@article{oai:kumadai.repo.nii.ac.jp:00027864,
 author = {田口, 周平 and 田口, 周平 and Taguchi, Shuhei},
 journal = {International Journal of Social and Cultural Studies},
 month = {Mar},
 note = {application/pdf, 論文(Article), Motive Internalism, in meta-ethics, is the position that if an agent sincerely makes moral judgments, the judgments are purely belief and themselves motivate the agent to take the necessary actions. As neuroscience concerning moral judgments advances, we are permitted to consider this meta-ethical topic with empirical facts. Cases of patients who have damage to the ventro-medial frontal area of the brain, are just one example, and some argue that these cases disprove Motive Internalism. However, this argument is found to be based on misinterpretations of Motive Internalism and in this paper I will offer the proper interpretation by considering the "inverted-commas" use of moral judgments. I will argue the interpretations of the neural basis of Motive Internalism.},
 pages = {77--85},
 title = {Motive Internalism in Neuroethics},
 volume = {1},
 year = {2008},
 yomi = {タグチ, シュウヘイ}
}