Jew born in Białystok, a city of language struggles in Poland, under the Russian Empire, hoped that Esperanto would work precisely as an *international* language for the peaceful coexistence of multiple ethnolinguistic groups.

[1955] 1982: 350). In fact, each individual can interpret a linguistic symbol in different ways, irrespective of its dictionary "objective meaning" commonly given as a repeatable, and the range of possibilities here is more than what Husserl calls "essentially subjective and occasional" expressions such as "left," "right," "here," "there," "this," and "I" (Schütz 1932: 31, 137–139, 148–149). In this sense, Schutz was more subjectivist than Husserl.

This fundamental subjectivism of Schutz's overlaps with the above-discussed subjectivism adopted to realistically judge nationality in the multinational Empire, where language has only a secondary meaning. Social realities (e.g. how a Jewish nationalist who speaks German for daily use or a refugee who changes their daily language in exile sees the world, or what their national identity is) can only be understood by looking at their inner time, not their language.

Thus, as seen, Schutz also deferred determination of belonging to a minority group to the individual choice of the person in question: *the self-determination of the individual*. Notably, this subjectivism of Schutz's is the same as the de facto position of Viennese Jews, who would not claim themselves to be a specific national minority so as not to inflame anti-Semites and support their arguments. For instance, as Nomura (1999: 306–309, see also 168–173) points out, when the Jewish National Council for German Austria (*Jüdischer Nationalrat für Deutschösterreich*) was launched by a Zionist, Robert Stricker, in November 1918, to represent Jews as a national minority in the new Austria,[43] the board of the Viennese Israeli Religious Community (*Israelitische Kultusgemeinde Wien*), the official representative organization of the Jews in Vienna,[44] issued a statement as follows:

> Every Jew will and must be completely free, according to his conviction, to confess *the nation* (Nation) *to which s/he feels s/he belongs. Under no circumstances, however—and this is stressed with considerable emphasis by the board—will the full rights and full duties of the Jews as state citizens* (Staatsbürger) *of German Austria, to which they are devoted in dedicated and sacrificial loyalty, be infringed*. (Vorstand der Israelitischen Kultusgemeinde Wien 1918: 705, emphasis original)[45]

Anderson ([1983] 1991) famously characterized the nation as an imagined community—but *self*-imagined community; the Jews, however, have often rather been a construct of other people's imagination. As Jean-Paul

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[43] As for this, see also Rozenblit (1998: 139–140), who points out that the Council consistently asked the new Austria to guarantee the Jews national rights in addition to individual rights as citizens, while, interestingly, remaining identified with German culture.

[44] Schutz's 1899 birth record is also registered in this community. See Leo Baeck Institute Archives (Box 4, Folder 10: 22). Incidentally, two months after Hitler invaded Austria and promulgated the *Anschluss* of Austria in March 1938, Schutz obtained the birth record's transcript. It is supposed to have been part of his and his family's preparations to defect (but the work of obtaining was itself probably done by his wife, Ilse; Schutz stayed in Paris at the time). See Leo Baeck Institute Archives (Box 4, Folder 10: 24) and Barber (2004: 76).

[45] Zweig (1942: 127–128) describes a similar reaction among civic Jews in Vienna against the publication of *The Jewish State* by Herzl. Such a rejection of the Zionist assertion of Jews as a separate nation was the typical reaction of Jewish liberals (Rozenblit 1994: 151).

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Sartre remarks, "The Jew is a person whom other people consider to be a Jew. This is the simple truth from which we must start. […] It is the anti-Semite who makes the Jew" (Sartre 1954: 83–84). To borrow Finkielkraut's (1980) book title, Jews are "the imaginary Jews." Zionism's self-imagining of the Jewish nation was also a kind of self-protective reaction to such an anti-Semitic imagination, and was not what many Viennese Jews had originally asked for.

The minority nationality determined by particular "objective" features such as "race," then, is merely a social construct, or a social fiction, fabricated by the majority. Nevertheless, Viennese Jews were eventually driven abroad or deported to concentration camps, despite their sense of belonging to Austria, speaking German as their mother tongue or daily language, (often) lacking belief in Judaism, and the unreality of the "Aryan"–"Semitic" racial distinction. Thus, we see a good reason for Schutz to have chosen subjectivism. As he remarked in 1940 in a review sent to Parsons: "Safeguarding the subjective point of view is the only, but a sufficient, guarantee that social reality will not be replaced by a fictional non-existing world constructed by some [objectivist] scientific observer" (Schutz [1940] 1978: 50; see also Schutz [1960] 1976: 8).[46] For Schutz, subjectivism (subjectivist sociology) seems to have been the countermeasure to grasp the *real* reality in which individuals live and thereby to guard their free choice and dignity in the age in which—as Horkheimer and Adorno ([1944] 1969) lamented—Enlightenment and civilization, the once-driving force of the emancipation of the Jews, had retrogressed into mythology and reverted to barbarism, in the form of the pseudoscience of race.[47]

3.2. *Lifeworld as a Counter-Idea Against Lebensraum*

In Schutz's theory, the issue of the construction in imagination of something or somebody by something or somebody else is dealt with in a more general manner as the problem of *typification*, part of what Schutz calls the *sociology of knowledge*, which studies "the social distribution of knowledge" (Schutz [1953] 1982: 15, n. 29a). According to Peter Berger (2011: 81), Schutz *democratized* the sociology of knowledge, which Max Scheler originally developed as a field to research society's influence on high-cultural thought. In Schutz's view, "what ordinary people (who don't write books and in many cases have not read any) think they 'know'" (Berger 2011: 81) can sufficiently matter to sociology. As part of this study, Schutz also democratized Weber's insight in his theory of scientific knowledge (*Wissenschaftslehre*) regarding the constitution of an *ideal type*: Not only scientists' knowledge of reality but also that of ordinary people, or the "man on the street" (Schutz [1946] 1976: 122, 129–130), is always typified, and therefore typifications for recognition in daily life must also be investigated.

The question is why this originally mattered to Schutz as a sociological question. He considered that typification is underlain by the distinction between "We" (*Wir*) in the immediate environment (*Umwelt*) of face-to-face fellow-men (*Mitmenschen*) and "They" (*Ihr*) in the non-immediate world (*Mitwelt*) of anonymous

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[46] In this context, it might be worth noting that Weber, the founder of interpretive sociology, had already stated that even the community-building based on "(biological-)race"-affiliation (*"Rassen"zugehörigkeit*) depends on subjectivity. See Weber ([1921/22] 1980: 234).

[47] See also Birken (1994), who proposes to restore German volkish thought to the context of the Enlightenment.

contemporaries (*Nebenmenschen*) (Schütz 1932: 202–210; see also Schutz [1964] 1976b: 41–53). In *Aufbau*, Schutz argued, "The relation to the non-immediate world is necessarily and always a They-relation," which is "the *empty form* for specific comprehension of the non-immediate-worldly alter ego through predicative explication of its *typical* being-so (how-being)" (Schütz 1932: 220, emphasis original). Then, extending this insight to the group in "Equality," he characterized "We" as the subjective meaning of group membership and "They" as its objective meaning (Schutz [1957] 1976: 251–257): While the former derives from self-identification by the group itself, the latter contrastively originates from hetero-identification, in which outsiders, by relying on their typification in a system of relevances, subsume a certain range of people into the same social category (e.g. Jews); hence, "people considering one another as heterogeneous may be placed by the outsider's typification under the same category, which then is treated as if it were a homogeneous unit" (Schutz [1957] 1976: 255). Schutz continues:

> The resultant discrepancy between the subjective and the objective interpretation of the group remains relatively harmless, so long as the individuals thus typified are not subject to the outsider's control. […] If, however, the outsider has the power to impose his system of relevances upon the individuals typified by him, and especially to enforce its institutionalization, then this fact will create various repercussions on the situation of the individuals typified against their will. (Schutz [1957] 1976: 255)

What Schutz experienced in Vienna was the process by which Jews, by virtue of the relevance of anti-Semitism, were excluded as "They" from "We." Especially in the new Austria, both assimilated Jews and Jewish refugees were institutionally lumped into the same homogeneous, fictive type—"Jews"—by race ideology.

Schutz had already declared in *Aufbau* that, renouncing the problems of transcendental phenomenology, he would pursue a phenomenological psychology of pure intersubjectivity, or "constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude" (Schütz 1932: 42), with a particular focus on the mundane-worldly construction of a "personal ideal type" (*personaler Idealtyp*) (see Schütz 1932: 205–208). Suggestively, Schutz had already emphasized in this context in *Aufbau*, *"Only the typical is homogeneous, but this always"* (Schütz 1932: 209, emphasis original). That is, typification is a homogenization in the imagination and, if applied to people, it will erase the differences between them. Schutz might have intended to make an objection to the highly biased typification of Jews from a phenomenological view, as, indeed, the "typical Jew" is unreal: Jews are heterogeneous. To begin with, they are also first and foremost concrete, different individuals because of their own inner time. This would also reject the quasi-biological, objective-scientific-seeming typifying theory of the difference between Aryan and Semite, which allows investigation of its underlying social world.[48]

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[48] Although quite different in approach, Wittgenstein's philosophy of language can also be interpreted as directed toward the issue of anti-Semitism, regardless of his intention or his stance on Jews. See Stern's (2001: 268-269) following incisive indication: "Anti-Semitism is strikingly akin to a Wittgensteinian philosophical problem: it arises from taken-for-granted prejudices and the misuse of language, and can only be resolved by a change in the way people lead their lives."

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Thus, Schutz's steadfast subjectivism and concern with the nature of typification by outsiders seems to have practical implications as well.[49] In fact, the capability to choose group membership without coercion was, for Schutz, an issue of individual freedom. Again, in "Equality," he states:

> It is, however, at least one aspect of freedom of the individual that he may choose for himself with which part of his personality he wants to participate in group memberships; that he may define his situation within the role of which he is the incumbent; and that he may establish his own private order of relevances in which each of his memberships in various groups has its rank. This freedom is probably the deeper meaning of the "unalienable right to the pursuit of happiness" […]. (Schutz [1957] 1976: 254; see also Schutz [1943] 1976: 82)

In Schutz's opinion, individuals will feel that their own rights and freedom as human beings have been lost if a social category that they do not find relevant to their own definition of their private situation is forcibly imposed on them by others' system of relevances, as it reduces that person to a mere interchangeable specimen of typified characteristics (Schutz [1957] 1976: 256–257, see also 261). "Typifying consists in passing by what makes the individual unique and irreplaceable" (Schutz [1957] 1976: 234), that is, erasure of each individual's "own characteristics or qualities" (*Eigenschaften*) irrelevant for immediate purposes. Schutz cited some concrete examples, the first of which was: "persons who believed themselves to be good Germans and had severed all allegiance to Judaism found themselves declared Jews by Hitler's Nuremberg Laws and treated as such on the ground of a grandparent's origin, a fact up to that time entirely irrelevant" (Schutz [1957] 1976: 257). Laws determining a person's "race" by their grandparents' religion would a priori be bankrupt. Nevertheless, many people, based on such an "objective" indicator imposed by others, were stuck in a category inconsistent with their subjectivity and thereby deprived of their right to pursue happiness.

In this context, Schutz's subjectivism regarding minority individuals' group membership seems to speak for assimilated Jews living in the turbulent, newborn Austrian republic. However, note that Zionism, a movement of *national* liberation of Jews, as a reaction against anti-Semitism, could also be a reifying typification of Jews, whereas, for Schutz, there is no monolithic, homogeneous collective of Jews.[50] Furthermore, in "Equality," Schutz even warns of a possible negative spiral between in-group and out-group: "[A] vicious circle is thus set

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[49] Less famously, in the US Selective Service Occupational Questionnaire in 1942, Schutz answers the question about his own duties as sociologist, "Research work in Social Psychology, Sociological problems in Europe, propaganda and public opinion." See Leo Baeck Institute Archives (Box 4, Folder 11: 18–19). Incidentally, Mori (1995: 670–671) indicates that, in contrast to Gurwitsch's lofty view of phenomenology, Schutz found a practical meaning of phenomenology in looking into the typically constructed order of our mundane world from a subjective point of view. For this, see the correspondence of Schütz and Gurwitsch (1985: 82–83) in April 1941.

[50] In "Equality," as an example of two groups that have much in common but have difficulty in understanding each other, Schutz cites the following example: "Jewish immigrants from Iraq have considerable difficulty in understanding that their practices of polygamy and child marriage are not permitted by the laws of Israel, the Jewish national home" (Schutz [1957] 1976: 246).

up because the out-group, by the changed reaction of the in-group, is fortified in its interpretation of the traits of the in-group as highly detestable" (Schutz [1957] 1976: 247). A rally of Jews as "We" (i.e., another nation) under Zionism could sharpen antagonism on both sides, which self-referentially sows further antagonism. One consequence "might be that those members of the in-group who plead for a policy of mutual understanding are designated by the spokesmen of radical ethnocentrism as disloyal or traitors, etc., a fact which again leads to a change in the self-interpretation of the social group" (Schutz [1957] 1976: 247). In fact, assimilated Jews loyal to Austria and wanting to be Austrians were squeezed between anti-Semitism and Jewish nationalism.

It seems that the significance of language for Schutz is understandable in this context in which both nationalist sides constructed Jews imaginarily. It is true that language cannot be the first, a priori indicator of nationality. Schutz particularly rejected the organicist idea that language is a manifestation of such a metaphysical entity as a *Volksgeist*. "What has just been clarified about social collectives is even more true of the meaning-objects (*Sinngebilde*) that we would call 'closed sign systems,' for instance, the system of the German language. […] [T]he fiction of an 'objective linguistic spirit' (*Sprachgeist*) must be rejected as an *impermissible metaphor*" (Schütz 1932: 228, emphasis added). However, if, dismissing such metaphysical collectivism,[51] one nevertheless adopts language as a practical, "objective" indicator of nationality, as in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, one can set aside arbitrary biological determinism imposed by others and opens a path to free assimilation by individual choice.

Note that this mode of reliance on language was crucially different from the Aryanist membership policy of the Third Reich. Hitler consciously adopted racial ideology to a priori exclude Jews, who had already become indistinct in cultural and linguistic terms (see also Stukenbrock 2005: 401–410, 428–429). In *Mein Kampf*, he says,

> On this first and biggest lie that the Jew was not a race but simply a religion, more and more lies are built up as an inevitable consequence. The moment-to-moment language of the Jew also belongs to them [these lies]. It is never a means for her/him to express her/his thoughts, but to hide them. By speaking French, s/he thinks Jewish, and while composing German verses, s/he only lives out the essence of her/his national character (*Volkstum*). (Hitler [1925/27] 2016: 799)

This dictator from Austria insisted that Germanization in the sense of mandatory use of the German language would lead to blood mixing due to the disappearance of differences between Germans and other nations, and thereby to the annihilation of the Germanic element (Hitler [1925/27] 2016: 997, 999). He thus asserted that "the national character (*Volkstum*), or rather the race, does not lie in the language, but in the blood" (Hitler [1925/27] 2016: 997, see also 813, 817). This blood logic completely prevented Jews from becoming members of the German cultural world, even when they wanted to be; and, worst of all, from living itself. Isaac Deutscher,

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[51] In such a metaphysical collective entity, "society's spirit (*l'âme d'une société*)," which Émile Durkheim refers to as the modern ideal for the national integration of France and thought of to be shared by people's sharing of the French language, should also be included. As for the linguistic view of Durkheim's, see Tada (2020a).

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a Marxist writer who was born in Galicia in 1907 and brought up in a Polish school, relates a tragic episode about his Jewish father:

> My father often used to say to me: 'Yes, you want to write all your fine poetry only in Polish. I know you will be a great writer one day.' For my father had a quite exaggerated idea of my literary talent, and wanted me to exercise it in a 'world language.' 'German', he would say, 'is *the* world language. Why should you bury all your talent in a provincial language? You only have to go beyond Auschwitz . . .'—Auschwitz was just near us, on the frontier—'you only have to go beyond Auschwitz, and practically nobody will understand you any more with your fine Polish language. You really must learn German'. That was his ever-recurring refrain. [...] Unhappily my father never went *beyond* Auschwitz. During the Second World War he disappeared *into* Auschwitz. (Deutscher 1968b: 65, emphasis original)

Hitler's racial thought was an irrational, paranoid delusion, rather than a mere imagining. Yet, it took on a reality, so that even the ethnolinguistic nationalism formerly common in Central Europe was thereby discarded—conveniently, since, as Étienne Balibar (1988: 140) points out, a racial community, unlike a linguistic community, is in principle closed, and permits neither new entry nor withdrawal. Thus, to use Andersonian terminology, the Nazis envisioned the German nation-state as an "imagined blood community" with an innate and unalterable membership, and altered the meaning of Germanization to the "extermination of non-Aryans" from the territory. Timms describes its consequence in Austria, contrasting it with the age of Habsburgs' liberal empire, as follows:

> Hitler, in effect, abolished the concept of the "citizen" and replaced it by that of the "Volksgenosse" (the "racial comrade" – the nearest English equivalent might be "kith and kin"). In thus subordinating citizenship (*Staatsbürgerschaft*) to the imperatives of race and nationality, he betrayed one of the most precious components of the Habsburg legacy: the principle enshrined in Article 2 of the Austrian Staatsgrundgesetz of 1867 that all citizens are equal before the law. (Timms 1994: 167)[52]

It might be no coincidence that Schutz brought the theme of the "lifeworld" (*Lebenswelt*) into focus just when the Nazis aimed for the realization of the social-Darwinist concept of "living space" (*Lebensraum*) through racial Germanization. Schutz first used the term *Lebenswelt* in 1937, the year before the *Anschluss* (which constituted an abuse of the national self-determination principle),[53] regarding personality in the social world (Schütz [1937] 2003: 139, 142, 144, 155; see Mori 1995: 583). The term *Lebenswelt* itself would have derived

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[52] In this connection, see also Schutz's ([1952] 1976: 223) view of government. A rational government that Schutz describes there in contrast with the totalitarian one seems to be similar to that of the Habsburgs' liberal empire.

[53] See Hitler's speech to the German Reichstag on February 20, 1938, in which he advocated national (*volkische* [*sic*]) self-determination (*Verhandlungen des Reichstags, III. Wahlperiode 1936, Vol. 459, Stenographische Berichte* 1938: 41). Not long after, Nazi Germany annexed Austria and then the Sudetenland.

from Husserl[54]; however, as mentioned, Schutz employed it in his own way. He had already used terms such as "world of daily life" or "life in the social world" in *Aufbau*, meaning a given intersubjective world common to "We" (Schütz 1932: 140, 194, 196, see also 190), and *Lebenswelt* in Schutz should be seen as another such term, and in fact one that encompasses and sums up those previous expressions (Wagner 1983: 57).[55] In any case, while Hitler tried to found *Lebensraum* on race, Schutz's *Lebenswelt* is instead grounded on the culture and the language that mediates and enables it. For Schutz, this We-relation of the *Lebenswelt* was *a given non-imaginary ontological reality in which heterogeneous people live together*, while other kinds of "We" (e.g., based on racial identity) were mere contingent, cognitive realities or "homogeneous self-typification[s]" (Schutz [1957] 1976: 252), constructed in the "We" of the *Lebenswelt*.[56] He wrote that "*the one objective world* is the intersubjective life-world which is pregiven to all of us as the paramount reality from which all the other forms of reality are derived" (Schutz [1945] 1982: 251–252, emphasis added).

Given the scantness of Schutz's remarks on the Jewish question, the above-discussed comparison of *Lebenswelt* and *Lebensraum* remains a hypothetical interpretation. Although, here, it would be enough to confirm that Schutz's concept of *Lebenswelt* has theoretical potential as a counter-idea (*Gegenidee*) against racial ideology[57]: Objectively seen, our *real* lifeworld in the age of world-life or world-traffic cannot be

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[54] The articles where the term "*Lebenswelt*" appears, which currently constitute Parts I and II of Husserl ([1936/54] 1976), were written based on the lecture series titled "The Crisis of European Sciences and Psychology" (*Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die Psychologie*). They were published in Belgrade in Volume One of *Philosophia*, the yearbook of the international philosophical circle that has the same name as the journal, early in 1937, although it was dated 1936 (regarding the dating, see Moran 2011: 76). Schutz was a member of Philosophia. Further, he attended Husserl's lectures, titled "Philosophy in the Crisis of European Mankind" (*Die Philosophie in der Krise der europäischen Menschheit*), held in Vienna in 1935 about half a year before the above-mentioned lecture series in Prague; the word "*Lebensumwelt*" (surrounding lifeworld) appeared in the "Vienna lecture" (see Husserl [1954b] 1976: 342–343). Besides, Schutz apparently had a personal opportunity to read a part of the draft of Husserl ([1936/54] 1976) in 1932. For the circumstances under which Schutz became aware of the late-period Husserl, see Mori (1995: 530–531, 549–563).

[55] Therefore, it would not be appropriate to overemphasize the distinction between "social world" and "lifeworld." Schutz himself remarks later: "[S]ocial sciences do in fact deal with *the real social world, the one and unitary life-world of us all*, and not with a strange fancy-world independent of and without connection to this everyday life-world" ([1960] 1976: 19, emphasis added).

[56] Schutz himself briefly makes a distinction between a given "existential group" with which people share a common social heritage and a "voluntary group" that people join or form on their own will (Schutz [1957] 1976: 252). However, this classification of groups is only formal and does not take into account the case in which immigrants share a social knowledge of the new lifeworld through assimilation. What is more relevant to the discussion above is that Schutz, after presenting the classification, suggested that any explicit self-typification of a group as homogeneous (including the case of "citizenship in a nation" or "participation in Western culture") takes place within the framework of the comprehensive cultural settings; based on Schutz's theory, it would follow that such cultural settings are shared by the lifeworldly, real "We" through the same language. See Schutz ([1957] 1976: 252).

[57] The only instance I am aware of where Schutz seems perhaps to write as a Jew to anyone outside of his family is found in a 1953 letter to Eric [Erich] Voegelin, a political philosopher and Schutz's friend from university. See Schütz and Voegelin

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racially homogeneous, *nor should such a homogeneity be aimed at*. That is, in contrast to the exclusionist, paranoid notion of homogeneous *Lebensraum*, heterogeneous *Lebenswelt* is the genuine, objective reality and, *as such, is accessible to everyone, including strangers*,[58] if they learn the common, *civic* language mediating intersubjectivity in daily public life.[59]

3.3. *The Linguistic Construction of the Civic Lifeworld*

It should be acknowledged that the circumstances surrounding Viennese Jews in those days could become a significant auxiliary line to understanding Schutz's concepts of lifeworld and typification more deeply. Since Schutz and his theory were not born in a vacuum, the meaning of the fact that he attempted to demarcate "We" by culture and language in the racial-ideology-dominated time must be reconsidered, particularly focusing on his own lifeworld underlying his social science theory.

As seen above, the human actor Schutz posits is a modern, rational individual and in this sense, a (civic-) liberalistic one. And, like Weber, Schutz nominally considered all social collectives (collective actors), including states, nations, and peoples, to be fictive.

> One also speaks of the state, the press, the economy, the nation, the people (*Volk*), the class, by making these collective concepts into subjects of verbal statements, as if each individual noun were the non-immediate world's alter ego constituted in ideal-typical grasp. This way of expression is of course only an anthropomorphic metaphor for characterizing a certain state of affairs […]. (Schütz 1932: 226; see also Schutz [1953] 1975: 38–39)

In another place in *Aufbau*, Schutz also cites the state and nation as examples of essentially anonymous (therefore fictive) collectives of which an individual cannot have any direct experience (Schütz 1932: 202). This idea of Schutz's could necessarily connotate that the reification of Jews as a nation (and/or a race) is also a metaphor.

([2004] 2018: 482), where Schutz refers to Hannah Arendt (who published *The Origins of Totalitarianism* in English in 1951). Note that Voegelin published books titled *Race and State* (Voegelin 1933a), whose part 2 contains the chapter "The Jews as Counter-Idea" (Chapter 7), and *The History of the Race Idea: From Ray to Carus* (Voegelin 1933b) both in 1933, a year after the publication of *Aufbau*. In letters to Voegelin in 1952 and 1953, Schutz refers, although very briefly, to the books' content (including Voegelin's concept of counter-idea), as noted by the editor of their correspondence (Schütz and Voegelin [2004] 2018: 441–442, 482). However, the usage of "counter-idea" in this paper above does not always follow that of Voegelin. Incidentally, it is probable that Schutz has read *Mein Kampf* (perhaps in English translation) (see Barber 2004: 98).

[58] As for the fundamental openness of lifeworld to strangers, see Schutz's statement cited in this article's Introduction again. He remarked there that the intersubjective world is "either actually given or *potentially accessible to everyone; and this involves intercommunication and language*" (Schutz [1954] 1982: 53, emphasis added).

[59] Note that this does not mean that strangers must (or are forced to) completely assimilate into the host society in terms of language. The question about *Umgangssprache* in the Empire's census too only asked what language they used in daily (public) life. Although the language selected was regarded as an indicator of respondents' nationality, they were not urged to discard their mother tongue or/and home (family) language.

However, despite denying some *Geist* inherent in language and implementing a thorough individualism, Schutz never rejected the reality of *a linguistic community*; this was an exception to his attitude toward collectives. Remarking that one has to be familiar with the intellectual-historical sedimentation of a whole linguistic community's language world to understand the meaning of each word, Schutz cites the following statement from Karl Vossler: "We study the development of a little word, and the mental life of all people who used it is reflected and crystallized in it in a special way" (Vossler 1925: 117; Schütz 1932: 138–139). In this regard, Schutz can be clearly distinguished from Weber, who, because of his fundamentally nominalist individualism, considered a linguistic community to entail an "'as-if' existence" or "imagined linguistic community," and even that linguistic *communitization* (community-building through language) comes only after linguistic *societization* (society-building through language) (Tada 2018). For Schutz, again, people's sharing of a language is a given fact.

> In the process of transmitting socially approved knowledge the learning of the vernacular of the mother tongue has a particularly important function. The native language can be taken as a set of references which, in accordance with the relative natural conception of the world as approved by the *linguistic community*, have predetermined what features of the world are worthy of being expressed, and therewith what qualities of these features and what relations among them deserve attention, and what typifications, conceptualizations, abstractions, generalizations, and idealizations are relevant for achieving typical results by typical means. Not only the vocabulary but also the morphology and the syntax of any vernacular reflects the socially approved relevance system of the *linguistic group*. (Schutz [1955] 1982: 349, emphasis added; see also Schutz [1957] 1976: 233; Schütz 2020: 190–191, 311, 358–359)

As suggested here, what Schutz conceptualizes as an intersubjective, sociocultural world is congruent with what is generally called the linguistic community, or at least included in it (see also Schutz [1950] 1982: 277–278). However, despite his reference to the mother tongue in the above citation, the lifeworld or linguistic community for Schutz would not necessarily mean a (closed) ethnolinguistic *Bodengemeinschaft* (soil community) contrasted with *Gesellschaft*. Linguistic community inherently permits new entry (see Anderson ([1983] 1991: 133–134, 148),[60] and the lifeworld into which Viennese Jews had assimilated through German, the "*Kultursprache*" (Hobsbawm 2002: 11, emphasis original), was a modern, urban one of autonomous citizens whom they joined largely as equals—a paved city where the "blood and soil" have been covered over, into which strangers flow from far and wide and whose inhabitants live a secularized civic life, anonymous to each other. As mentioned, the bearers of children's socialization to whom Schutz refers were their parents and teachers—in modernity, neither extended blood-kin group, village community, nor religious community controls this acculturation process any longer.[61]

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[60] We should also note that the ethnolinguistic model of the nation-state, like the racial model, is originally "mythical" (Council of Europe 2007: 19).

[61] As an example, we can recall here that Wittgenstein had been teaching as a primary school teacher in some villages in Lower Austria from 1920 to 1926 after World War I. Besides, his second, but last book that he published in life was the

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The modern lifeworld, in other words, is necessarily a "*social* lifeworld" (see Schutz [1960] 1976: 6; Schutz [1940] 1982: 123) fundamental to which is a state of openness and anonymity, as distinct from a communal one, and Viennese Jews wanted to be and were already citizens of the supra-national social world in the period of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, before being forced to become a Jewish nation as an imagined community. What Schutz inhabited until its dissolution was a *secularized, civic(-liberal) lifeworld* whose culture could ideally tolerate the multinationality brought by the continuous influx of strangers from all around the Empire (see also Hobsbawm 2002: 10–11).[62] The fact that Schutz characterizes the lifeworld as a cultural world does not imply the sharing of premodern norms, as Parsons assumed. At least in Vienna, the "*city air*" enabled Jews to choose assimilation, discarding their old religious customs (see also Rozenblit 1983: 4–6), and its conditions were learning civil-social knowledge (civic culture and civic education) and the German language as its medium. Language (or a linguistic community) was related not to nationhood but to citizenhood (or citizenship), as English was to serve as a bridge for Schutz to live as a citizen in the new lifeworld of New York.

The confrontations between particularism and universalism, individual and society, micro and macro were Schutz's main scientific concern, and he consistently began with the individual, not from something macro that could be entangled in organicist nationalism. This was natural for Schutz, as he believed that nationality should be a matter of each individual's subjective choice. On the other hand, Schutz considered that a civic lifeworld, whose common foundation is a language, is a given for individuals, since the rational, abstract individual without characteristics or qualities (*Individuum ohne Eigenschaften*), as if born in a vacuum, that the French revolutionaries assumed was as much a fictive or ideal type as the *Volksgeist*. The real, given things for Schutz were rationally acting but concrete individuals with their own inner time and characteristics based on it,[63] and the concrete civic (or public) lifeworld of Vienna where they lived using the German language.

From this perspective, Schutz's frequent citations of the German language as a concrete example of the medium of meaning-understanding in *Aufbau* might have had a certain connotation.[64] For Husserl, language

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spelling dictionary of German, which he made under the title of *Dictionary for Elementary Schools* during his teacher days; in its preface, which was not added in the 1926 press version, Wittgenstein also remarked as one of the editorial policies that "Dialectical expressions are included only insofar as they have been established in the educated language" (Wittgenstein [1926] 1977: XXVIII, XXXIII).

[62] Incidentally, according to Mosse (1964: 295), Hitler believed his anti-Semitism derived from his encounter with Eastern Jews or "ghetto Jews" in Vienna. Furthermore, the stereotype he formed of them at that time led to his anti-urbanism. Mosse remarks, "This [stereotyped] view of the Jews became bound up with Hitler's hatred of Vienna itself. He loathed the city, and *precisely that part of it which was most civilized excited his greatest loathing*. No doubt it is at this point that his anti-urbanism became basic to his attitude toward life. This took the usual Volkish forms, including the glorification of the peasant, but it focused on the Jewish stereotype" (Mosse 1964: 295, emphasis added).

[63] It is worth adding that this point distinguishes Schutz from Weber. This founder of interpretative sociology, who belonged to the so-called "generation of the 1890s" (Hughes 1958) which pursued the Enlightenment's genuine rationalism, accordingly still started from the idea of the abstract (that is, relatively timeless) human individual, although "subjective meaning" also mattered to him.

[64] As to the places in which Schutz refers to the German language in *Aufbau*, see Schütz (1932: 121–122, 124, 134–135, 139, 228).

per se was simply one of the universal traits that make human beings human, so that each concrete, individual language never mattered to him. What he kept in mind in focusing on the mediating function of language was the question of how a scientific ideality, such as a geometric one, which is not a mental construct reducible to an individual mind, reaches from the first discoverer's consciousness to ideal objectivity (see Husserl [1939] 1976: 368–372). It is in this abstract context that Husserl mentioned language, and accordingly he conceived of even the linguistic community as a universal unity of the human "We" in the fundamental, broadest sense (Husserl [1939] 1976: 369–371). Corresponding to this, Husserl saw the lifeworld as universal and presumed its singularity. In contrast, Schutz conceived of the lifeworld as a particular one and premised plural lifeworld*s* corresponding to each culture, while keeping its universalist connotation (see Yu 1999: 171–172). To put it in terms of the familiar dichotomy of the principles of citizenship or nationality, Schutz's idea of lifeworld, on the one hand, is similar to *jus soli* in France rather than *jus sanguinis* as (until recently) in Germany—that is, not a closed blood-community that a priori refuses the assimilation of strangers; on the other hand, the lifeworld for Schutz was not the universal, ideal world of an abstract human being as often assumed in France,[65] but a particular real world which a concrete person having her/his own inner time was born into. This is probably one reason why Schutz's concept of lifeworld seems to contain both universalism and particularism—and as we must remember, Vienna was actually such a place for assimilated Jews: Strangers had been *included as citizens* in Vienna's social lifeworld, mediated by the universal, civic-liberal culture and a particular language (vernacular), German.[66] Or: being mediated by both of them, strangers had *chosen* by themselves to be included. In this regard, we might more accurately say that a person can be a member of a lifeworld not because s/he was territorially born there, but rather because s/he hoped to be its member according to her/his subjective sense of belonging.

Therefore, it was not contradictory for Schutz to emphasize the givenness of intersubjectivity based on the lifeworld, despite his individualism. Rather, it seems that the lifeworld in his conception, *being combined with his individualism*, meant, first of all, not a communal-cultural but a *civic-cultural* or *civic-social* lifeworld, consisting of emancipated, diverse individuals under modernity: people live there as free and equal citizens, forming intersubjectivity through a common language[67]; and "strangers" too can and may enter the *host lifeworld* by learning the language, which enables them to acquire commonsense knowledge necessary for everyday civic life there. To learn the language is, from strangers' own viewpoint, nothing but a *realistic*

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[65]   Regarding the image of such an abstract human being in France, see also Tada (2020a).

[66]   Recall that the German language was the ticket into the German culture, a "universal medium of emancipation," although only one of the vernaculars in Central and Eastern Europe. See also Rozenblit (1998: 143), who describes that liberal Jews attempted to keep a civic-cultural (not ethnocultural or ethnonational) definition of German identity in the new Austria as well. "These Liberal Jews understood their assimilation in utterly cultural terms. In the words of one writer, they had assimilated not in a deutschvölkisch sense, but in a purely cultural way" (Rozenblit 1998: 143, emphasis original).

[67]   If the interpretation above is correct, it may follow that it is naive to find a congruity between Schutz's sociology of the lifeworld and Wittgenstein's late philosophy of the lifeform, as ethnomethodologists often do. According to Gellner (1998), Wittgenstein adopted an abstract, universalistic individualism in his early philosophy and then swung to a romantic communalism in his later philosophy; these two positions respectively corresponded to the confrontational polar theories of knowledge that the Habsburg Empire faced as its "dilemma."

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(not idealistic) means for living as a member in the new lifeworld. In this sense, Schutz's linguistic view was consistently individualist: Individuals can and may change their language (and lifeworld based on language) a posteriori by their self-determination. Language is a vehicle that a rational individual actor can pragmatically switch depending on her/his actual purpose and actual biographical situation, separate from her/his identification (and emotion based on it). Schutz would then ground on this language-concept his civic lifeworld and civic intersubjectivity. A civic lifeworld, in which heterogeneous individuals spontaneously gather and somehow live together, using a common (but vernacular, not artificial) language as a given practical tool for their social lives, is an ontological, paramount reality in modernity. In this sense, the real civic lifeworld is linguistically constructed, whatever be the participants' origins (affiliations). In consequence, the meaning of language for Schutz may have corresponded with the ideal of the modern liberal society: Language is a medium through which free and equal, diverse individuals, who have autonomy based on their own pre-linguistic inner duration, make *civic participations* with each other.

As for Schutz's own lifeworld, attention is often focused on his marginality in his place of exile. However, compared to the United States, in which Jewish arrivals, even while remaining strangers, could also live in broader personal-ideal-typical categories such as "foreigner," "immigrant," or "white,"[68] their status in the homeland, Austria, amid the unceasing whirlwind of anti-Semitism, was much more marginalized and precarious. Applying Schutz's lifeworld theory to himself and his ideas, we should realize that his basic sociological thought, which bore fruit in his *Aufbau*, had been formed in the threatened civic-cultural or civic-social lifeworld of Austria; the following statement found in a biography of Sigmund Freud seems true of Schutz as well: "The hostile situation of the Jews creates a passionate 'why?' and this 'why' can, under favorable conditions, founded a remarkable scholarly exploration (*Wissenschaftlichkeit*)" (Wittels 1924: 227).

Having experienced the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire at an impressionable age, in his work, Schutz seems to have thematized the post-1918 daily world, in which social realities increasingly divided and world views conflicted with each other. As stated previously, he also pointed out the fictiveness of social collectives, but considered study of them not meaningless but rather a significant complement to the theory of forms in the social world (Schütz 1932: 227), because ideal-typically imagined collectives such as "Germans," "Austrians," or "Jews" appear as taken-for-granted realities with some meaning in daily social life. This seems to be one reason Schutz chose the social-scientific field of sociology, in particular interpretative sociology, which attempts to understand subjectivity.

4. Epilogue: Sociology in the Age of "We" and "They"

As a final remark in "Equality," Schutz discreetly expresses his own opinion about what equality of opportunity should mean. Citing another scholar's argument that the principle of equality of opportunity would lead not to *laissez-faire* but to collectivism, he himself asserted the following by maintaining his individualist position:

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[68] For instance, in a registration card of Schutz in the US, Schutz is categorized by the registrar as white; in the US Selective Service Occupational Questionnaire in 1942, he himself answers the question about race as white. See Leo Baeck Institute Archives (Box 4, Folder 11: 3, 18).

But the ideal of equality of opportunity may mean something else, although something far more modest. It should assure to the individual who finds himself in the human bondage of his various group memberships the right to the pursuit of happiness, as we defined this notion at the end of Section V (1), and, therewith— in terms of his own definition—the maximum of self-realization which his situation in social reality permits. (Schutz [1957] 1976: 273)

And we have already seen above what Schutz had said at "the end of Section V (1)," but here it is again:

It is, however, at least one aspect of freedom of the individual that he may choose for himself with which part of his personality he wants to participate in group memberships; that he may define his situation within the role of which he is the incumbent; and that he may establish his own private order of relevances in which each of his memberships in various groups has its rank. This freedom is probably the deeper meaning of the "unalienable right to the pursuit of happiness" […]. (Schutz [1957] 1976: 254)

It should not be allowed for some "objective(-scientific-seeming)" definition, based on race or whatever, to enforce a particular group membership on an individual. Schutz no doubt believed that equality of opportunity included an equal guarantee of the right of minority individuals, or "strangers," to self-realization in a civil society *by choosing assimilation as an individual choice*. However, this assimilation would not mean a homogenization, wiping out all distinct characteristics (*Eigenschaften*), but *simply an entry into the role of citizens in a "unity of diversity."* Any individual is a concrete being who, with their various characteristics, actually lives in a world peculiar to them, rather than an abstract being living in a vacuum. In this sense, Schutz's thought may be similar to Sartre's "concrete liberalism" (Sartre 1954: 175–178): minorities should not be excluded from society because of their characteristics that distinguish them from the majority. However, while Sartre's concrete liberalism, as a kind of collectivism, aimed to assert a minority's right to maintain their collective identity against assimilationism based on the ideal of the abstract individual (especially in France), Schutz focused on the various concrete individuals of minority origin who, with characteristics based on both their own inner time and their comprehensive identity as citizens, individually chose assimilation into the majority's civic life (i.e., host civic lifeworld)—more precisely, in today's terminology, Schutz dealt with the issue of *inclusion* rather than that of assimilation[69]: in terms of language, this refers to the possibility of *plurilingualism*.[70] In any case, all he supposed as a precondition was that these individuals would share the same language to some extent, allowing them to participate as "well-informed citizen[s]" (Schutz [1946] 1976) in society.[71] The "common language" (Schutz [1951] 1982: 75), as the medium *par excellence* for typification and intersubjective knowledge, would be the basis of civic life. Schutz says:

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[69]   As for this point, see also fn. 11 above.

[70]   For the definition of plurilingualism, see Council of Europe (2001: 168).

[71]   See also Schutz's statement quoted in fn. 17 above.

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The typifying medium *par excellence* [emphasis original] by which socially derived knowledge is transmitted is the vocabulary and the syntax of everyday language. The vernacular of everyday life is primarily a language of named things and events, and any name includes a typification and generalization referring to the relevance system prevailing in the *linguistic in-group* [emphasis added] which found the named thing significant enough to provide a separate term for it. The pre-scientific vernacular can be interpreted as a treasure house of ready made pre-constituted types and characteristics, all socially derived and carrying along an open horizon of unexplored content. (Schutz [1953] 1982: 14)

It is true that the givenness of everyday language can prevent us from questioning the problem of meaning in daily life (see Schutz [1951] 1976: 160). That is, everyday language, as "a treasure house of preconstituted types and characteristics," can contribute to the "epoche of natural attitude" (see also Schutz [1950] 1982: 285). In this sense, the mediating function of language is not always purely honorable without any caveat, as was the case with the German translation *Rasse*. However, because of the inseparability of language and (conceptual) knowledge, those who are not well-acquainted with the language (that is, people of the *linguistic out-group*) can only have poor access to knowledge accumulated through the language in question; it follows that they also have difficulty with both civic participation in the correction or dismantling of the kind of prejudices (or stereotypifications, as a form of "common-sense" in the host lifeworld) that lead to discrimination and civic self-realizing.

Schutz's theory seems to have presupposed the world-life or world-traffic of his time; and he practiced his own theory. It is of note that Schutz made great efforts to bridge his notion and the American academic knowledge-world, and actually wrote articles in English from the outset, by trial and error, and that in a way that he incorporated American intellectual tradition so that American readers could understand his ideas (see Coser 1984: 123, 311; see also Schutz 1970: 3; Schütz and Gurwitsch 1985: 40, 68–69, 125–126; Nasu 1997: chap. 4). Compared to his fellow exiles from the German-speaking sphere, his efforts to assimilate into the American linguistic in-group were rather exceptional; however, as a first-generation immigrant, Schutz attempted the same thing as the Jews who had previously tried to assimilate into the German linguistic in-group of the Empire.

In a sense, the United States might have been for Schutz a substitute for the dismantled Empire—from one pluralistic (multinational) state to another pluralistic (multiracial) state. It was, at least, a movement between similarly cosmopolitan, liberal cities: from Vienna to New York. The cultural gap between them would, especially at that time, have been smaller than the one between Vienna and an Austrian rural, blood-and-soil-based area. In any case, the span of time during which Schutz lived in a nation-state that a priori refused the assimilation of strangers by orienting toward racial homogeneity was, rather exceptionally, only twenty of his sixty years of life; nor did he move back to Austria after the war. As a result, the subjectivist-sociological treatises that might have been written in German if the war had not happened were published in English, and after his death, they became known to the world. The exiled phenomenologists required considerable time to be accepted in the United States, while logical positivists of the Vienna Circle like Rudolf Carnap or empirical researchers like Paul Lazarsfeld gained audiences and received good university posts much sooner (Coser 1984: 9, 110–125, 297–312; see also Nasu 1997: chap. 6). It is probable that Schutz's writing in

English contributed to the dramatic acceptance of phenomenology since the 1960s.

At the same time, it should also be noted that the United States had introduced an assimilationist language policy for immigrants. Following the growth of "old-stock" white Americans' anxiety about the increasing number of new immigrants, Congress had approved a significant change in US naturalization policy in 1906, after which immigrants who could not speak English would not be granted citizenship; this was the first language restriction enacted in federal law (Crawford 1992: 53).

Symbolically, in the ship's manifest of the vessel that brought Schutz and his family to the United States in 1939, English is given as the language that Schutz can read and write, while German was given in the ship's manifest on his first visit to the United States in 1937 (SS *Rex* 1937; SS *Nieuw Amsterdam* 1939). To have been accepted, Schutz may have had to prove at that time that he could use English; and, perhaps as evidence of his English ability, actually continued to write in English after. Jewish refugees were originally not so welcomed— the *St. Louis*, a ship full of Jewish refugees, had famously had to return to Europe after being turned away by Cuba, the US, and Canada the month before Schutz's arrival in the US.[72] Hence, such a linguistic strategy might have been required to avoid risks associated with his unstable position as immigrant.

Although Schutz eventually chose to acquire American citizenship before the end of World War II,[73] he could indeed have been regarded as an "enemy alien" in the United States. Following the above-mentioned example of a German suddenly, unexpectedly determined to be a Jew under the Nuremberg Laws, Schutz cites another example of typification based on objective interpretation: "Refugees from Europe, who believed they had found a haven in the United States, discovered themselves placed, after Pearl Harbor, in the category of enemy aliens, by reason of the very nationality they wanted to abandon" (Schutz [1957] 1976: 257).[74] This situation would have been true of Schutz himself: Because of the 1938 *Anschluss*, his nationality was given as "Germany" in the above-mentioned ship's manifest of 1939, while it had been "Austria" in 1937. Moreover, the 1939 manifest defined his race as "Hebrew,"[75] although the 1937 one had marked him as German. In sum, Schutz had been racially German in independent Austria, but, paradoxically, became racially not German after

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[72] To begin with, as Nomura (2012: 72–73) recalls, it was never easy for Jewish refugees from Nazi Germany to emigrate to the US, where the 1924 Immigration Act, enacted on the back of Anglo-Americans' consciousness of a "racial" crisis, raised barriers against immigrants from Germany as well through national origin quotas.

[73] Schutz obtained permanent status as a naturalized American citizen in November 1944 (i.e., five years after he defected to the United States). In the form for petition for naturalization, he pledged to take up arms in defense of the United States if necessary. See Leo Baeck Institute Archives (Box 4, Folder 13: 15, 29, see also 5, 8; Folder 14: 48) and Barber (2004: 98). World War II was ongoing at the time, and there was a possibility that Schutz would have been required to serve in the U.S. Army and fight against the Austrians mobilized by the Third Reich.

[74] Gurwitsch refers to such an "enemy alien" in his letter to Schutz on July 16, 1944 (Schütz and Gurwitsch 1985: 128). Zweig (1942: 491–492) also writes about a similar experience of his in London. See also fn. 76 below.

[75] To be precise, the item that the manifest uses is "Race or people." For the fluid history of this item (and of the Hebrew category) in ship's passenger lists in the US, see Perlmann (2018). Incidentally, Schutz's "Race or people" (i.e., "German" in 1937 and "Hebrew" in 1939) in the passenger lists is probably self-reported. Perlmann (2018: 37) points out that, from 1903 on, immigrants directly provided their own "Race or people."

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Austria became part of Germany, even as his nationality became German—no matter what the term "race" referred to.[76]

In any case, the United States was not always a haven; and of course, nor is it today.[77] As a reaction to the swift advance of globalization, nativism, chauvinism, and even racism have increasingly been coming to the front. The same is true of other countries as well. But this is because today's real society is the world society (Beck and Grande 2010: 190), in which many people move across and beyond borders (and therefore, pandemics such as COVID-19 rapidly spread worldwide). A homogeneously demarcated, national society is only an ideal-type, that is, a fictional construct. Even if there was relatively high national-cultural homogeneity inside borders, it should be regarded as an exceptional phenomenon achieved through the growth of economy and the expansion of mass education during the Cold War or "Cold Peace" (Hobsbawm [1994] 1996: 228), which, although divided the world (and also the former Austro-Hungarian Empire's territory) by the Iron Curtain, kept national borders after World War II relatively stable. However, given the reality of the current world society, the age in which one could believe in national society—its whole period seems to correspond approximately to the one that Hobsbawm ([1994] 1996) calls *the short twentieth century*—is already "the world of yesterday," which may make some people nostalgic and drive them to nationalism.[78] The world of today seems to be rather something akin to the multinational and multilingual Austro-Hungarian Empire, or "the world of the day before

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[76] Meanwhile, Schutz's letter to the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, dated February 21, 1942, shows that he carefully confirmed that he was registered as an Austrian. He probably did this to avoid being dealt with as an "enemy alien" due to the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 7, 1941. His naturalization certificate in 1944 also listed his former nationality as Austrian. See Leo Baeck Institute Archives (Box 4, Folder 11: 45; Box 4, Folder 13: 12, 29; see also Box 4, Folder 14: 48). Furthermore, in the form of the "Statement of Facts To Be Used by the Clerk of Court in Making and Filing My Petition for Naturalization," Schutz apparently wrote "White (Hebrew)" in the race column and did "Austrian" in the nationality column. See Leo Baeck Institute Archives (Box 4, Folder 14: 49).

[77] Janik and Toulmin (1973: 270–271) points out that, in contemporary America, one can watch a kind of replay of the linguistic and racial issues once found in the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

[78] This "world of yesterday" includes, for instance, the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which pursued the substantive equality of ethnonational groups. Their dismantling literally symbolized the beginning of the end of the "Cold Peace." It is true that they, as the previous empires of the same Central and Eastern Europe did, self-identified as multinational states. However, they did not succeed in fully instilling a unified *supra-ethnonational national identity* based on Marxism and proletarian internationalism; instead, they dissolved into nation-states, some of which plunged into violent wars with each other in the process or thereafter, as, for instance, Ukraine and Russia are currently (as of December 5, 2022) in all-out war especially since the invasion by the latter of the former in February 2022. See also Anderson's ([1983] 1991: Introduction) brief discussion in the early 1980s regarding the then ongoing situation of nationalism(s) in the East camp as well. But already immediately after World War I, Mises, born in 1881 in Lviv (*Lemberg* in German), a central city in Eastern Galicia belonging to Ukraine today, refers to the "extremely difficult Ukrainian problem" in his *Nation, State, and Economy* (Mises 1919: 20). The Ukrainian People's Republic, which had been founded in 1917 after the Russian Revolutions, united with the West Ukrainian People's Republic in January 1919, thereby unifying East and West Ukraine; but even after that, it continued to be invaded, interfered with, and rebelled against by multiple forces from both inside and outside its own territory (In the end, it was able to survive

yesterday.”[79] The heterogeneous Empire, where Schutz spent his childhood and youth, is then not a past special case, as it was often viewed in the age of the national society, but a preceding example that we can generally recall when thinking about our current living circumstances.

In fact, the present-day world is full of immigrants and refugees (i.e., diaspora in a wide sense) again, and the lifeworld is becoming increasingly diversified. Therefore, one should realize that *the real, concrete lifeworld given to an individual in the age of this world society, from the outset, is a heterogenous one: the multinational or cosmopolitan lifeworld*. There would also be many cases of the transboundary lifeworld. In correlation with such a reality, the multilingualization of the lifeworld is inevitably ongoing, too. It is not rare that teacher and immigrant pupils in school, for instance, do not share a common language, a key part of the foundation for transmitting social knowledge. Thus, how to get these pupils to learn the host country's language for their integration emerges as a challenge. Where conflicts between in-group and out-group or between dominant majority and subaltern minority groups are sharpened, some people in host countries who feel their lifeworld threatened carry on anti-immigration campaigns. Some politicians even foment this overtly by circulating racist

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only until 1920 and was ultimately divided and ruled by the Soviet Union, Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia). With the competition between the Ukrainian national idea and the idea of a Greater Russia particularly in mind, Mises offers an outlook about Ukrainian nationalism in the book as follows: “The Ukrainian movement in Galicia [since the days of the Austrian Empire] had then, the least considerably, promoted the separatist efforts of the Ukrainians [under the rule of the Russian Empire] in southern Russia, perhaps brought them into being in the first place. The recent political and social upheavals (*Umwälzungen*) have promoted Ukrainism in southern Russia so much that the possibility cannot be entirely excluded that it [Ukrainism] will no longer be overcome by Greater Russianism (*Großrussentum*). However, this is not an ethnographic [racial] or linguistic problem. It is not the degree of affinity (*Verwandtschaft*) between languages and races that will determine whether the Ukrainian or the Russian language will be the winner, but political, economic, confessional, and general cultural circumstances. And it is perhaps possible that the final decision in the former Austrian and Hungarian parts of Ukraine will turn out to be different from that in the long-time Russian parts” (Mises 1919: 21). The nature and status of Ukrainian nationalism or national identity cannot be further discussed in this paper, but what can be said with certainty about today's ethnic nationalism in the area is that the authoritarian president of the Russian Federation, who seems to have had a sense of relative deprivation since the collapse of the multinational communist empire, used the presence of ethnic Russian inhabitants or/and native Russian speakers in eastern and southern Ukraine as a pretext for a series of military outrages from 2014 onward. In July 2021, he further published an article claiming that Ukrainians and Russians are historically “one people” (один народ) (Putin 2021 = 2021). It was seven months later that that invasion began.

[79] For instance, Hobsbawm's following indication seems to clearly indicate a similarity between “the world of the day before yesterday” and the world of today. He says, “As it happened, the time when the democratization of politics made it essential to ‘educate our masters’, to ‘make Italians’, to turn ‘peasants into Frenchmen’ and attach all to nation and flag, was also the time when popular nationalist, or at all events xenophobic sentiments and those of national superiority preached by the new pseudo-science of racism, became easier to mobilize. For the period from 1880 to 1914 was also that of the greatest mass migrations yet known, within and between states, of imperialism and of growing international rivalries ending in world war. *All these underlined the differences between ‘us’ and ‘them’. And there is no more effective way of bonding together the disparate sections of restless peoples than to unite them against outsiders*” (Hobsbawm [1990] 1992: 94, emphasis added).

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messages tarred with misrepresentations and untruths. All this is quite familiar: open attacks on minorities have become a part of daily life again. At least, it is certain that we are living in an age of "We" and "They." The verse of Rudyard Kipling's that Schutz cites in "Equality" would sound more apt today:

> Father, Mother and me,
> Sister and Auntie say
> All the people like us are We
> And everyone else is They.
> And They live over the sea,
> While We live over the way.
> But – would you believe it? – They look upon We
> As only a sort of They![80]

More precisely said, both "We" and "They" are now living just "over the way" or even on the same side of the way, and the distinction between them is merely a posteriori, typifying distinction according to some particular relevances of the moment. To begin with, it is realistically improbable, though often assumed, that an individual has only one group membership determined by a single "objective(-scientific-seeming)" characteristic of theirs. Schutz before his exile would also have conceived of himself as being simultaneously Austrian, German, Viennese, and Jewish (and situationally have presented any of these identities).[81] As he says, "The most important element in the definition of the private situation is, however, *the fact that the individual finds himself always a member of numerous social groups*" (Schutz [1957] 1976: 253, emphasis added).

However, mere criticism of people animated by nationalism or racism as "prejudiced lowbrows" does not entail any cognitive discovery about their reality; it could not be called a social-scientific investigation. If the worse comes to the worst, it will sharpen the distinction between "We" and "They" and cause a *vicious circle*. In contrast, Schutz himself characterized prejudices as "elements of the interpretation of the social world and even one of the mainsprings that make it tick" (Schutz [1957] 1976: 262). These prejudices do not always lead to discriminations, which are predicated on a power differential among groups; furthermore, theoretically, one should recognize that all people living in this mundane social world necessarily have typifying prejudices, through which a particular reality selectively appears to each person. There is no individual with an unprejudiced, abstract, transcendental perspective, as if in a vacuum. This being so, Schutz conceived that practically speaking, diminishing social tensions derived from prejudices is a viable "educational goal," achievable "by a slow and patient modification of the system of relevances which those in power impose upon their fellow-men" (Schutz [1957] 1976: 262). The important thing here is that what should be modified in pursuit

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[80] As cited in Schutz ([1957] 1976: 243) from Kipling, R., "We and They," *Debits and Credits, Verse, Inclusive Edition*, copyright 1926 by Rudyard Kipling, reprinted on permission from Mrs. George Bambridge, London.

[81] See also Tsurumi (2020), who discusses the "internal international relationship" in such multiple identities of self, especially regarding (Russian) Jews in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

of this goal would primarily be the *majority's* system of relevances and typifications in society. Schutz says, "A system of relevances and typifications, as it exists at any historical moment, is itself a part of the social heritage and as such is handed down in the educational process *to the members of the in-group*" (Schutz [1957] 1976: 237, emphasis added).[82] That being so, the assumption of the old Enlightenment will be reversed: not minority individuals (i.e., the out-group's individuals) are pressed to become "abstract individuals without qualities" for assimilation; rather, the majority's taken-for-granted, often pseudoscientific relevances and typifications toward the minority must be changed (see also Schutz [1957] 1976: 260–261; Schutz [1946] 1976: 133–134).[83] *Those who should be enlightened (through education) are the majority, not the minority* (while minority individuals who hope to join the majority's civic lifeworld for self-realization would presumably chose to learn the majority's language in exchange).[84]

It may still be fresh in our minds that a particular "racial" minority was at times discriminated against due to being connected with the spread of the virus in the global crisis of COVID-19 (see Center for the Study of Hate and Extremism 2021).[85] A feeling of hatred against "They" is also capable of transmitting an "infection." However, one can maintain the hope that this type of "infection" is preventable through tenacious education, which works as a vaccine. In such a situation, one contribution that sociology can make to resolve social tensions between "We" and "They" would be to assist vaccine production through subjectivist investigations leading to the emancipation of the majority individuals from their own stereotypifications about "They." However, this is not to treat the "infected" members of the majority, or the "ill-informed citizens," as just another "They" and criticize them without hearing their voice. As suggested, such an "enlightenment from above," which can itself be based on a prejudiced, homogenizing typification, would bring about a reverse effect, in the form of a vicious circle. To begin with, the given fact that they are also living together in the same lifeworld, or in the same "spontaneous order" (Schutz [1955] 1982: 300–301), should not be overlooked. They, too, are concrete living persons, not an abstract type. Hence, Schutz himself seems to have thought that sociology's aim can be to *understand* the subjectivity of bigots as well: to investigate how the world appears to them and why it appears so to them now, with their whole lives in mind (see Tada [2018] 2019; Tada 2020b). Sociological experts, as

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[82] Relatedly, see also Barber (2004: 4), in which Schutz's positive evaluation of (national) citizen's education in American schools is cited. In this connection, see also Hirschhausen (2009: 552–557).

[83] Schutz ([1957] 1976: 260–261) cites the following impressive passage from Gunnar Myrdal's *An American Dilemma*: "It keeps coming to me that this is more a white man's problem than it is a Negro problem … The real problem is not the Negro but the white man's attitude toward the negro" (Myrdal [1994] 1996: 43). Note that the former sentence in this quotation seems to be written by Ray Stannard Baker and the latter is a remark by Thomas P. Bailey, although Schutz himself does not mention this information.

[84] As for enlightening the majority, see also the redefinition of enlightenment as sociological enlightenment by Tada (2020b).

[85] Although not directly related to the corona crisis, the murder of George Floyd in May 2020 in the United States might also be recalled here as a racist incident that occurred during that period. In any case, we already know that the increase in excess death of racial or ethnic minorities was much greater than those of the majority during the pandemic in the United States.

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"disinterested [scientific] observer[s] of the social world" (Schutz [1953] 1982: 36; see also Schutz [1945] 1982: 245–259; Schütz 1932: 274–275), thus, without simply demonizing them, elucidate their motives (and, perhaps, their anxiety or sense of relative deprivation as well). Here could lie a clue toward solving the issue of social division, avoiding a vicious circle. In this light, I will end by quoting from Schutz a kind of mission statement, which sociologists in this globalized, turbulent century should also take seriously.

> But then—and that is an important point—this reference to the subjective point of view always *can* be performed and should be performed. As the social world under any aspect whatsoever remains a very complicated cosmos of human activities, we can always go back to the "forgotten man" of the social sciences, to the actor in the social world whose doing and feeling lies at the bottom of the whole system. We, then, try to understand him in that doing and feeling and the state of mind which induced him to adopt specific attitudes towards his social environment. (Schutz [1960] 1976: 6–7, emphasis original)

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